

*by*DIANA SPEARMAN



JONATHAN CAPE
THIRTY BEDFORD SQUARE
LONDON

# FIRST PUBLISHED 1939

JONATHAN CAPE LTD. 30 BEDFORD SQUARE, LONDON AND 91 WELLINGTON STREET WEST, TORONTO

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN IN THE CITY OF OXFORD
AT THE ALDEN PRESS

PAPER MADE BY JOHN DICKINSON & CO. LTD.

BOUND BY A. W. BAIN & CO. LTD.

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# ACKNOWLEDGMENT

My most grateful thanks are due to Professor Lionel Robbins, without whose help this book would have been even more unreadable than it is.

I must also thank Professor Ginsberg for the help he gave me with the chapter dealing with psychology, Professor Gibb, from whose lectures I learnt anything I know of Islamic political ideas and last, but not least, my old friend Maurice Newfield.

1939

DIANA SPEARMAN.

THE most striking of modern political developments is the revival of autocracy in Europe. This revival has the most serious implications both in theory and practice. If, as the Fascists predict, dictatorship spreads over the whole of Europe, the life of every individual will be affected. The enthusiasm which Fascism undoubtedly inspires makes it necessary to revise many accepted ideas on political psychology and political theory. It appears, for example, as if liberty has far less attraction and authoritarian government far more than has been usually supposed.

To some this movement appears as an unmitigated disaster, the prelude to the destruction of civilization; to others as a means of salvation, not only political but moral. Views as different are held as to the causes of dictatorship. The historic materialists have put it down as a manifestation of the class struggle. Other observers regard it as the result of 'international anarchy'.1 Fascists explain it as arising from the failure of democracy to deal successfully with modern economic and political developments. None of these theories seems to cover all the countries concerned. For example, the theory of class struggle fails entirely to interpret the situation in Poland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Equally, the mere fact of 'international anarchy' does not explain why dictatorship should have appeared in some countries and not in others. The Fascist idea that modern developments inevitably lead to Fascism neglects the fact that the only country ruled by a dictator which can be described as typically modern is Germany.

An examination of the dictatorships shows that autocracy has been imposed in different countries for different reasons.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> LORD LOTHIAN, in the Contemporary Review, October 1933.

All these governments have, however, certain characteristics in common. Illegality, personal rule, the violent enthusiasm of at least a section of the people, an exaltation of the State and a depreciation of the value of individuality, together with a worship of the personality of the dictator, invariably accompany modern autocracy.

By illegality more is implied than the question of whether or not the dictator has kept within the letter of the law. The theory of modern autocracy is a reversal of the attitude to law dominant in Europe since the Roman Empire, and a return to the Platonic idea of the inadequacy of written codes. In practice the revolt is shown by the habit of leaving large powers to the central and local government to issue decrees which are never codified as laws, and by the fact that the dictatorships are the only European governments since the tyrants of fourteenth-century Italy which have been unconcerned with the legal basis of their right to rule.

In theory the movement has taken a variety of forms, of which examples are the defence of violence in Fascist literature, the Bolshevist idea of law as a weapon in the class struggle, and the National-Socialist theory of law as an expression of the 'folk' mind. The Bolshevist code definitely lays down that different classes shall be judged differently; not in the sense common to many medieval codes that different classes have different rights and duties, but in the sense that there can be no law unrelated to the economic circumstances of the individual. The Germans have a somewhat similar conception of law as a function of race and of its chief purpose as the defence of the nation regardless of 'abstract' ideas of justice. These ideas are the negation of law in the ordinary sense.

Associated with the distrust of law is the personal ruler. Modern autocracy has assumed the extreme form of authoritarian government, that of the centralization of government in the hands of a single man. How far in practice the dictator

actually exercises the powers attributed to him it is not possible to say, but in theory he is absolute, and he is restrained by no legal or constitutional rules.

The dictatorship is supported or accompanied by violent enthusiasm. There can be no doubt that this emotion is genuinely felt by the members of the dictator's own party, who, it must be remembered, in some cases number millions. The dictators claim, probably with truth, that the majority of citizens support their rule.

These characteristics appear to some extent in all dictatorships; Italy, Germany and Russia exhibit them all in their most extreme form.

This revival of autocracy is the very last development which was expected by political thinkers. Before the War, and even after it, it was almost universally accepted that democracy was the only possible system of government in the modern world and that all autocratic governments would eventually be superseded by democracy. The value as well as the inevitability of democracy was generally admitted, but even anti-democrats foresaw no limit to the spread of popular government.

It is clear that it is impossible to account for such a complete reversal of a previous tendency by any one simple explanation. Still less can it be explained as pure neurosis or perversion. Whatever one's own preferences are in forms of government, it is necessary to remember that violent changes do not occur without any reason. The very fact that autocracy has reappeared in so many countries seems to indicate that for some purposes and in some circumstances it has certain advantages. This idea is strengthened by the frequent appearance of autocracy in human history. Although never found in the most primitive societies, above the lowest level it occurs in all stages of civilization. In European political theories there has always been a large body of what may be called rational defence of autocracy, quite apart from the theories of loyalty to a particular

dynasty. These facts appear to show that autocracy, no less than democracy, has a psychological basis; that it can appeal to certain emotions as a thing in itself, apart from arguments as to what it can do; and also that it has a certain use as an administrative expedient.

A less important but still considerable element in the success of the dictators is the appeal they were able to make to familiar ideas. During the nineteenth century a large number of doctrines appeared which, though they were drawn from very different sources and inspired by very different ideals, all tended to destroy the moral hold of democracy. Marx, Sorel, and Nietzsche, William James and Bergson all contributed to the intellectual atmosphere which developed Fascism, Bolshevism and National Socialism.

These three factors not only differ in importance, but differ also as to the section of the population which they influence. The basis of dictatorship seems to be its administrative advantages in a time of crisis. This administrative efficiency induces those who are directly concerned with politics to elevate one of their number, they frequently believe for a short time only, to supreme power. The emotional loyalty which a personal ruler can attract enables dictatorship to be continued even after the crisis is past. Loyalty is an emotion chiefly felt by those who are farthest removed from power themselves.

The influence of ideas seems to be subsidiary, and to be important chiefly in preparing the minds of the type of young men who will form the dictator's party.

The revival of autocracy therefore contains two problems: the problem, essentially political, of the seizure of power, and the sociological problem of the change in public opinion which sanctioned its seizure. It is with these problems that this book is concerned.

#### CHAPTER I

# THE RISE OF DICTATORS

ALL dictatorships have certain common characteristics; indeed, the very fact that some governments can be grouped together as dictatorships shows their similarity. But modern dictatorships also differ widely among themselves. They can be roughly divided into three groups: First, the totalitarian dictatorships of Germany, Italy, and Russia. The characteristics of totalitarian dictatorship are: a single party, with a prohibition of all other forms of political organization, an exaltation of the leader of the party as an autocratic ruler, and a determination to subordinate every aspect of national life to the State, or rather to the creed of the ruling party embodied in the State.

There are, secondly, the Catholic dictatorships. In Portugal, for example, the government is definitely based on Catholic ideas. In a sense, this kind of dictatorship might also be described as totalitarian in that the range of Catholic practice and ideas does extend far beyond the merely political. But it is not totalitarian in the sense that every activity is subordinated to the State. On the contrary, the State itself acknowledges the existence of a moral authority, superior to itself.

Thirdly, there are dictatorships which may be called political dictatorships. Although organized under a personal ruler, they are merely attempts to deal with a political crisis and are not designed to produce a social and cultural revolution. This is reflected in the fact that the dictator's party only plays a very minor role and that the dictatorship is not based on any elaborate creed. The dictatorship of Pilsudski in Poland and

of King Alexander in Yugoslavia was of this type. Whereas the dictators of the totalitarian states are simply the leaders of the victorious parties, in both Poland and Yugoslavia the dictator had a special claim to the allegiance of the whole country before he seized the government. In Poland the dictator was the hero of the World War and of the war with Russia; in Yugoslavia he was the king, with all the special claims to loyalty which kingship gives.

The dictatorship in Turkey cannot be exactly included in any of these groups. While clearly totalitarian in the sense that it does aim at a complete social transformation, its object is supposed to be the establishment of democracy, and although the political structure is authoritarian it does not seek to dominate every aspect of life.

All these dictatorships are attempts to deal with a crisis. In modern Europe dictatorship has arisen out of three kinds of crises - the dissolution of long-established autocracies, the failure of democracy in the new countries created by the Peace Treaties, and the quite different failure of democracy in Germany and Italy. There is a certain similarity between the situations in the countries in each group, but it must be remembered that it is similarity merely and not identity. Even with this limitation it might be thought that all the countries faced with a certain type of crisis would have adopted roughly the same type of dictatorship. But this is clearly not true. Russia, Turkey, Portugal and Spain were all involved in the problems of finding a substitute for a government which had collapsed, (though in Portugal the government was democratic and, in the other countries, autocratic), and of modernizing a backward country. Russia adopted a totalitarian dictatorship with a rigid Utopian creed, and Turkey a personal military dictatorship, Portugal a Catholic dictatorship, and Spain, having tried a military dictatorship, has so far failed to find any solution to the problem at all.

There seem to be three chief factors which influence in different degrees the evolution of different kinds of dictatorship—the kind of crisis, the kind of dictator and the national tradition. It is clear that the nature of the preceding crisis does profoundly influence the type of dictatorship finally evolved. For example, the Russian and Turkish autocracies were bound up with the religious institutions and their fall brought about a complete religious and social transformation, while the failure of democracy in Poland was simply the failure of an unfamiliar machinery of government. In the former case, reconstruction was necessarily much more fundamental than in the latter.

The type of dictator also deeply influences the dictatorship, both because dictatorship is a personal form of government and must be adapted to the idiosyncrasies of the ruler and because the government will be modified according to the sources from which the dictator actually draws his power. In modern Europe there are two possible sources of power, a political party and a professional army. It is clear that the National Socialist régime in Germany is moulded by the personality of Hitler and by the fact that he is the leader of a party, in contrast to Pilsudski and Kemal, the commanders of an army.

Which type of dictatorship appears in any country depends both on the nature of the crisis and on the national background. Russia, Turkey, Spain and Portugal were all faced with the problem of the decay of the political system, partly under external pressure and partly under the weight of its own inefficiency. This political problem was complicated by the backwardness of the country compared with the more advanced nations of Western Europe.

This backwardness has two aspects: first, the purely practical, the weakness of the country in the face of any kind of aggression; and secondly, less obvious but equally important,

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that ideas spread from the more advanced countries and are embraced with fervour, yet lack the essential support of suitable conditions. For example, the democratic idea was developed in countries where conditions favoured its successful working, but exported to countries where none of these conditions was present. In those countries in which modern industrial civilization was invented, ideas, technical inventions and social changes developed together. Even here industrialism has produced serious problems, but its impact on the countries where it was merely adopted, instead of invented, was much more disruptive. The technical efficiency of the west, especially in war, demonstrated most convincingly the inferiority of the native culture. The prestige which this technical superiority gave ensured that western ideas should be accepted by large sections of the population; in some instances they were adopted as a means of becoming as powerful as the more advanced nations, notably in Turkey; in other cases they seemed merely a more finished variation of native ideas, as, for example, Communism in Russia. Such theories as democracy or Socialism seemed also to lead to direct benefits for large groups and classes. The native culture was not only relatively but absolutely declining; these countries were falling from the level they had previously reached. At least, this was clearly the case in Portugal, Spain and Turkey, which had all been at one time pre-eminently powerful and successful states. Portugal and Spain had a native culture of the utmost splendour, and, if Turkey had not achieved so much in the cultural sphere, Turkish government and administration in the seventeenth century was in many ways more advanced than that of Europe. If some citizens grasped almost too eagerly at modern ideas and methods, others still clung to the established ways. This division made reconstruction even more difficult as there would clearly be immense difficulty in obtaining any agreement. The more highly developed and complex the

original culture, the more violent would be the struggle, as can be clearly seen in Spain.

From the administrative point of view the decline in standards is still clearer. The government in Turkey and Portugal was totally inefficient in every sense; weak, corrupt and incapable of performing its most elementary functions. In Spain and Russia, the actual administration was not so bad, but here, too, the government was clearly incapable of dealing with the serious problems which confronted it.

From the political point of view, the situation was similar in all these countries, but the historical background and the social conditions were, of course, very different, and while it was the decay of the political system which gave dictatorship a chance to establish itself, it was the general background which decided what kind of dictatorship should emerge.

Russia, during the nineteenth century, presented the curious spectacle of a country successful in her foreign relations and unsuccessful in her home affairs. She acquired, between 1860 and 1900, vast territories in Central Asia, and, in spite of defeat in the Japanese War, the majority of Russian statesmen were still dreaming of expansion in Turkey and of establishing a predominant influence in the Balkans. During the whole period the internal situation grew steadily worse. The Tsarist government was rapidly losing its psychological hold over the minds of its subjects and social and economic conditions were producing a revolutionary spirit in large numbers of the population.

The Liberal revolution of March 1917, which made the Communist revolution possible, was produced by this political aspect of the Russian problem. It is a condition for the success of Communism, as for the success of any other revolutionary creed, to destroy the practical and theoretical foundations of the existing system. This is exactly where the Communists have failed in other countries. In Russia the preliminary work was done for them by the growth of ideas

hostile to autocracy. By 1914 there was a general sentiment among the educated classes against autocracy as such; it is probable that it was shared by the industrial workers, although for different reasons. There were, of course, numerous groups which were quite unaffected by democratic theories; in fact the peasants, the vast majority of the Russian people, were probably quite prepared to accept an autocracy as long as its policy suited them. But they were antagonized by the government's attitude to the agrarian problem. As Count Witte said: 'The people's dream is an autocratic Tsar, but a people's Tsar.' The agrarian question was the fundamental problem of Russia. The emancipation of the serfs had not created a contented peasantry. Although he had been bound to the soil, the Russian peasant had always considered that the soil was also bound to him. He never recognized the right of the landlords to retain any part of the land or to receive any compensation for the land surrendered to the peasants. The extreme poverty of most of the peasants naturally intensified these feelings. Miserable as the condition of the serfs undoubtedly was, they had been, to some extent, sheltered from the ordinary effects of economic forces. After the emancipation, a considerable number of serfs found, as did a considerable number of freed negro slaves in the United States, that there were disadvantages to freedom. The majority of peasants were miserably poor. It was calculated that, in one district, the peasant family on the average holding would have an annual income of 134 roubles and an annual expenditure of 159.70 roubles, and that the Zemstvo (local government) fines would bring the deficit up to 60 roubles. The peasant naturally attributed his misery to the lack of land. It is said that the peasant allotments were too small, they were smaller than the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> M. T. FLORINSKY, *The End of the Russian Empire*, in the series Economic and Social History of the World War: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Oxford University Press.

average French holding and Russian agricultural methods were much more primitive than the French. In Poland, where the Russian Government had wished to weaken the power of the landlords, and therefore given more land to the peasants, they were certainly less poor than in Russia. Better methods of cultivation were clearly a necessity, with or without the breakup of large estates. Stolypin attempted to reform agriculture by splitting up the village commune and creating a class of individual peasant proprietors. The first effect of his policy, however, was to aggravate the problem by increasing the number of landless peasants. These were known in Russia as 'poor' peasants; the poor peasant was described by Mavor as feeling at once the 'need for land and the impossibility of renting it. This is the class for whom schemes of purchase through the state bank have practically no interest, and for whom any scheme, involuntary or otherwise, which will give land without the necessity of redemption payments, offers invincible attractions."1

There was a continual agitation among the peasants for the division of the landlords' estates. Partly it arose naturally, but it was encouraged and in part formulated by intensive socialist propaganda.

The emancipation also estranged the country gentlemen, and a large part of the aristocracy, from the Throne. It separated the country gentlemen from the country and, in many cases, ruined them. Transplanted to the towns, many of the smaller landowners or their children became revolutionaries and terrorists. Even those who were not socialists before the Revolution had very little to lose. The poverty of country gentlemen, officers and priests in Russia was certainly a factor in the Revolution. Even those who kept their estates were not enthusiastic supporters of the Tsar. The larger landowners particularly were dreaming of political power in exchange for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> MAVOR, The Economic History of Russia. London, Dent, 1910.

the loss of their serfs, and looked with envy at the position of the landowners in Germany.

To the agrarian problem were added the complications of industry. With the growth of industry, an urban working class appeared. The policy of the artificial development of industry, initiated by Count Witte, involved a continual rise in the cost of living, and, therefore, real wages were lower than they need have been. Capitalism in Russia inherited the traditions and methods of the serf factories. It was, for example, apparently common for foremen to strike the workmen. The relations between capital and labour were further embittered by the fact that many of the owners, and still more of the managers, were foreigners, and the strong nationalist feelings of the Russian workers were enlisted on the side of Socialism. It must also be remembered that the whole system was permeated with corruption, cruelty and inefficiency.

By 1914 there was a general agreement that the existing system in Russia was intolerable and must be altered. Even the Conservatives desired a minor change, which was to consist in the abolition of those slight elements of liberalism which had been incorporated in the State.

The situation in Turkey was, from the political point of view, very similar. Here, too, an autocracy, based on religion, had been undermined by the spread of European ideas. Here, too, the State was an empire, including many nationalities whose only bond was the person of the Sovereign. Turkey was also in every respect a backward country, far more so than Russia. In Russia, science, literature and art were as highly developed as in any country in Europe, while in no single sphere, except that of the army, did Turkish institutions approximate to the European level. Superficially, at least, Turkey was in a far worse position than Russia. In foreign affairs, Russia was, up to 1914, successful, while Turkey was only saved from partition by the protection, first of Great

Britain, and then of Germany. Few countries can have reached the state of collapse, military, financial and psychological, which Turkey reached in 1918 and survived. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Great War was only the culminating incident in its long retreat before Europe. In the West, the Turkish Empire had been destroyed by the revolt of the European provinces and their formation into national states; in the East it was menaced by Russia's spread westward, which the Tsarist statesmen had decided should end in the occupation of Constantinople. Turkey was not only defeated herself, she belonged to a defeated continent and a defeated religion. Asia and Islam seemed to be doomed to subjection by Europe and Christianity.

Internally also, Turkey was hopelessly poor and incompetent. The majority of the inhabitants of Asia Minor were illiterate peasants, who tilled their land by the most primitive methods. There was practically no industry, and such trade as existed was in the hands of the Armenians and the Greeks. There were neither railways nor roads; disease and poverty were everywhere. The government was both weak and tyrannical. There were, however, elements of strength concealed in this catalogue of misfortunes; the very simplicity of the social structure meant that there were no intractable problems. If once an energetic government gained control there would be no opposition, and very few real difficulties. But energetic government was exactly what Turkey appeared incompetent to produce.

The dictatorship in Portugal replaced a democratic, or a nominally democratic, not an autocratic government. But fundamentally the situation was much nearer to that in Russia and Turkey than to that in Italy or Germany. Portugal has never been able to find a satisfactory substitute for absolute monarchy, though her energies have been largely absorbed by the political problem since the beginning of the nineteenth

century. The Portuguese monarchy had been declining in power and efficiency even before the French Revolution, and the ideas which the revolution let loose affected Portugal, as they did every European country. But if the Peninsular War had not violently disturbed the whole social life of Portugal, it seems unlikely that the attempt to establish a constitution would have been made so early. Although Portugal was at first sympathetic to the French Revolution, revolutionary ideas did not penetrate further than the educated classes until late in the nineteenth century, and the educated classes were very small in number, consisting of the large land owners, the officials and the middle class. Of these, when the first idealistic fervour had passed, only the middle class remained attracted by democratic ideas. The majority of the population were peasants, miserably poor, illiterate and interested only in their own village affairs. They were still, in spite of the recent expulsion of the Jesuits, almost completely under the influence of the priests. The working class of Lisbon was always antidemocratic; the revolutions they started were revolutions in favour of absolute government. Their attitude to the government was partly personal loyalty to the monarchy, partly religious loyalty to the Catholic Church, and partly a desire to defend the charitable institutions of that Church, from which they largely benefited.

In these circumstances, it seems unlikely that revolutionary ideas would have spread quickly or that the sympathy of the intellectuals would have resulted in anything but administrative reforms, but for the general upheaval caused by the Napoleonic Wars. The result of these wars in the internal affairs of Portugal was first to awaken interest in politics in every class in the country; even the peasants could not remain indifferent to the French occupation. Secondly, Liberalism became identified with the French and Conservatism with the English interest. This division made compromise or concession all the more

difficult as each side regarded the other as traitors and also greatly embittered the political struggle. Thirdly, the events of these years prevented the growth of a really national liberal movement; the democratic party was modelled chiefly on French, slightly on English, liberalism and pursued policies totally unsuited to the actual situation in Portugal.

The constitutional monarchy, which was finally established after the civil wars of the nineteenth century, failed entirely to solve, or even to try to solve, Portugal's problems. The peasants remained poor, oppressed and inarticulate, so inarticulate that no one bothered to consider them. The people, to a Portuguese politician, meant the mob of Lisbon. The kings were incompetent and for many years made no attempt to interfere in politics. The country was governed alternately by two parties, the 'Regenerators' and the 'Liberals'. By an arrangement similar to that in Spain, each party was given a chance, not so much to govern, as to draw a cabinet minister's salary, every few years. The retiring Ministers were appointed by the new government to positions such as that of Director of the Agricultural Bank, which enabled them to live while in opposition. This process, known as 'Rotatavosism', failed to produce one tolerable government in fifty years.

The republic failed as completely as did the monarchy. There were forty governments in the years from 1910 to 1926 and seventeen attempts at revolutions. The republic governments combined all the disadvantages of dictatorship with an inefficiency in administration unparalleled in the modern world. After the revolution of 1910 the government were completely unable to control it own supporters, and cruelties as bad, though certainly no worse, than the cruelties of the absolute monarchy, took place. There was complete incompetence and corruption in all the government departments. Three out of four of the population were illiterate in 1926. The Report of the English Board of Overseas Trade for 1924

says that the roads had been allowed to get into such a state that in many places they were beyond repair. The state railways were also in an advanced state of decay.

Although Portugal is a very fertile country, the standard of living of the peasants is probably the lowest in Europe. Methods of cultivation are extremely primitive; for example, the rotation of crops has been adopted only in very few places. The peasants take practically no interest in politics. In Lisbon itself there was a Socialist movement, whose adherents expressed themselves chiefly by throwing bombs. It is true that these bombs often failed to explode as they were generally of home manufacture. But even when damage was done, the criminals were seldom arrested and hardly ever convicted, because the police and the jury were afraid of being assassinated in revenge.

But perhaps the most striking proof of the failure of government was the state of the national finances. The budget had not been balanced since 1914. In 1923 the government gave up any attempt to draw up or present a yearly budget and from this date subsisted on monthly budgets. The budget deficit averaged four millions yearly. Up to 1924 the Bank of Portugal simply issued notes to cover the deficit through the Treasury and the Caxia General des Depositos.

At first sight it seems difficult to understand how this system could have continued. But the government had evolved an ingenious system by which they were enabled to tap the capital resources of the country. The Caxia General des Depositos was an institution originally founded to encourage saving. It received deposits from all classes of the community and all deposits were guaranteed by the State. It attracted money from the Joint Stock Banks because it paid interest on deposits. The commercial banks were themselves in the habit of keeping money there. The funds thus acquired were used chiefly to finance the government. Portugal was, in any case, short of

capital and this arrangement conducted to the government any liquid capital the country did possess.

The government was anti-clerical and not without reason. The Church in Portugal has played the same part as it played in Spain, except that it has been more obscurantist. The separation of Church and State was, no doubt, a sensible move, but it was useless to expel religious orders unless the government had something to put in their place. The education provided by the Church was bad and its charity capricious, but, as Portugal had no educational system and a system of poor relief on paper only, the Church was at least better than nothing. The peasants also had remained Catholic and, although they were too passive to show any resentment at the government's measures, these deepened the gulf between the town and the country.

It was clear, even before the War, that a crisis was approaching in the affairs of all these countries, and that some kind of reconstruction was essential. The only possible basis of such a reconstruction was a revival of the original religious ideas or a complete break with the past. Portugal alone attempted to solve the problem by a return to traditional ideas. The dictatorship in Portugal is based on Catholic principles and Catholic doctrines. The same experiment was tried in Austria, but the Catholic corporate state was unable to withstand the onrush of German nationalism. The weakness of both Catholic dictatorships lies in the fact that, in both, the dictatorship was entirely imposed from above and had no popular support of any kind. In the party dictatorships of Italy, Germany and Russia the dictator had, through his party, secured a basis for mass support before the revolution. In the personal dictatorships of Poland and Turkey the dictator was already a national hero. But in Portugal the army, when it seized power, appeared to have no political creed, and Salazaar was quite unknown to the general public. On the other hand,

there existed in Portugal no other possible basis for a national revival than Catholicism. The fanatical brand of modern nationalism seems to require very different conditions. Either the country must be in actual danger, danger that can be appreciated by everyone, or else it must appear that great gains can be won by a nationalist dictator. Neither of these conditions was present in Portugal. The Portuguese colonies might be threatened, but no one contemplated the conquest of Portugal herself. The majority of the population took too little interest in politics to be excited to passionate enthusiasm by nationalist doctrines; equally, there was no real basis for socialism. The industrial workers of Lisbon were not sufficiently capable to seize the power or to organize the government even if they had done so. There was nothing in any Socialist theory to attract the peasants. Catholic doctrine was, perhaps, the one idea which was both familiar enough to be understood and idealistic enough to be inspiring to people whose lives are so hard and so limited as those of the Portuguese peasants.

Such a solution in Russia was clearly impossible. It had, it is true, been preached by the 'Slavophil' school, but the doctrines of the Orthodox Church did not really possess sufficient hold over the minds of the people to form a basis for any government. A mere return to the past, even to an idealized version of the past, offered nothing to any group in Russia, except possibly to a few intellectuals. The Orthodox Church had never been a school of either saintliness or statesmanship. The vast majority of the population, the peasants, were deeply dissatisfied with the existing social structure, and, what is more, saw an immediate advantage for themselves in revolution. The Communist Party appeared to be the only party which would give them what they wanted, immediate peace and the land. Communist doctrines, also, were far from unsympathetic to The Russian peasant had never acquired the individualist psychology of the peasants of Western Europe.

The vast majority of Russians were living, not only in the preindustrial era, but also in a collectivist economic system. For the Russian peasant there existed no private property in land - far the most important form of property known to the peasants. 'The sacred right of private property, so passionately defended since the Revolution by Russian opponents of Socialism, was until 1906 nearly an empty sound for the masses of the Russian people.'1 After the emancipation of the peasants in 1861 the land distributed to the peasants was still regarded as belonging to the landowner, although it was to be held for the benefit of the peasants. In fact, the peasants bought this land with the help of the government, but the purchaser was the peasant commune, not the individual peasant. The commune was collectively responsible for the money borrowed from the government, and distributed the land to its members. The distribution was governed by the idea of complete equality, calculated either on the number of the family or on its working power. This principle involved redistribution every few years to adjust the amount of land to changes in the family, and strip cultivation to ensure that no one should have a worse or better allotment. The system prevented the growth of any sentiment of ownership. What the peasant felt was not a right to any particular piece of land, but a right in all the land.

Twenty-five million out of the total number of Russian peasants lived in communes. This attitude to property was associated with a curious anti-individualism. The peasant sense of equality showed itself in a jealousy of individual action and a dislike of prominent individuals.<sup>2</sup> This seems to be the psychological basis of the Bolshevist campaign against the kulaks. The rule which required unanimity in any decision of the commune worked against the appearance of peasant leaders, and the redistribution of land tended to make

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> FLORINSKY, The End of the Russian Empire. <sup>2</sup> Ibid

economic differences at least less sharp. 'The purpose of redistribution was primarily to give equal shares.' 'The Russian peasant has a passionate desire to level everyone, to bring everyone down to one standard of living.' The psychology of the peasant was obviously fertile ground for Communist propaganda, and in fact the existence of the peasant commune was incompatible with the other economic institutions of Russia. It could not be reconciled, either, with the ordinary property rights in land possessed by the non-peasant classes, or with the development of economic individualism implied in the growth of industry.

The tendency of the commune to encourage equalitarianism was reinforced by religious ideas. Contrary to general opinion, religion in Russia tended to produce equalitarian social theories. This can be seen by the frequency with which heretic sects, such as the Dukhobors, developed political theories. As Paléologue<sup>3</sup> pointed out, the peasants' sincere but extremely primitive conception of Christianity predisposed them to accept Socialism. The social theories of early Christianity had, after all, a definitely communist tinge, and there is a certain likeness between the labour theory of value and religious social ideas, which can also be seen in the Christian Communist sects of the English Civil Wars.

The commune not only produced a peculiar outlook in the peasants, but also deepened the gulf between the different classes in Russia. Perhaps in no other country and in no other period has there been so deep a psychological difference between different classes as there was in Russia. The peasants and the middle class lived in totally different worlds. It was not only the peasants' lack of education that separated them, but also the fact that they lived in entirely different economic

3 An Ambassador's Memoirs.

<sup>1</sup> FLORINSKY, The End of the Russian Empire.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> STOLYPIN, quoted in CHAMBERLAIN'S History of the Russian Revolution.

and legal systems. This gulf between the workers and peasants, on the one hand, and all the other classes, was noticed by all observers in pre-war Russia and had an important influence on the course of the Revolution. Both the peasants and the soldiers showed a hatred and distrust of the upper classes which cannot be explained only by previous oppression; even officers who had been popular were killed, and it is a commonplace that it was often the most public-spirited landowners who were murdered. The peasants distrusted not only all high officials, landowners and bourgeois, but also minor local officials, such as the village schoolmasters, who were often themselves socialist, and even all educated people, no matter of what class.

In Poland, where this gulf was not nearly so wide and where all classes were bound together by the idea of Polish independence, the Revolution took a very different course. Though the institution of serfdom was legally as harsh there as in Russia, it had not been, at least since the beginning of the eighteenth century, so much abused. There were no peasants' revolts in Poland, except in Galicia during the Nationalist revolt of 1863, a revolt encouraged and financed by the Austrian Government.

This estrangement between the lowest classes and the remainder in Russia is illustrated on the other side by the complete lack of understanding of the peasants' and workers' point of view which was shown by the governing classes. Russia is in strong contrast to Turkey. The Turkish peasant was certainly oppressed by everyone with whom he came in contact, and the course of the War was very similar in Turkey and Russia; but the Turkish peasant, in spite of numerous desertions from the army at the end of the War, did finally fight for the preservation of the old system.

That the peasants' attitude to property was important in deciding the course of the Revolution can be seen when it is remembered that in Poland, Finland and Lithuania, where the

commune had never existed, the peasant movement adopted a very different policy, even after the withdrawal of the German troops. In Finland and Lithuania, the peasants took the land, but they created an ordinary system of peasant proprietorship and were extremely hostile to Bolshevism. In Poland, although the programmes of the peasant parties in modern Poland show that the peasants want to divide up the land, they made no attempt to seize it for themselves during the revolutionary wars and there were no instances of the murders of landlords so common in Russia.

The influence of this atmosphere was not limited to agriculture. Owing to the recent growth of industry, most of the industrial workers were born and educated in peasant homes, and even up to the War large numbers of them were temporary workers who returned to their native villages for the harvest and looked forward to ending their days there. The propaganda which explained how industry could be managed in the same way as the land was managed at home, with the profits going to the workers instead of the owners, must have been extremely congenial to these factory hands. The behaviour of the factory committees after the Revolution, when they insisted on taking over the management of many factories, even against the orders of the Bolshevist Government, suggests that they did conceive of industry as something which could be divided up as easily as land.

The immediate disaster of the War accentuated all these tendencies and destroyed or weakened those other factors in Russian life which worked against revolution. The background of events from July to October 1917 was final and hopeless defeat; the German army was approaching nearer and nearer to Petrograd. The Germans commanded the Gulf of Finland; the Kaiser entered Riga on September 8th. The Russian Empire was falling apart; Finland, Poland, the Ukraine and the Caucasus proclaimed their independence. Economic

conditions were fearful; there was no food, no fuel and no hospital supplies. The Bolshevists, thanks to Lenin, were in a position to take advantage of the situation. In the pre-war struggles of the Communist Party, Lenin had always stood for two things: for the formation of a coherent political philosophy - or, as he put it, profound scientific knowledge - and for the organization of a body of trained 'Revolutionists'.1 The advantage of 'profound scientific knowledge' does not rest in the truth of its matter or in the science of its methods, but in the fact that a rigid creed disciplines a party and holds it together. Marxism, of all creeds so far enunciated, is in this way the most effective, because it provides both a guide through the chaos of social phenomena, thus facilitating action, and a rule to regulate the action itself. The uncompromising and ruthless character of Communist doctrine, in a country where the other parties are equally ruthless and better armed, has frequently led the Communist parties to disaster. Twice in Germany has strict adherence to communist maxims produced the defeat of the Communist Party. But in Russia, where the Bolshevists were the only party who knew what they wanted or how they proposed to get it, this rigid theoretical basis was one of the causes of their success.

The conception of a band of professional revolutionists arises partly from the necessity for a correct theoretical background. In no country, above all not in Russia, is it conceivable that many of the working class should concern themselves with the Marxian dialectic. The basis of a science of revolution is, therefore, a band of men capable of working out general plans in accordance with the Marxian dialectic. This body is a small, select organization which 'will compare leaflets, work out approximate plans and appoint bodies of leaders for each town and district, each factory district and each educational district'.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> LENIN, 'What is to be done?' *Iskra Period*, collected works (Martin Lawrence).
<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

Although the Bolshevist leaders had been exiled, the nucleus of a Communist Party, on the basis described above, existed in Russia. Fortunately for the Bolshevists, the Communist Party had been illegal in Russia and, therefore, they were not hampered by a large, undisciplined, democratic party. Directly the Revolution allowed them to return to Russia, Lenin and Trotsky were able to address themselves immediately to the task of rousing public opinion against the Liberal government.

The Bolshevist victory may be ascribed to two things: first, to the fact that they themselves knew what they wanted, and secondly, to the superior attraction of the Bolshevist idea. The White Armies were hampered by the prevailing uncertainty, which seems to have affected even themselves, as to what they were offering the Russian people. They had no clear-cut definite programme, and after 1918 all those reasons which caused people to cling to the institutions they knew had vanished. Anarchy and civil war were no longer threats but realities; the ordinary framework of life was broken, and to many people a unique opportunity of constructing a new and better world appeared. Finally, the Bolshevists won because their ideas were more acceptable to the majority of the peasants than those of the White Armies. The peasants were always afraid that the victory of the White Armies would mean the return of the landlords. The Bolshevist Revolution, although in the end it turned out to be entirely opposed to the ideas of the French Revolution, in its early stages incorporated not only the Socialist ideal but also the democratic appeal of equal opportunity for all, of education for the working class, and of liberty. Although the leaders of the White Armies declared that their object was to restore democratic government, they made no attempt to establish any kind of democracy in the areas under their control or to persuade the peasants that their rule was better than that of the Bolshevists.

The War produced in Turkey an entirely different type of

dictatorship, a dictatorship based entirely on personal loyalty to the saviour of Turkey. When Kemal assumed power, the majority of the people certainly did not know what his policy was and probably felt little inclination to ask.

The Turkish defeat in the Great War was complete and seemed at the time to be final. By the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkey practically ceased to exist. The Sultan was to be left at Constantinople, but the Greek frontier was advanced to within a few miles of its walls. Turkey transferred her rights in Smyrna and its hinterland to Greece. On her Eastern frontier an Armenian republic was set up, with Trebizond as its port. Kurdistan was declared autonomous. The rest of Asia Minor was divided into spheres of influence and awarded to England, France and Italy respectively. Even the small independent state left by these stipulations was to be under European control: the finances, the customs and the army were to be administered by the representatives of the Allied Powers. Turkey was menaced not only by imperialism in its cruder form, but by a disapproval of the whole Turkish social and political system. Humanitarian Europe detested everything in Turkey, from polygamy to compulsory military service. Liberals wished to edify the world by the suppression of military autocracy, humanitarians to prevent massacre, and Christians, if not to convert Moslems, at least to demonstrate the ultimate fate of Mohammedan nations.

Nor did there seem to be any difficulty in carrying out these plans. The Turkish army had almost ceased to exist as a result of defeat and desertion. Constantinople was occupied by Allied troops. The Greek and Armenian elements were deeply hostile to the Turkish Government: the Greeks regarded themselves as outposts of Greece rather than Turkish subjects, and the Armenians were working for the creation of an Armenian State. The Turks themselves were profoundly hopeless. The maladministration during the War had been

even worse than usual. The population had been starved and bullied; the corruption and demoralization of the public services were unparalleled in their extent. In 1919 Kemal said: 'There are no links left between the government and the people.'1 There was naturally an economic crisis. This was aggravated by the increase of the brigandage which had always existed, which in ordinary times had had a reasonable. and almost legal, character, but had now become savage and quite uncontrollable. Out of this chaos Kemal produced in three years an army which defeated the Greeks; a government which was at least more efficient than previous Turkish governments and the Treaty of Lausanne, the first negotiated on equal terms between Turkey and the great powers since the eighteenth century, which, with the exception of Mosul, conceded everything he demanded. Turkey retained the whole of Asia Minor and on the Russian frontier secured territory which had not been Turkish since 1850: Greece renounced all pretensions to Asia by accepting the exchange of populations. The subject of Armenia was not mentioned. The Capitulations, the special arrangement by which foreigners in Turkey lived under the law of their respective nations and which were resented as an assertion of European superiority, were abolished. Turkey was invited to join the League of Nations, from which Germany was still excluded as too uncivilized to associate on equal terms with the Allies.

Even to European observers the policy which led to this result was an unusual combination of military and diplomatic skill. To the majority of Turks, who knew nothing of Anglo-French discords and Bolshevist dangers, it appeared that Kemal had performed a miracle before their eyes: and he had not only emerged victorious from what at the beginning had

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Confidential Report to Enver Pasha, quoted in *Turkey in the World War*, by Ahmed Emir in the series, Economic and Social History of the World War: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Oxford University Press, 1930.

seemed a hopeless struggle, but that he had fulfilled the most cherished traditions of his people. Sword in hand he had defied the infidel, and the infidel had capitulated. It was hardly surprising that the party formed by the 'Slayer of infidels', 'the Sword of God', should have been elected by a large majority, or that the general who had beaten first the English at Gallipoli and then the Greeks should have enjoyed the support of the army.

This emotional appeal might not be lasting, but once Kemal was legally supreme he was supported by the whole tendency of the Mohammedan political tradition. In Islamic thought a certain sanctity adheres to the ruler, in whatever manner he may have acquired power and whatever manner he uses it. 'Obey even if a negro slave is placed above you' is the Koranic injunction, and the religious duty of obedience was later transferred from the Caliph to any ruler who was in effective possession of power. Probably the more important legacy of Mohammedan political theory is not the legal view, but the conception of the ideal ruler which exercises such a hold over Moslem thought. Moslem people have the idea of the ruler in the same way that Englishmen or Americans have a vague but strong belief in democracy, although most of them would find it hard to justify their belief on theoretical grounds or even to formulate it in coherent terms.

It is also well to remember that there has never been a popular revolt in Turkey. Every European country, even Russia, has experienced quite serious peasant revolts, inspired by a definite if crude and vague political theory. In Turkey, in spite of the oppression experienced by the unfortunate peasants, the only movement which could be called popular was the war of 1920 against the Greeks, in defence of the existing system.

It would have been possible, in the opinion of many it would have been wiser, to have attempted to base the necessary reconstruction on an appeal to these traditional ideas. In fact, Kemal

had originally collected his army by posing as the Sultan's representative and as the defender of Islam. Once having achieved power, however, he pursued a policy of the most radical reform, entirely regardless of religious susceptibilities or historic associations. It is not that the Turkish Government is anti-religious in the same way as the Russian Government is anti-religious. The Koran has been translated into Turkish with the encouragement of Kemal himself, the government is building mosques in the new suburbs of Constantinople, and services in the mosques are broadcast by the government wireless. But the government has tried in every way to substitute loyalty to the Turkish National State for loyalty to Islam and to the Sultan as the Caliph and defender of Islam. This state is supposed to be completely indifferent to religion, all Mohammedan social traditions have been abandoned and the most 'modern' practices have been introduced in all spheres from marriage to the treatment of criminals. Kemal constantly declared that he was a liberal and a democrat and Turkish official opinion was definitely hostile to most of the ideas of Fascism. It seems probable that it is really the intention of the Turkish Government to prepare their people for a kind of democracy, which would be modified indeed by the Turkish respect for discipline and the other military virtues, but which would allow a certain measure of freedom.

It is easy to see why Kemal succeeded in making himself absolute ruler of Turkey. The chief factors in his success were the magnificent services he had already rendered. His personal popularity not only made it difficult for his critics to rouse effective opposition, but also induced a certain lack of conviction in their attacks. As President in effective possession of the government, a post to which he had been legally elected, he could dispose of the army and the police force. There is no doubt that at his death the vast majority of his subjects were sincerely attached to him, but this was not true of the early

years of his reign, and at the end it did not necessarily mean, as it would have in Europe, that they approved of every detail or even the major part of his policy; it simply meant that neither religious nor democratic feeling was strong enough to break through his personal popularity and the real power of the army.

In Turkey and Russia the collapse of the autocracy involved a complete reconstruction, not only political, but also social in the widest sense. In Italy and Germany, dictatorship was a reaction against the political, moral and social ideas of pre-war Europe. The decadence of Portugal was not only political but had manifested itself in every sphere, therefore the attempted national revival also had to look to other motives besides the political. But in Poland and Yugoslavia, dictatorship arose from the mere mechanical failure of democracy to work and the dictatorship was rather an administrative expedient than a religious conversion.

The position of Pilsudski in Poland was somewhat similar to that of Kemal in Turkey. He had raised and commanded the Polish legions, which fought in the Austrian army against Russia, and had commanded the army which defeated the Russians in 1920. The actual influence of the legions was very small, but psychologically they were enormously important because they gave the Poles a belief in the possibility of influencing their own destiny. At the end of the War Pilsudski was the hero of Poland, but he failed to fit into the structure of democratic politics, and it was not until 1926 that he seized the government.

Democracy in Poland did not work smoothly. The administration was inefficient, the Assembly was split up into a number of different groups. From 1922 to 1926 there were six governments. Poland had been divided between three empires, and the first necessity was to unify the administration. The peasants were pressing for agrarian reform and this was

the only subject which interested the peasant deputies in the Assembly. Poland also contained large minorities of other races, who were naturally not inspired by the fervid Polish patriotism of the pure Poles. This emotion is accentuated by the novelty of freedom; the memory of foreign rule is still vivid. It is difficult for the peoples of Western Europe to believe in the reality of foreign conquest; but Poland's independence dates only from 1918 and she was again threatened by Russia in 1920. The pure sentiment of patriotism is hardened by economic considerations. In any country an enormous number of inhabitants are dependent directly or indirectly on the State, and in Poland industry is largely concentrated in those areas which, in the event of a Polish collapse, could hardly fail to be seized by Germany. Therefore, any system which seemed to give the minorities power to threaten the stability of the State could not for long attract the Poles; they would be prepared to give up their own liberties on condition that the minority also lost their influence. The very divisions which made it impossible to get any real agreement drove the country towards an extreme centralization of power.

The actual occasion of the coup d'état was a financial crisis. Economic difficulties had been constant since 1920. The general fall in agricultural prices hit Poland hard and the inability of successive governments to balance the budget had aggravated the position. In 1926 the chronic difficulties became acute. Unemployment rose from 175,000 in January 1925 to 359,000. It was largely concentrated in the textile industry in Lodz and the mines of Silesia. The fact that 1925-6 was a comparatively prosperous year in Europe, especially for Germany, Poland's only industrial neighbour, made the situation still more ominous, particularly in Silesia. The budget was unbalanced and the zloty began to fall. The government was divided as to the approximate measures and it was impossible to get a majority to carry out any proposals whatever.

The coup d'état began in a personal quarrel between Witos, the Prime Minister, and Pilsudski, who was living in retirement, a sort of incarnate alternative to democratic government. It ended, after three days' fighting in the streets of Warsaw, with the complete victory of Pilsudski.

Everyone was prepared for a ruthless tyranny of left-wing nationalism. In fact, Pilsudski's government was a dictatorship of the centre, equally opposed to Communism and Fascism; it was the most liberal of all the dictatorships; strictly political, it made no attempt to impose any particular creed or to interfere with the universities or schools. The basis of its political philosophy was the idea of Poland for all Polish citizens, as opposed to the Socialist cry of Poland for the workers and the Fascist demand that only those who are Poles by race should take part in politics. The very fact that every party in Poland split up into Pilsudskists or anti-Pilsudskists was a tribute to Pilsudski. The Pilsudskist bloc contained members of every political party, including representatives of the minority groups. This consolidation was achieved with the minimum of repression consistent with the abolition of democratic government. Although individuals suffered, whole classes have not been proscribed. In spite of the cruelty of the repression of the Ukrainians in 1932, caused equally by the foolishness of the victims and the stupidity of the government, it cannot be denied that Pilsudski was successful while he lived. But his death has brought to the surface all the divisions, both in his own party and in the nation, which personal loyalty to him as ruler concealed. And it seems doubtful whether any permanent solution has been found to the question of the best form of government for Poland. Also, when it is said that Pilsudski was successful, it must be remembered that the difficulties of Poland were peculiarly suitable for a dictator. Dictatorship is an expedient that readily occurs to people's minds when the country is disturbed by troubles which are in

reality superficial and which could be removed by administrative reforms. Inefficient government tends to weaken the psychological resistance to dictatorship by depriving democracy of most of its advantages. A corrupt and incompetent Parliament and Civil Service can produce conditions which seem as tyrannous to the ordinary citizen as the rule of the most ruthless autocrat.

The breakdown of democracy in Yugoslavia was caused by difficulties very like those of Poland. In both cases the fundamental problem of creating a national state was complicated by the existence of large alien minorities and by political inexperience. The country contains many different nationalities, but the two most important are the Serbs and the Croats. They belong to the same race and speak the same language, though in Serbia it is written in Cyrillic and in Croatia in Latin characters. But their history and, therefore, traditions are very different. Serbia for centuries formed part of the Turkish Empire. The years of Turkish domination prevented the growth of a native aristocracy or middle class. Before the War there was practically no industry in Serbia and very little that could be called intellectual life. Serbia consisted, as it still chiefly consists, of peasant proprietors. As was natural in a state of this kind, there was a strong democratic sentiment. The Serbian idea of democracy was, of course, rough; two deposed and one murdered king in eighty years show how dangerous the experiment of dictatorship might have been to the Crown. The Croats lacked the experience of self-government, but they had been a part of the Austrian Empire and had naturally acquired a higher cultural level. Before the War propaganda for the union of all South Slavs was active in Zagreb, but it is doubtful how seriously the Croats really took these ideas. And in any case, they probably visualized the union taking place in very different circumstances and believed that the fact that the Croats were richer and better educated

than the Serbs would result in their influence being at least as great if not predominant. In 1918, however, the possession of a trained and equipped army was a more vital factor than either education or economic development. The Serbs managed to secure a centralized constitution which erected under the facade of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the greater Serbia of the Nationalist's dream. The most important Croat party was the Croat Peasant party, led by Radič, and this party never accepted the constitution. Their attitude certainly contributed to the instability of the government. There were twenty-three governments in the ten years from 1918 to 1928. When the King established the dictatorship in 1928, the different parts of the country were still living under the laws of their previous nationalities, in spite of the obvious inconveniences of such a system, because no government had been in office long enough to produce a scheme for the codification of the law. The Croats were seriously dissatisfied with the constitution and, no doubt with justice, complained of the Serbian administration, which they alleged was both cruel and corrupt.

On the other hand, in 1928 itself, things seemed to be improving. The troubles of the new state were entirely political; there were no difficult social questions as there were in nearly every other country in Europe. Yugoslavia had escaped the agrarian problems which beset the aristocratic states, like Hungary and Poland, as well as the complications of industry. Even religion was regarded with a safe indifference. The exceptionally good harvest of 1927 and the general prosperity were also encouraging. Unfortunately the situation was radically changed by an event that was little more than an accident. A Serbian deputy murdered the leader of the Croat Peasant party in the Assembly. This murder led to a complete breakdown of democratic government. The King found it impossible to find anyone who could form a government, and for three months Yugoslavia was without a government at all.

Finally the King solved the problem by declaring himself dictator. His action was accepted with enthusiasm by the Croats and with resignation by the Serbs. The object of the dictatorship was to solve the problems arising from the inclusion of different racial groups in one state; the means by which the King tried to achieve this object was the destruction, as far as possible, of all peculiarities of language, government or sentiment. Political parties with a racial or geographical basis were forbidden. The name of the state was changed from the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to Yugoslavia (South Slavia). The King's position was, from the beginning, extremely difficult. He had no party on which he could depend. The Serbs had no sentimental attachment to their King, and had always shown themselves extremely hostile to any idea of absolute monarchy. The policy of destroying the existing political parties was bound to make him unpopular in Croatia. It is said the improvement in the administration, which followed the establishment of dictatorship, was merely temporary, and that corruption and inefficiency were soon as rife as under democracy. All the difficulties of the government were increased by the death of King Alexander, who, in spite of the general dislike of the dictatorship, seems to have always retained a certain popularity, even in Croatia. The government has, however, succeeded, in spite of frequent declarations of their intention of re-establishing democracy, in carrying on, what is in effect, a dictatorship.

The Fascist dictatorships are essentially different. Governments like those of Kemal and Pilsudski have often occurred before, and although there is no exact parallel to the Communist dictatorship, it is an idea with which philosophers, from Plato onward, have often toyed. But Fascism is the result of modern conditions and could hardly have appeared in any other period. It is an attempt to solve all the problems of modern society by centralizing every activity in the state. It arises out of the difficulties of highly-developed, not of backward, states. In

Italy and Germany Fascism is supported by a doctrine of mystical nationalism and inspired by imperialist ambitions, but it is by no means certain that all the characteristics of Fascism might not appear without the theories which are known as 'Fascist'. In England, for example, it is the Left rather than the Right who desire the all-powerful state. In both Italy and Germany dictatorship superseded a democratic government. The possibility of dictatorship in a democratic country depends on the failure or the apparent failure of democracy. In Italy this failure was perfectly real and objective, while in Germany it was psychological or illusory, according to one's point of view.

In Îtaly, the weakness of the Liberal government and the violence of the Socialists between them reduced the country to a state in which the average citizen was prepared to accept any government which would restore order by any methods. After the War socialism was more powerful in Italy than in any European country, except Russia. Socialism grew steadily in Italy, as it did in all industrial countries, during the first years of the twentieth century. By 1914 the majority of the industrial workers of the north were under the influence of Socialist Trade Unions. But it was not until the economic upheaval, produced by the War, that it became one of the dominant parties. The War was never so fully accepted by the Italians as it was by the people of other countries. The Socialists had always been against Italy's entry into the War, and as it progressed they became more and more pacifist and, after the Russian example, revolutionary, at least in phrase. The end of the War brought victory, but it also brought an economic crisis which was felt even more severely in Italy than elsewhere, owing to the fact that Italy is almost entirely dependent on outside sources for her raw materials, and the scarcity of raw materials hit her particularly hard. Inflation and the disorganization of the labour market, consequent upon rapid

demobilization, created a situation in which the working class was faced with increasing unemployment, together with rising prices. These conditions naturally led to the growth of Socialism. By the end of the War Socialism dominated local government in all northern and central Italy. There was an outburst of strikes all over the country, but the strikers did not seem to know whether they were striking for higher wages or for workers' control of industry. Large tracts of the countryside, especially the Po Valley, were terrorized by the Red Leagues, which secured a monopoly of labour by methods which often went as far as murder. They regulated the entire economic life of the countryside; a labourer who was outside the Red League, even if he was not physically intimidated, could get no work. An employer who employed non-union labour was deprived not only of workmen, but of every necessity of life, from medical attendance to food. The Socialists showed not a sign of any constructive ability, and their rule was distinguished by corruption and incompetence. This did not, indeed, differentiate them from other political parties, but, together with the general impoverishment, produced spontaneous local revolts against Socialist administration. Fascism originated in these local revolts. It drew its adherents from different classes in different regions; in the beginning their only bond was a nationalism inherited from the War. In the Po Valley, where large farms are worked by peasants who have no land and are entirely dependent on their wages, Fascism was the farmer's system of defence against the Red League. But in Ferrara and Parma, Fascism was the party of peasant proprietors who were equally opposed to the Red League and to the large landowners. While they destroyed the Red Leagues, they attacked the landowners and, in some cases, succeeded in inducing them to divide their estates into small holdings. The town Fascists were equally various in their origin and their aims. In Cremona the movement started

as a reaction of the Socialist and anti-clerical parties against the Catholic Popular Party's administration. The Cremona Party long retained a Socialist tinge and its leader, Farinarcci, was one of the foremost opponents of the liberal economic tendencies of the early Fascist government. On the other hand, in Bologna and Regio-Emilio, Fascism was a movement of small shopkeepers against the co-operative societies, while the Florentine Fascisti were intellectuals, influenced by the 'Action Française' writers. Mussolini's achievement was to combine all these elements into a party strong enough to overthrow the government.

It is perfectly true, as anti-Fascist writers have pointed out, that Socialism, or at least revolutionary Socialism, was on the wane before the Fascist organization really began; but, although this now can be seen quite clearly, it was not visible to the people of Italy in 1922. Socialists were still in control of municipalities, the Red Leagues were still operating and the Fascists' intervention had produced, by 1921, a state of affairs very near to civil war.

The government, terrified by the Russian Revolution, would not intervene, for fear of precipitating a similar upheaval, and were not averse to the Fascists' activities. By 1922 the Fascists had an organization, and it was clear to the leaders, particularly to Mussolini, that they might hope to rule the country.

When, in the autumn of 1922, the Fascists marched on Rome, public opinion was probably prepared to accept a government that was neither Socialist nor connected with the discredited old political parties. But they had no conception of the sort of government Mussolini would impose. He took office as the Prime Minister of a coalition government and it was not until 1925 that the process of turning his administration into a dictatorship was complete. Dictatorship was established by a mixture of violence, persuasion and real

achievement. While there is no doubt that terrorism was resorted to, at the same time the Fascist government had produced an economic revival. This revival was secured by a policy completely opposed to Fascist economic doctrines. De Stefani, Mussolini's first finance minister, introduced economic liberalism. He reduced the succession duty, dear to the hearts of the Socialists, and the tariff on flour, the particular delight of the Conservatives. He balanced the budget and reduced the muddle of the state railways to order. The majority were, no doubt, anxious not to lose these benefits and there was no very obvious alternative to Fascist government. Mussolini had not, at this date, started either economic experiments, imperialist adventures or the complete suppression of free thought. The Socialist Party was disorganized and the working class had felt the power of a government hostile to working-class organization. The Socialist fervour of 1920 had passed; the results of Socialist agitation had appeared to be economic disturbance and unemployment. The Fascist government had also made strenuous efforts to conciliate working-class opinion. The Fascists during 1924 and 1925 supported and even organized strikes; the Fascist council even contributed a thousand lire to strike funds at Valdarno. Mussolini was, moreover, actually the head of the state, with all the prestige and all the power which control of the government gives. It may be presumed that the army was sympathetic to Fascism. The Liberal opposition failed to get from the people any real response to its protests at the arbitrary actions of the government.

The collapse of democracy in Germany seems due rather to the fact that it never really took root than that it failed in any very definite way. In Poland even liberals supported dictatorship to escape from the administration and financial chaos to which democratic government had reduced the government. In Italy the government had not performed the elementary function of keeping public order. Democracy in Germany

certainly cannot be said to have failed in this sense. It would take an expert in administration to decide whether, from the purely administrative point of view, German government had deteriorated since 1918 or not, whereas in other countries not only the ordinary citizen but even the casual tourist could see the effects of weak and inefficient government. Germany provides the only example of the growth, within a democratic state, of a large party whose unconcealed aim was to replace democracy by autocratic government. There are, of course, factors in German history and German tradition which militate against the successful working of democracy, and in Germany democracy started with the disadvantage that it was not established in response to any real or deep-seated desire for democracy as such, but was simply a result of defeat in war was, in fact, an accident. In England and France, democracy was established in response to popular demand. Although in France the change was brought about by violent revolution and in England by constitutional agitation, in both cases the process was a revolution in the sense that it was a real and spontaneous popular movement. The German Revolution of 1918 was simply an attempt to escape from the intolerable privations of the War. If there had been no war, or if Germany had won, there is no reason to think that there would have been any great changes in the German constitution. Germany had been affected by the revolutionary movement of 1848, but the latter half of the nineteenth century saw a great decline in Liberal sentiment. Lowell said in 1896: 'There are two opposite forces growing in Germany to-day; one is the belief in military monarchy, the other is the spirit of discontent, which is making fearful headway among the lower classes; and, between the two, the Liberal elements are being pushed into the background.' The Nationalist and the Socialist sections in the nineteenth-century revolutionary movement had both abandoned political Liberalism. The Nationalist desire for a unified

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Germany had been satisfied, not, as in Italy, by Liberal statesmen, but by the Conservative Minister of Conservative Prussia, and the enormous growth of wealth and power since 1870 seemed to many people a justification of monarchy. At the same time, the Social Democratic Party had absorbed all the really discontented element. The Liberal programme was thus divorced from the elements which, in other countries, gave it a large part of its appeal: from nationalist sentiment on one side and from working-class aspirations on the other. The growth in the Social Democratic vote was accompanied by the decline of the two Liberal Parties, the National Liberal Party and the Progressive Party.

It is true that the Social Democratic Party, a party Socialist and even Communist in phrase, grew stronger after every election. But its desire for democracy was only incidental. Its real interest was in Socialism, and its only use for democracy was as a way to Socialism. This concentration on social rather than political objectives is another difference between the other western countries and Germany. During the period of political change in England and France there existed real democrats, who desired democracy as an end in itself. The Social Democratic propaganda undoubtedly weakened the attraction of democracy in Germany, not only by concentrating on social rather than on political measures, but by its constant Marxist depreciation of political liberties. Social Democrats had preached for years to the working class that the liberal State was merely a capitalist device, valuable because it allowed the formation of Socialist parties; this propaganda greatly contributed to the state of mind which accepted National Socialism.

It must also be remembered that the German Empire was a libertarian state in the sense that Hegel used the word 'liberty', in the sense that it was ruled by law and not by the caprice of an individual. All the German States had constitutions. In the Prussian constitution certain rights were guar-

anteed to the citizen, such as the right of free assembly; it is true that these rights were modified by administrative rules, but the fact of their existence marks a wide difference between Germany and Russia. There was substantial liberty of discussion, especially after the fall of Bismarck. Justice was equal between classes and free from political bias. The Reichstag had considerable influence; it was necessary, in fact, though not in theory, for the Chancellor to be supported by a majority. Germany was, of course, not a democracy. The franchise for the local, State and Imperial legislatures, though in theory universal, was heavily weighted in favour of the rich. But the change to democracy was not great enough to produce an emotional exhilaration. Democracy in other countries is associated with certain social policies, such as universal free education and social insurance. Whatever the ultimate effect of unemployment insurance and the other social services may be, there is no doubt that they are felt as benefits by the majority of the working class. In Germany the whole progress of social services, both in conception and in organization, was the work of the Imperial Government.

The Republic succeeded an exceedingly efficient administration which had incorporated a large element of liberalism. The only considerable section of the people which desired a change wanted a change far greater than anything the Republicans either wished to make or could have made even had they wished. The only charge the Republic could really bring against the Empire with any hope of popular response was the charge of having first started and then lost the War. As the passions raised by war cooled, the first part of the indictment lost much of its effect, and the second was turned by the National Socialists against the Republic, especially against the Social Democrats themselves.

Superficially the revolutionary situations in Germany and Russia were almost exactly the same: the revolt of the outraged

people against an autocracy which had led them to defeat and starvation. By a coincidence much insisted on by the Bolshevists, even the details were similar. In both cases the immediate cause was the shortage of food caused by the War. In both cases the first symptom of revolution was unrest in the Fleet. Lenin, perhaps naturally, thought that the Republican Government would suffer the same fate as the Provisional Government in Russia. A German Communist revolution was hourly expected in the Kremlin. Although the parallel was superficially so striking, the German situation was in reality wholly different from the Russian. In Russia before the War there had existed a widespread resentment against the government. There was also a large class which benefited immediately and concretely by the Revolution; the peasants got their land, miserably mistaken as they were as to the ultimate effects of Bolshevist rule. In Germany, the position of no class or interest was materially improved, with the possible exception of that of the Jews. The people's anger against the Imperial Government was bound by its very nature to be transient, and there was no real desire for democracy and no democratic tradition on which to build, once the immediate occasion of the Revolution was past. In these circumstances, it was plain that democracy would have to be strikingly successful to survive; there was no margin for failure.

The success of the democratic government in Germany depended largely on the peace terms. If the Allies desired a democratic and peaceful Germany, the only possible course was to put the blame for the War on the Imperial Government and to support the Republican Government, even to the extent of making concessions repellent to Allied public opinion. As has often been pointed out, this policy was pursued toward France after Waterloo. The Germans had, after all, opened negotiations on the basis of Wilson's fourteen points, and though it can be contended that the German army was on the

point of collapse and that Germany would, anyhow, have surrendered unconditionally in a few days, this is and must for ever remain a supposition only. The terms of the Peace Treaty were a violent shock to German public opinion: there seems no doubt that, whether or not they accorded with the letter of the Fourteen Points, they were certainly incompatible with their spirit. The Allies went out of their way to provide the Germans with every excuse for repudiating the Treaty by refusing to allow the German delegates to take part in the Peace Conference. A detached observer might have thought the Allied statesmen were more concerned to insult the Germans than to secure concessions. The Peace Treaty did not weaken Germany except temporarily. In fact, it probably strengthened the Imperial administration against the States Government by binding all the German States together in a common misfortune. The Ruhr adventure and the French attempt to foster separatist movements in the Rhineland added the last element of bitterness. Large numbers of workpeople in the Ruhr had a personal experience of an invading force; it was during this period that even the Communist Party became nationalist.

But if the French and English statesmen made reaction almost certain, German governments since the War have certainly contributed to the same result by their financial policy. Everyone is familiar with the social effects of inflation of the mark, the ruin of the entire class of rentiers, the destruction of savings, the psychological transformation of the middle class. The middle and lower middle class acquired a political recklessness, a tendency to extremism, a complete negation of all those qualities which are generally called 'middle class'. The bourgeois became as ready as the worker to listen to denunciation of capitalism; but the denunciations took rather a different form, and the bourgeois took into politics all his commercial readiness for action. The financial policy of the Republicans thus prepared the situation which Hitler was to turn to his own ends.

The results were not fully seen until the slump of 1931 destroyed economic security for the second time in twenty years. The depression hit Germany psychologically as hard as it hit the U.S.A. Americans saw 'the American contribution to human progress' collapsing with the stock markets; the Germans saw their revenge for the War disappear in the depression. There had been during the boom a widespread feeling in Germany that German prosperity was a vindication of German civilization. If Germany had been defeated in the War, in the more important arts of peace she was far more advanced than France and far more successful than England. Also, many Germans, of whom Stresemann was one, argued that it would be impossible to keep a country so rich as Germany in an inferior political position, and that she would become, through her economic strength, the leading continental power. The slump, besides the mass of physical suffering, brought also a psychological defeat. The scandals and the failures revealed by depression appeared to show that German prosperity had been a sham, based on stupidity and corruption; thousands of young men felt that they had been personally cheated, not only by the capitalist system but by individual business men. To this theoretical and general rage was added the effect of lack of any prospects in the professions or in business. The universities were turning out every year far more students than could find the employment to which they considered their education entitled them. The typical middleclass family had been ruined in the inflation; they now saw their children's prospects swept away. National Socialism seemed to offer a remedy for all these grievances.

Although the National Socialist Party loudly proclaims its contempt for theories, it is in fact the only autocratic party, with the exception of the Communist Party, which had a political theory before its seizure of power. In all other countries it was events and not ideas which created dictator-

ship. Hitler, however, achieved power by his ability to collect a party. He did not so much invent a doctrine as combine tendencies which have existed in German political ideas and psychology since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The doctrine of National Socialism joins the purely political ideas of nationalism and militarism with that mystical and anti-intellectualist attitude which has constantly reappeared in German literature and philosophy.

To take the strictly political ideas first, Nationalism has been, since its triumph in 1871, exceptionally strong in Germany. From the purely rational point of view Germany has more reason than have other countries to be violently opposed to any movement that can threaten the national unity. The disasters which overwhelmed Germany from the Thirty Years' War to Jena plainly and undoubtedly arose from its division into independent states. The memory of these disasters is still a living tradition. In 1880 Bismarck said: 'Germany has not yet recovered from the effects of the Thirty Years' and Seven Years' Wars; and determination to prevent the recurrence of similar disasters ought still to be the keynote of German policy.' Many people supposed that the intense State patriotism would prevent any attempt at centralized dictatorship, but the very strength of local feeling means that it can only be overcome by an even stronger emotional appeal. This necessity at least partly accounts for the frenzied nature of German nationalism, which, apparent before the War, has become even more marked lately.

It is not any peculiar wickedness of Germans, but the accidents of German history, which tinge this nationalism with a strong military tone. The first German national sentiments were roused by the victories of Frederick the Great; the Empire was created by the war of 1870; even the greatest period of German literature is associated with the struggle against Napoleon. It must also be remembered that it was

largely the impact of the military spirit of France which turned the Germany of Goethe into the Germany of Bismarck. German nationalism originally had no political aspirations. In the work of the writers of the revolutionary period, Germany is conceived, not as a state, but as a culture, a 'Kulturnation'. Political unity seemed an irrelevance, the unity which they desired was a unity of freedom of thought and intellectual endeavour. All those German names which have become symbols of reaction and nationalism, Schlegel, Novalis, Görres, Hegel, were all originally inspired by the liberal ideas of the aufklärung. It was the failure, or the apparent failure, of these ideas in practice which turned these men into the passionate Conservatives they finally became.

Hitler adopted this militarist patriotism, merely changing the conception of the nation from a geographical to a racial basis. The German State is supposed to include all Germans, whether they live in German territory or not. This state is based on the theory of Nordic superiority. Roughly, this theory is that there is 'a great race' to which all civilization is due, tall, fair-haired, blue-eyed, and that its modern representatives are the German, the English and the Scandinavian peoples. As a political faith its practical effect was to give a sanction to extreme nationalism. It appeared to give a scientific, even an ethical justification to the dislike of the Jews which had previously, in spite of its strength, been hard to justify. This idea is also in a certain sense a continuation of the nineteenth-century theories of Germany's cultural mission. German nationalism is, unlike Italian nationalism, not content to exist for itself alone. Even in the most fervent of German patriotic doctrines there is a feeling that nationalism must be justified by the importance of the nation to the world. The bias against the Jews was strengthened by the anti-intellectualist theories of National Socialism, which tended to regard the Jew as the type of the pure intellectual.

National Socialism also incorporates the romantic attitude which has always persisted in Germany since the end of the eighteenth century, but in adopting these ideas National Socialism coarsened and vulgarized them to such an extent that it may be safely said that their originators would not recognize them. This mystical and anti-intellectualist attitude is a constant force in German literature from Goethe and the romantic nineteenth century to Nietzsche and Stefan George. Most German writers ultimately revolted against the purely intellectual life and demanded that a place should be found in the ideal life for will, intuition and emotion. The tendency is obvious even in Goethe and Hegel. It was revived in Nietzsche and the tradition was carried on by Stefan George to the very days of the National Socialists. The romantic attitude has produced nearly all that is most valuable in German literature, but the dangers of abandoning reason in political speculation, far more in political action, are obvious. The ideas which in Novalis and Fichte are dreams of the ideal State; when vulgarized, as they must inevitably be vulgarized, to make them suitable for political propaganda, become arguments for disregarding law and refusing to consider the economic or social dangers of a given policy.

The basis of the romantic attitude is a distrust of reason. From this arise the political ideas of the romantic writers, conservatism, hostility to Roman law, and a belief in religion. Novalis's remark, 'We seek the absolute and find only things', is a perfect expression of National Socialism — indeed, of all Fascist philosophies. It must be admitted that there was some ground for the anti-intellectualist attitude in the early nineteenth century. The liberal writers of France had proceeded on the assumption that reason alone had influence over men's minds, unless they were corrupted by the pressure of their own interests. To any competent observer of society this is clearly inadequate, and the practical result of such theories appeared

to be demonstrated by the collapse of the French Revolution into a despotism more lawless and ruthless than any monarchy. But these early romantic writers remained under the influence of liberal ideas even when they became convinced and bigoted conservatives. Their conservatism resembled that of Burke, by whom in fact they were greatly influenced. Their distrust of pure reason showed itself in a reverence for the national institutions and an unwillingness to change anything, however absurd or even unjust. They believed that the state is an organism, analogous to any other living organism, and that its development is governed by its own laws, and therefore attempts to alter the state in accordance with preconceived ideas were certain to fail, or, if successful, would merely distort its natural development.

But anti-intellectualism in Nietzsche and Stefan George took a wilder and more sinister aspect. It showed itself not in the more moderate form of political conservatism, but in an exaltation of the heroic virtues, even in an exaltation of what other writers have regarded as the heroic vices. Its praise of hardness, of cruelty and of courage has been combined in the Nazi attitude with the violent Nationalism of the romantic, as the two tendencies had previously been combined in Moeller's Van der Bruck, Das dritte Reich.

Romantic Nationalism alone, however, would merely have led back to the pre-war social and political structure. Such a return was impossible as a practical programme. A mere return to the old, without any element of novelty, has never been the basis of a great popular movement, and it was impossible to win either the industrial workers, the middle class or the peasants to any real enthusiasm for monarchy tempered by feudalism. The economic theories of National Socialism provided the element of novelty. The connection between socialism and internationalism is merely a coincidence. There is nothing in the theory of socialism which implies international-

ism, and there is a great deal in the practice which implies the exact opposite. The actual organization of Soviet Russia, for example, resembles much more closely the Nationalist Socialist ideal, than the ideal of pre-war socialists.

There is also, quite apart from the spread of socialism in all European countries, a definite tendency in German thought towards socialism, a tendency which can be discerned as clearly in the Conservative writers as in the advanced thinkers. Socialism is a natural corollary to theories of the omnipotence of the state, whether these theories derive originally from conservative or socialist thinkers. It is clearly and obviously incompatible with the philosophical theory of the state to leave so large a field of human life as economic activity to individuals. But this socialism is not the socialism of humanitarians. It is, as Goebbels said, 'not a Socialism of theory, but of practice. It is the heroic, manly Socialism that our Prussian Kings once practised. It is the soldierly Socialism of the Prussian Grenadiers.' Its inspiration is Sparta rather than Marx; yet, at the same time, it encouraged the working class with the echoes of their own ideas

National Socialism can thus in a sense be shown to provide for many peculiarly German ideas and needs; and yet its final success appears to have been far from inevitable and to be due to a series of accidents. The first of these accidents was that Germany, overwhelmed with difficulties, mild indeed compared with those of Russia or Turkey, but fatally depressing to a highly intelligent, educated and excitable people, produced no great democratic statesman and even no military adventurer rash enough to use the army to seize power. Brüning's somewhat dim personality could not kindle the imagination of the Germans, starving for heroes, and neither Von Papen nor Von Schleicher really had the faintest idea what to do. In all crises in which dictatorship has arisen out of democracy, there seems to be this paralysis of judgment among

the democratic politicians. In Poland, in Italy, in Germany, no one could apparently think of any effective policy. The second accident was the mistake that Hindenburg and his advisers made in their estimate of the ability of Hitler, and of the attraction which National Socialism held for the masses of the people. The Nationalists believed that they were duping Hitler when they themselves were being duped. If they had realized the danger, it does not seem impossible that Hindenburg might have combined all the democratic parties against the Nazis.

It is clear that dictatorship has appeared in very different countries, under very different circumstances and been imposed for very different reasons. It is also clear that modern dictators have all attempted to provide a solution, however mistaken that solution may turn out to be, to serious problems. It may well be asked, Why was it necessary to have a dictatorship in order to establish communism in Russia, modernize Turkey and reform the Polish finances? The simple answer, the answer which nineteenth-century Liberals would have given, is that the majority of people would not have accepted these policies and, therefore, they must be imposed by force. But, although repression is an essential part of the administration of even the most benevolent dictator, it will not permanently safeguard a ruler unless the conditions incline people to submit; in fact it is not even possible for a dictator to suppress his opponents, without causing his own overthrow, unless there seems to be an urgent necessity for strong government. Both the dictator and his subjects must feel that the object of the dictatorship is of immense importance and that any opposition will seriously interfere. This becomes even clearer if the failures amongst the dictators are examined. Hitler, Mussolini, Pilsudski, King Alexander and Kemal were all successful in the sense that they seized the power and have retained it up to the present, or have only been removed by death. In Spain, Lithuania and Greece,

dictators appeared who were not successful, even in this somewhat limited sense. Primo de Rivera made a really serious attempt to deal with the problems of Spain; Valdemaras tried to establish a kind of Fascism in a country where none of the conditions for Fascism existed, and Pangalos in Greece attempted to set up a military dictatorship, possibly inspired by the example of Kemal.

The political problem in Spain was very like that in Portugal. The French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and the processes of heredity destroyed the Spanish monarchy and nothing has so far taken its place. Neither democracy nor absolute monarchy nor modern dictatorship has been able to unite the people or even to attract sufficient of them to establish itself permanently by terrorism. Spain in the nineteenth century was devastated by civil wars, fought to settle essentially the same questions as Spaniards are still fighting over. It was the exhaustion of both sides, rather than any conversion to reason, which dictated the compromise of the constitutional monarchy, set up in 1874. The monarchy gave the country a breathing space of fifty-seven years, but it did not solve a single problem, and when the agitations of the twentieth century stirred up discontent again, all the old problems reappeared. The difficulties of Spain are more serious than the difficulties of Portugal because Spanish culture is not dead. The majority of the Spanish working class are still attached to the characteristic features of Spanish life and bitterly resent attempts at modernizing and so destroying it. Those ideas which have spread from other countries, have taken a distinctly Spanish tinge; for example, Socialism has, in several areas, taken on the intensely individualist form of anarchism and even the Communist Party is split between Trotskyists and orthodox communists. At the same time the people want that improvement in their standards, which could only be achieved by accepting all the consequences of industrialism, including

a modification of their intense individualism. There is great poverty, especially among the peasants in the south, who passionately wish to divide up the large estates. The landowners' habit of living away from their land and treating it entirely as a commercial investment naturally does nothing to make the peasants less revolutionary. Socialism has captured the urban working class, and their socialism is accentuated, as it was in Russia, by the number of foreign companies working in Spain. Religion provides another cause for quarrel; the domination of the Church over education and over village affairs has always been bitterly resented by large numbers; on the other hand, equally large numbers are devoted to the Church.

The comparative peace which Spain enjoyed from 1874 to 1931 was obviously only a lull. The first crisis occurred in 1923 when the difficulties of the post-war years accentuated every problem and aggravated the general discontent. Spain was also engaged in a ruinous and humiliating war with Morocco. Strikes were constantly occurring in all the towns and there was chronic disorder in Barcelona. Assassination was indulged in by all parties in this city, for example, the Archbishop of Zaragossa and the leader of the anarchists were murdered on the same day. The rest of Spain was, however, completely peaceful, and if it was dissatisfied with the government, not more so than usual.

When Primo de Rivera declared himself dictator, there was very little opposition, less in fact than attended the debut of any other dictator, except Kemal. The interference of the army in politics was a respected tradition and the existing régime roused enthusiasm in no one, and yet Primo de Rivera is the only dictator in an important country who has fallen from power. Nor can his fall be explained by spectacular failure. He did not fail except in his inability to attract any popular support. In other respects he was as successful as most dictators. He brought the Moroccan War to a victorious end. He

stabilized the peseta and built a large number of motor roads. It is true that he did not conquer any new territory, but that was, in the circumstances, hardly possible. His dictatorship was also the least harsh in Europe; he imprisoned his opponents, but he also frequently released them, and he neither shot, hung nor tortured his enemies. The only respect in which his policy was really tyrannical was in his dealings with Catalonia, where he tried to stamp out every vestige of Catalonian national tradition or feeling, even going as far as dissolving the Catalonian Bar Association because it published a list of its members in Catalonian.

His failure seems to be due to two things: first that he did not have complete control of his own instrument, and secondly that he could not provide any doctrine which would have rallied the people to him. He achieved power by means of the army, but he was not, as were the other military dictators, its unquestioned chief. There were hundreds of generals who felt they could govern as well or better than Primo de Rivera. As there were also hundreds of civilians who felt the same, and conditions in Spain encouraged these feelings, no one had considered himself endangered by the previous disorders; they had been merely inconvenient. Spain was not menaced by any aggressive power. The state of Spain in 1923 might be said to be worse than the state of Germany in 1923, but the Germans were used to a highly efficient government, and the Spaniards were not. The Germans cared passionately whether their country was a great power, while the Spaniards were completely indifferent. The very mildness of the dictator's rule probably contributed to his fall. It is better for a dictator to be loved as well as feared, but it is essential for him to be feared. Primo de Rivera was always regarded as something of a joke, even by his opponents.

Valdemaras in Lithuania and Pangalos in Greece also failed and disappeared from public life. Valdemaras seized power in

1926 by a coup d'état, on the pretext that the existing government was coquetting with communism. He was a theoretical Fascist, having been a professor of history, but he lacked the necessary conditions for putting his theories into practice. Whatever may be the case at present, Lithuania was not then in danger; although she is a tiny state surrounded by three countries, who all believe, for different reasons, that she should rightfully belong to them. The population consists of landowning peasants, who, although they dislike communism, do not fear it very acutely. The necessity for a dictatorship at all was far from plain, and Valdemaras did not produce any striking results either at home or abroad.

Pangalos, in Greece, set up a military dictatorship in 1926. He could not, however, establish himself permanently. There was no real hostility to democracy, though democratic government might be held responsible for the disaster of first beginning, and then failing to win, the war with Turkey. Pangalos was also just a general, like Primo de Rivera; he was not the saviour of the country, like Kemal. The Greeks have none of that delight in obedience which distinguishes the Turks and the Germans, and they were not frightened of what might happen if the government was not strong, as were the Poles. Greece had already lost everything it was possible to lose, except her independence, and the only possible threat to independence was Turkey. The Turks have probably no desire to conquer Greece and, anyhow, in 1926 were far too occupied with their internal problems. Pangalos lacked that other possible basis for dictatorship, the desire for expansion. The Greeks were tired of trying to wrest portions of Asia Minor from the Turks, even the dream of once more owning Constantinople had lost its hold. The real difficulties of Greece were economic, and Pangalos could not cure them, could not even persuade the Greeks that he was curing them, as some rulers have been able to do.

The failure of these three dictators might be explained by their lack of the great abilities which all the successful dictators possess. But although this clearly contributed, yet it appears that the social background in the countries they ruled was unsuitable to dictatorship and that the crisis, which enabled them to seize power, was not serious enough to override everything else. It is interesting to observe that all the failures occurred in poor and peculiarly unmodern countries. Except where there is a tradition of discipline, as in Turkey, dictatorship seems to be more difficult in these poor and, therefore, relatively simple, states than in modern industrial nations. Social traditions and actual circumstances are both important in deciding whether dictatorship will appear or survive. These two factors may work in different directions, as they would in England if a tremendous crisis ever arose, or they may support each other as they did in Turkey and Germany; but the most important thing seems to be the extent and seriousness of the crisis. If things are only bad enough, a dictator might appear in any country, even a country whose traditions were violently opposed to it, but the fact that dictatorship has everywhere arisen out of a crisis is not an explanation; every sudden change comes, in a sense, from a crisis, and the question still remains, Why in these circumstances do people turn to a dictator?

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## CHAPTER II

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Many theories have been put forward to account for the survival of autocracy; of these perhaps the most popular is the explanation, or a variation of it, which is offered by the Communists.

Communism regards the Liberal State simply as a concealed dictatorship, and the Fascist State as this dictatorship in its naked form. Political democracy, in this view, is a farce which enables the capitalists to delude the workers. As long as it can be carried on it is, from the capitalist point of view, the most efficient form of government. The growth of workingclass organization, however, prevents the continuance of this illusion of peace, and the capitalist is compelled to resort to open force. This explanation, of course, stands or falls by its interpretation of the Liberal State, but although no one but a professed Communist accepts this interpretation, many people regard dictatorship as in some special way the rule of a class; a class not in the sense of a definite and limited body of men, which of course it is, but in the sense of a social class. It is therefore interesting to see how far the history of modern dictatorship fits this theory.

Many nineteenth-century thinkers besides Marx thought that democracy would produce a clash between the working class and the owners of property and that universal suffrage would inevitably end in civil war. The situation imagined by De Tocqueville as vividly as by Marx is a situation in which a Socialist party is making a vigorous attack, either by preparing for a violent seizure of power or by attempting to pass Socialist legislation. 'The creation of a Fascist party is then a

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desperate expedient only resorted to by a capitalist class in the face of the most urgent danger from the workers.'1 In theory this seems a probable or even an inevitable development. In actual fact only two modern dictatorships arose out of social conflict. In Turkey there was no social conflict at all. In Poland neither Socialism nor Communism played much part in the inefficiency which led to the coup d'état of 1926. The real Socialist Party was not particularly strong and certainly was not a serious menace to established order; the Communist Party was non-existent. No party was proposing any large transfer of power or property. Pilsudski drew adherents from every class. He was supported by the urban working class, and the railway strike in his support was the decisive factor in his success. The proximity of Russia undoubtedly led people to believe in the necessity of strong government, but it was Russia in her aspect of national State, not of Communist missionary, which Poland feared. In Germany the victorious Nazis declared their dictatorship to be anti-Communist, but before the coup d'état there was no immediate prospect of a Communist revolution, and after the coup d'état the Nazis were as determined to destroy the Liberal and Conservative political organizations as they were to abolish Communism. In Yugoslavia the quarrel lay between geographical, not racial, units, and local, not class, hostility led to the impasse which made dictatorship possible.

Only in Italy and Russia did dictatorship arise from social conflict. The most striking fact about the situation before the coup d'état in both these countries is not the revolutionary fervour of the workers, but the complete collapse of the government, not as a result of revolutionary action but before any such action had occurred. In Russia this administrative collapse was used by the working class and the working-class leaders,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> JOHN STRACHEY, The Coming Struggle for Power. Victor Gollancz, London, 1932.

but they did not produce it. It was caused by the disorganization of industry and transport, which was not consciously desired by anyone, either Socialist or capitalist. In Italy the Socialist movement had failed before the Fascists really became powerful. The peak of the Socialist movement was the seizure of the factories by the workers in 1920, loudly encouraged by Mussolini. This attempt at workers' control collapsed without the intervention of any capitalist organization. From this moment the power of the Socialist movement steadily declined. The Fascist movement in Italy did not, as it should have according to Communist theory, step in and seize the prize from the workers just as they were on the point of gaining it. The Fascist power only began to grow when the revolutionary ardour of the Socialist Party was already on the wane.

Also, both the Fascist and the National Socialist parties attracted a considerable number of working-class adherents. In Communist theory this fact is irrelevant, for the workingclass Fascist is simply considered as a dupe of the capitalist. It is none the less interesting that in 1921 50 per cent of the membership of the Fascist Party was working-class. Agricultural labourers formed 24 per cent, industrial workers 16 per cent, and private office employees 10 per cent of the total membership. In Germany the National Socialist Party had a working-class element; but even apart from this it is plain that large numbers of working people must have voted for Hitler in the elections preceding his formation of a government. Fascism is essentially a popular movement, far more a popular movement than Communism, which in no country outside Russia has been able to collect a tenth of the votes which Hitler polled in the elections from 1930 to 1933.

There is a difference amongst Communist writers as to the class which benefits by Fascism. Some say Fascism is a reaction of the lower middle class, others that it is a government of large capitalists, others that it is designed to save the profits of

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'finance-capital'. Certainly industrialists have not been conspicuous in their support of Fascist parties. In Italy, it is true, some industrialists were prepared to support Fascism as a sort of militia, but they were certainly not enthusiastic about a Fascist government. In Germany if business, either big or little, supported any party it was rather the Nationalists than the National Socialists. The fact that many individuals contributed to the Fascist Party's funds does not make that party a capitalist party, any more than the fact that most of the Bolshevist leaders were of middle-class origin makes the Bolshevist a party for the protection of middle-class interests. One Communist writer describes the typical Fascist Party as composed of the petit bourgeois, the worst of the 'aristocrats', of labour, disillusioned Socialists and backward peasants. This heterogeneous mass is 'used' by the ruling class. That is, the Fascist Party is composed of representatives of every class or group in the country.

Nor can it be said with any accuracy that Fascist dictatorship is exercised in the interest of any one class. As Professor Röpke has pointed out in connection with Germany, the distinguishing characteristic of Fascist dictatorship is its complete separation from any class. The dictatorship is exercised theoretically in what is conceived to be the national interest, and the special interests of all or any class are sacrificed to this conception. Practically the only class which has benefited is the party members. It cannot be argued by anyone that the present economic policy of the German Government, for example, either is intended to help or does in fact help the capitalists to make profits. It is apparently the contention of some writers that the nationalist policy of Germany is undertaken for the purpose of benefiting the manufacturers of armaments. The fantastic improbability of this sort of explanation of a large political movement is obvious.

The economic policy of both Italy and Germany is the very

opposite of that which would be pursued by a dictatorship, anxious to save or to restore capitalism. The distinguishing characteristic of capitalism is the allocation of the factors of production in accordance with the profit index. The Fascist governments have consistently ignored this index. Besides extremely high taxation, there is in both countries strict control of private investment in order to canalize money into those industries the government wishes to encourage. It is forbidden to pay a dividend of more than 6 per cent. Pressure is brought to bear on employers to take on more labour or to refrain from dismissing workmen regardless of the needs of the business. Trade Unions were abolished not because they were a menace to the economic, but because they might become a danger to the new political system.

Any policy destined to stabilize the existing situation is interpreted by the more extreme Socialist and by Communist writers as a capitalist manœuvre. It must, however, be remembered that some governments are completely uninterested in the relative position of different classes within the community, being concerned only with securing or maintaining the independence of the country. For example, it is plain in the case of Poland that, if it was Pilsudski's primary object to keep Poland independent, the first years of its existence were not the time to start far-reaching social reforms. Such reforms, however desirable in themselves, would obviously have created violent opposition to the government just when it was essential that the government should be supported by as many people as possible. Pilsudski's policy was dictated by no preference for any particular social class, but by the view that Poland required a period of internal peace and stability. He has himself set out quite plainly the considerations which guided him: 'Poland must be prudent; because she was new and poor, she had to avoid hazardous experiments. The Right and the Left are with us about equal, as the weak majorities by which our social

laws were passed, proved. For the moment we must remain as we are, without essaying adventures with the Right or the Left.'1

But though no Fascist dictatorship is exercised in the interest of any particular social class, it is true that certain industrial or land-owning groups can and do, for economic reasons, attach themselves to the dictatorship. Alliances of this kind tend, however, to be precarious, for Fascist governments unhesitatingly sacrifice their friends if necessary. The industrial workers can also to some extent levy the same kind of blackmail, as can be seen by the efforts to conciliate working-class opinion by organizations such as the Italian Corporations and the German Labour Front.

To the consideration that dictatorship has occurred in countries where there was no social conflict, the convinced Communist retorts that the dictatorship arose from class conflict in the sense that the aim of these dictators is essentially to produce an environment suitable for the development of a bourgeois industrial class. But even if this analysis could be proved, it tells us nothing of the circumstances which made dictatorship possible in the first place. It is quite plain that social conflict did not produce the collapse of the Sultan's government in Turkey or the tension between the Croats and the Serbs. In Poland it is true that there existed a Socialist Party, and antagonism between the landowners and the peasants may be held to have been one of the minor causes of the inefficiency of the Sejm. But the existence of a Socialist Party is not an inevitable prelude to dictatorship. There was, indeed, no reason inherent in what is known as the 'alignment of class forces' why the Socialist Party should not have filled the position occupied by the Socialist Party in Great Britain or France.

We touch here, on the cardinal error of all Marxist explana<sup>1</sup> E. J. Patterson. Speech quoted in *Pilsudski*, *Marshal of Poland*. Arrowsmith.

tions of social phenomena - namely, that the class-conflict produces both a particular situation and its opposite; that it produces both revolution and reaction, both stable and unstable political conditions.1 This, even if true, would be a truth of singularly little interest. It accounts for the existence of a struggle, but cannot explain why the struggle occurs when it does or why one class should be successful at one time and another class at some other time. As far as Marxist theory can guide us, a Communist revolution might have occurred in Great Britain in 1880. The only explanation of the success of the National Socialists which is vouchsafed us is the mistaken policy of the Social Democratic leaders. But this seems hardly compatible with the materialist conception of history. The idea that a revolution can be stopped because politicians adopt a certain policy is in direct contradiction to the theory that all political change is determined by changes in methods of production. Marxist historians do in fact, of course, fall back on secondary causes. They elaborate the naked theory of the class struggle by saying that revolution will occur when the possessing class can no longer buy off the workers. But this procedure gives away the entire case, for the precipitating cause becomes not social conflict but whatever new factor makes it impossible for the capitalists to continue their beneficent operations. The social conflict might have raged for ever without producing a change in the form of government. Nor is it any answer to this to show, if it can be shown, that the secondary causes also arise from some shift in economic power, either between classes or between national states.

It is easy to imagine or indeed to see conflicts about economic matters. What is not easy to see is, why in Marxist theory the only conflict which has any importance is the conflict between the two classes, into which the modern world is said to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See P. A. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories. Harper, New York, 1936.

divided, those with property and those without. Quite apart from the question of whether this classification is a useful or accurate one, divergences of interest, either real or believed, have appeared between many other groups and have entirely cut across the Marxist classification; for example, the political quarrels which have arisen in some countries between agricultural and industrial producers. The theory of the class-war is not however founded on an observation of the facts, but on the belief in a Socialist State which will give the whole product of industry to the workers and indefinitely raise their standards. The only motive anyone could have for opposing Socialism is the desire to secure for ever the benefits which an unjust system allows them. It has, however, never been proved that a Socialist State could do what its advocates hope; on the contrary, both theoretical considerations and such examples as we see in practice justify the gravest doubts. It is, therefore, extremely unlikely that a real basis for the class conflict exists and there remains no reason to maintain that people are waging the classwar, when they themselves declare that they are doing something quite different.

The threat of Communist violence as distinct from class conflict is, of course, one of the chief factors which produce dictatorship. Clearly, if one party is determined to attempt a coup d'état, the only way of resisting it is by force. It is obvious that this must in the end destroy democratic government. In Italy the Socialists were the first to resort to violence; in Germany the Communists, although they did not in practice try violence and war, never ceased to preach the necessity of violent revolution, bloodshed and massacre. It seems foolish to complain if the more timid bourgeois thought they really meant what they said.

Many neutral writers have put forward theories to account for dictatorship. There are a great number, but they fall into four chief groups: dictatorship as a result of the War, dictator-

ship as a mass neurosis, dictatorship as the result of the introduction of democracy into countries not sufficiently developed to understand it, and dictatorship as a result of racial psychology. All these explanations contain a certain amount of truth, but neither separately nor together do they provide a complete and satisfactory answer to this problem of the change in the political attitude of large numbers of people.

The War is in one sense obviously the cause of dictatorship, but dictatorship has not appeared in all the countries which took part in the last War, so it cannot be merely the experience of war which is the deciding factor.

There are many people who describe dictatorship as a massneurosis. If by the term 'neurosis' is meant more than a metaphor, it seems to have no relation to political phenomena. No one would deny that certain social events - for example, defeat in war - have a morbid effect on the individuals composing the nation concerned, and that the emotion, engendered by defeat, is heightened by the perception that it is shared. But in what sense this can be called neurosis is difficult to see. The distinguishing point of neurosis is an inability to adjust oneself to the realities of life. It is essentially the destruction of the power to make the appropriate response. The action which has been called 'mass-neurosis' may, for all we know, be the appropriate reaction to preserve the nation. It is, of course, perfectly easy to answer that the rational course would be not to preserve the nation, but the point is that the individual already feels the nation to have value, and, feeling this, it seems likely that a great deal of the social behaviour which we call neurotic may be useful.

For example, one of the most obvious parallels between individual and social neurosis is the tendency of conquered nations to be absorbed in romantic dreams of their history. In the individual this kind of day-dreaming tends to be disastrous to initiative and fatal to happiness, and the social day-dreaming of

a whole nation certainly affects individuals in the most unhappy way. But equally there is no question that in a country like Poland or Ireland this habit did serve to keep alive the national self-consciousness and therefore prevent the nation being absorbed into the larger unit. Neurosis is an abnormal reaction to a situation. Can the reaction of the Germans or the Italians to defeat in war and economic difficulties really be described as abnormal? It is surely normal to be humiliated by defeat, to resent being forced to admit that one's country was guilty of starting the war, and to be seriously alarmed by the prospect of imminent civil war. Even the adoration of the dictator, although it obviously incorporates unconscious motives, can hardly be called abnormal. It is normal to human beings to feel gratitude, and if the dictators can perform what they promise no human beings would be more worthy of gratitude. It may be argued that people should be able to see that the dictator cannot do these things, but this failure is an intellectual shortcoming. One may believe what is not true without being in any way neurotic.

It used to be fashionable to explain dictatorship as a result of the introduction of democracy to countries not sufficiently developed to understand it. The argument was extended to include Italy by the suggestion that democracy was incompatible with a predominantly agricultural economy. This idea was put in its most picturesque form by Delaisi, who said that Europe could be divided into two halves by a line drawn from Bilbao to Kovno; below the line was to be observed dictatorship and the horse, above it democracy and the tractor. The advent of Hitler has destroyed this connection between agriculture and dictatorship. The reason that agricultural countries were the first to establish dictatorship was rather that the agricultural countries were poor and weak and therefore more likely to get into difficulties of every kind. Violent political change does not occur in periods of prosperity and success. The economic

crisis has now overtaken the industrial countries and shown that industrial development is no insurance against autocracy.

The example of Hitler has also abolished the correlation between dictatorship and illiteracy. The Germans are at least as well educated and intellectually developed as any other people. A great deal has lately been made of the fact that Germany was before the War a monarchy and that Germans consequently lacked political experience. It is, of course, true that to the average German the idea of the authoritarian State is less repugnant than it is to the average Englishman or Frenchman; but the other aspect of dictatorship, the violence and illegality, would have seemed before 1933 even more repugnant. Germany was ruled by an Emperor, but by an Emperor who, though powerful, was in the fullest sense of the term subject to the law; and liberty, intellectual and personal, seemed as safe in Germany as elsewhere. The fact that Pacifists or Socialists were not favourably regarded by German society as a whole does not differentiate Germany from other democratic countries.

Political inexperience is a more valid point, but the collapse of the Republic does not seem to have been due to political incompetence. The price of democracy may be the establishment of the two-party system, but under proportional representation such a development is impossible. German democracy seemed, before Hitler's victory enabled us all to be wise after the event, to show political incompetence in two ways: by the multiplication of parties and the instability of government. Both these, however, are characteristic of French democracy. In spite of this instability of the Cabinet, German democracy did not show the symptoms which preceded the democratic collapse in other countries. Government in Italy and Poland was almost paralysed, and in both countries the outstanding feature was the weakness of the executive. The German coalition government under Brüming was not timid or weak.

The essential functions of government were carried on, the violence of the Nazis and the Communists was firmly suppressed, and there was no failure to protect the ordinary citizen in his daily life.

Dictatorship has been frequently explained as a result of national psychology: some peoples are said to have an innate tendency to autocratic government. Very little is known about racial psychology, and even if it could be proved that certain attributes were racial, that would not carry us much further. Modern nations, like Germany and England, are not races but amalgams of a large number of races. Nor is the concept of racial psychology necessary, for the tendency of nations to behave in the same way over long periods of time can be adequately accounted for by the strength of national tradition. The individuals composing a nation are educated in certain ways and taught to admire and condemn certain kinds of action. The different attitudes inculcated towards authority, for example, in America and Russia must have some effect in determining the country's attitude to different forms of government. The strength of national tradition explains the survival of certain ideas and institutions, but it cannot explain social change. Dictatorship, even where it has succeeded autocracy, has involved a violent breach with tradition - for example in Turkey and Russia. The living tradition in Italy was rather democratic than autocratic.

All these explanations concentrate on the situation previous to the coup d'état and attempt to find some common factor in the countries concerned or in the problems which seem to have led to dictatorship. It is impossible to establish any unity between the different countries ruled by dictators. There is no similarity in social structure, economic organization, national tradition or race. Germany, Nordic, industrial and largely Protestant, succumbed as easily as Poland, chiefly agricultural, Slav and Catholic. Italy, with a strongly Liberal

tradition, accepted an autocrat as quietly as Turkey, which had never known any other form of government. Nor can a common factor be found in the crisis which preceded dictatorship. The difficulties which led to dictatorship arose from the most varied causes. The common factor in dictatorship is not to be found in the crisis, but in the similarity of the government set up to deal with the crisis, a similarity more striking still when it is remembered with what different aims the dictators are inspired. These governments have two aspects: the administrative aspect of extreme centralization and the psychological aspect of the worship of the dictator.

It is clear that autocracy has certain administrative advantages in all situations and definite advantages over democracy in some situations. There is at the moment a tendency to over-rate the irrational element in social movements as much as the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers overrated the rational elements. Because much or even most political behaviour is caused by emotional or unconscious forces, it does not follow that there is no rational behaviour. Men are not guided by reason in the choice of their ends, but they are guided by reason, to some extent at least, in the choice of the means by which they propose to attain these ends. No one deliberately chooses a form of organization which he believes to be incapable of securing the object he has in view. An illustration of this is the turning of many Socialists to authoritarian government, which is opposed to the ideals - in other words the emotions — which were the original basis of their creed. Socialists start from the conviction that liberty and equality are good; they then see, or think that they see, that liberty and equality are impossible in the present economic system, and finally they defend dictatorship, which is in itself a negation of liberty and equality. Of course, when the Socialists are actually in power their attitude can be explained by their desire to stay there, though even then the explanation is pro-

bably inadequate. But Socialists undergo this development who are neither dictators nor ever likely to become dictators. Their attitude is to be explained partly by the psychological attractions of dictatorship, a purely emotional reaction, and partly by a perfectly rational perception that dictatorship is the most efficient instrument for the introduction of Socialism. These latter considerations are most likely to influence those who are themselves in politics or who passionately desire some definite end such as Socialism or national revival.

The fact that all dictatorships have adopted the same kind of organization shows that this organization is efficient for certain purposes. The advantages of autocracy are well known: quickness, decision and ability to disregard public opinion. In normal circumstances these are not really of great moment. It is much more important that action should be right than it should be quick; much more important that no one should be treated unjustly and that the majority should willingly consent than that startling decisions should be taken. But there are circumstances in which it matters more that something should be done than what that something is. For example, in Turkey at the end of the War it was essential that the State should be reorganized; the basis of reorganization was really a secondary consideration. In the crises which afflict most modern States, such as economic depression, the exact opposite is true: it is the rightness of the action taken which is of supreme importance. Secondly, in a crisis it is sometimes necessary — and people believe it to be necessary more often than it is — to suppress or disregard some section of the population. Democracy by its very nature makes this impossible. Dictatorship in such circumstances is efficient just because it does allow public opinion to be disregarded. People consent to give up their own power because they are thankful to find someone prepared to take the responsibility of unpopular action.

It is clear that the efficiency of dictatorship in a crisis is one

of the factors which allows it to succeed, but it is also clear that its superiority to democracy in this sense is not great enough to account completely for its success, much less to account for the enthusiasm which the dictators undoubtedly inspire. The most striking feature of the revival of autocracy is the fact that it is, in theory at least, the rule of one man. How far the ruler actually exercises the powers attributed to him no one can say with any certainty. But it is obvious that all dictators are immensely powerful in practice, and in theory they are absolutely supreme. This is a psychological phenomenon, and its explanation is to be found in the psychological crisis which accompanied the political crisis.

It is important to realize that the crisis which preceded the dictatorship was in every case a real crisis. In no instance has dictatorship been the result of mere intrigue or of minor political difficulties. In every case it has been imposed to deal with serious problems. Even in Spain the problems were serious, as has been shown by recent events in that unhappy country. In the other countries it had been found impossible to carry on the existing government before the dictator seized power. The previous governments were not exactly overthrown by the dictator; they had already collapsed. In Poland it was impossible to come to any decision on the most important question of the moment, the financial crisis. In Yugoslavia the deadlock between the Serbs and the Croats made it impossible to continue sittings of the Assembly. In Italy the Liberal government had abdicated their power by allowing the Fascists and Socialists to carry on what amounted to civil war. In Turkey and Russia the autocratic governments had simply disappeared. In Germany no government could be formed without the support of the Nazis unless the other parties had consented to enter an anti-Nazi coalition, which none of them would have done. Not only was it impossible in this sense to carry on the work of government, but the existing systems had

either never had, or had lost, their psychological hold over their subjects. In Russia and Turkey the majority of the people, and in the other countries large and growing minorities, rejected the moral claim of the State to obedience.

The situation is to some extent analogous to that in the sixteenth century when the struggles between Catholics and Protestants made it necessary to revise the medieval conception of society. In modern Russia and Turkey the religious obligation to the State was also destroyed by the spread of European ideas. In Italy and Germany the growth of revolutionary Socialism divided the country into two groups with antagonistic conceptions of the nature and purpose of the State. The growth of Socialism is important, not from the Communist point of view that the possessing classes will defend themselves, or even from the point of view of civil war, but because the Socialists in Italy, and both the National Socialists and the Communists in Germany, refused to acknowledge the ordinary obligations of citizens. If a large number of persons refuse in this way to recognize the authority of the State, even if they remain a minority, either the State will collapse into anarchy or into several States, or a new basis for authority must be found. This is even plainer when the division is not theoretical but geographical, as it was in Yugoslavia.

The situation becomes even more urgent when the problems which created the antagonistic parties are not the only problems, but when the State is also faced with other dangers. This is the case in all modern dictatorships. The countries are simultaneously faced with an internal problem and with external dangers, or what are thought to be external dangers. In this situation a new government must be organized and made acceptable to the people. As many divergent aspirations as possible must be included in the new governments, and in order to do this it is essential to introduce a new principle not associated with either party in the previous conflicts. In the

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modern world, as in Rome and in Cromwellian England, this new principle is personal loyalty to an individual. From the popular point of view, dictatorship is government by one man, and this aspect, as we have seen, is constantly emphasized in the propaganda. The reason for this emphasis is that personal loyalty provides an emotional basis for reconstruction. Hitler in *Mein Kampf* puts this point quite clearly: 'One must not forget that admiration for him who is great not only represents a tribute of gratitude to greatness, but also a virtue which binds together and unites all those who experience this gratitude.'

In all countries governed by dictators there is a cult of the ruler, the ruler conceived not as a means to some end but as an end in himself. He is the expression and personification of the age, asserting himself as its ruler by the splendour of his personality. Everything he does is right because he does it. The proclamation after Mussolini's escape from assassination in 1926 ran as follows:

"No reprisals.

No demonstration, either civil or religious. We must obev.

Who fails to obey offends the Duce whom God has given, and whom he now wants definitely to preserve intangible for the safety and greatness of our country.

Signed, The Provincial Political Secretary."

A careful and experienced observer comments on this: 'On the part of the writer this manifesto is no doubt rhetorical, but on the part of many poor peasants these sentiments are quite genuine and express literally a religious conviction.'

'Mussolini is always right. One thing should be dear to you above all else, the life of the Duce', is the instruction given to Fascist recruits. The prayer of the avanguardisti begins with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> H. W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1931.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Almanocco Scholastico, quoted in F. W. Roman, New Education in Europe. Routledge, 1930.

an appeal to God and ends with a blessing on Mussolini: 'In the adored name of Benito Mussolini may he be blessed (nel nome adorato di Benito Mussolini benedice).' 1

A Turkish author writes of Mustafa Kemal: 'The great chief has given his body and his blood to the party exactly as the Messiah at the last supper said for the bread, "This is my body"; for the wine, "This is my blood". He who ransomed and saved the Turkish race from final destruction has given to his people, too, in the written history of the seven years' struggle a political scripture which will become a symbol of their redeemed national life.'2

"Thine was the arm which dragged us from the narrow passage which leads to death. We walk always in the lines traced by thee, our road is illumined by thy divine light."

Emilio Bordero has stated the Fascist attitude to Mussolini in philosophic terms: 'Italy has been at all times the country of the individual, of man exemplary as such; not merely as a man of genius nor as a hero in Carlyle's sense of the word, nor as a representative in the Emersonian significance of that term, but rather of man as a type, as a perfect human product existing in his own right... Mussolini is indeed the man in the Messianic sense, which I have already expounded, but he is also the exemplary Italian in whom the people finds its representative.' The influence of Nietzsche is evident in this passage, but the same idea occurs in Turkey, where it is unlikely to be derived, directly at least, from the German philosopher:

"There is in creation much that is beautiful, much that is fine. But the most beautiful and the finest of all is a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Almanocco Scholastico, quoted in F. W. Roman, New Education in Europe. Routledge.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> YACOUB KADRI, quoted in GRACE ELLISON, Turkey To-day.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> From a Turkish school reading book for children.

<sup>4 &#</sup>x27;The Fascist Dictatorship' in *Dictatorship on its Trial*. Ed. Otto Forst de Batteglia. Translated H. Patteson. New York, 1931.

perfect human being. To feel this from the heart it is only necessary to be, even for a short time, in the presence of the great Gazi."1

Similar sentiments are expressed about the Polish dictator. 'We might concentrate on a number of reforms carried through during this period ... but we prefer to contemplate the man himself, his features, gestures and deeds, standing out against the background of his people and of the distracted and tormented continent of Europe . . . His figure is the embodiment of greatness, grace and heroism combined with simplicity. The virtues of centuries of magnificent examples have become lyric in his life.' An eye-witness has given a description of heroworship. 'The Gazi appeared on the lawn. As soon as these poor peasants saw the object of their adoration they were frozen with awe and respect; then, clenching their cloth caps with sheer nervous tension, they ran up to the President, deposited their baskets of fruit before him and talked stammeringly, as if dazed by magnificence of something superhuman ... An old man wept as he held the basket of their humble offering to the Turkish hero.'3

In Germany the attitude of hero-worship has been formulated into a definite theory. There are 'Führers' for every branch of activity; but as well as this extension there is the same adoration of the person of the dictator as in other countries. Goering, in his book Germany Reborn, describes Hitler's relation to his party: 'Everyone who knows the close inner bond between Hitler and his men will understand that for us followers it is axiomatic that the Leader must possess any quality which is attributed to him in its highest perfection. Just as the Roman Catholic considers the Pope infallible in all matters concerning religion and morals, so do we believe with the same inner

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> From a Turkish reading book for adults.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> 'Poland and Dictatorship' in *Dictatorship on its Trial*, ibid.
<sup>3</sup> SIRDAR IKBAL ALI SHAH, 'The Changing Face of Islam' in Journal of the Central Asian Society, 1929.

conviction that for us the Leader is, in all political and other matters concerning the national and social interests of the people, simply infallible.' Newspapers and magazines are full of descriptions of the Leader, often expressed in the terms of Christian symbolism. 'The War produced, apart from all its horrors, the epochal source of new life. All the healing power that sprang from it has been condensed in the person of Lance-Corporal Adolf Hitler, the light of whose ideas was for weeks dimmed by gas, our opponents' meanest weapon, in order that, although outwardly blind, he might see the inner light of the German transformation.'

Benn the poet thus explains the principle of leadership:

"The Leader is the creative force; in his person are united the irrational elements of the will of history, first made visible by him ... He appoints himself, although one may also say that he is appointed; it is the voice from the burning bush and he follows it; thither he must go and see the great face. In our case the mass followed, and surrendered itself to the Leader."

In Russia the same phenomena occurred in spite of the theory of historic materialism, held as an article of faith by the Bolshevists, which denies that an individual can have any influence on the progress of events. The worship of Lenin has spread from the children's organizations to the whole field of national life. The Lenin corner now not only appears in schools and children's clubs, but also in ships and barracks. The most astonishing example of the tendency is the mausoleum in which Lenin lies embalmed and the never-ending procession of people passing through to see the dead hero as he was in life.

Trotsky has protested against the deification of Lenin, but even he has used language about Lenin as fervent as any

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> KARL RAUCH, 'Die literarische Welt', quoted in *Heil Hitler*. Christophers, London, 1934.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Gottfried Benn, Der Neue Staat und die Intellectuen. Berlin, 1934.

employed by the admirers of Mussolini or Hitler. 'And now Vladimir Ilyich is no more. The party is orphaned, the workers' class is orphaned. Our party is Leninism in practice, our party is the collective leader of the workers.'1 Later in the same book he attempts to reconcile Marxism and hero-worship. 'We sing, "No higher being saves us", and also, "No tribune"; that is right, but only in the historic sense, that is, in so far as the workers would finally conquer if there had been no Marx, no Lenin. The workers themselves would have perfected the ideas of the working class, but it would have been slower... Lenin, the greatest executant of the testament, who not only trained the proletariat aristocracy but trained classes and peoples in the execution of the law, in the most difficult situations, and who acted, manœuvred and conquered.' only Lenin but also Stalin is included in this new appreciation of individual personality. Modern Books, Ltd., the Communist publishers, produce a Stalin pocket series; among them is a symposium on the character and career of Stalin. In this book the celebration of Stalin's birthday is described:

"Numberless telegrams are coming in from all over the Union and foreign countries congratulating Stalin on his fiftieth birthday. There is hardly a workers' meeting of any considerable size which would not mark the event ... expressions of greeting and the warmest sympathy for the most faithful pupil and fellow fighter of Lenin, the best of the best of those forming the iron guard of Bolshevism."

It is laid down in the beginning of the Stalin series that this enthusiasm is not hero-worship. Mr. and Mrs. Webb, however, although they do not consider Stalin a dictator, find in Russia 'the deliberate exploitation by the governing junta of the emotion of hero-worship, of the traditional reverence of the Russian people for a personal autocrat . . . Scarcely a speech is made, or a conference held, without a naive — some would say

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> LEON TROTSKY, Lenin. New York, 1931.

a fulsome — reference to "Comrade Stalin" as the great leader of the people.' On January 22nd, 1936, a ceremony in commemoration of Lenin was held. The *Daily Telegraph* correspondent thus described the scene:

"When President Kalinin had acclaimed Stalin as the great inheritor of Lenin's cause the entire vast audience sprang to their feet... and gave the 'great Red Leader' an endless ovation. Comadu Stekzi then painted a glowing picture of the triumphant path followed by our land since Lenin's death, under the genius-leader the great Stalin."

It will naturally be asked here whether such expressions can be regarded as genuine. Are they not tributes forced from a terrorized population, or an extravagant form of flattery used by those who wish to get something out of the dictator? The answer is not so simple as a rationalist psychology taught the nineteenth century to believe. The roots of impulse are so intertwined in the human mind that even the individual cannot always tell when submission is extorted by fear, and when fear becomes pleasure and pleasure fear. It is still more difficult to judge the reaction of a whole people, especially in countries where dissent would be dangerous. But there seem to be reasons for believing that the adoration so lavishly expressed is, at least in part, genuine. This, of course, does not mean that it is not encouraged and in fact largely created by propaganda. The very existence of the propaganda suggests, however, that there is a desire for some such figure. Political propaganda never tries to create new desires; it simply gives people what they are believed to want, trusting to the carelessness and preoccupation of the majority of the citizens to prevent them noticing the discrepancy between the actual and the official. What people are believed to want is an all-powerful ruler. It might have been thought that the power of the dictator would have been minimized and that he would have been presented

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> BEATRICE and SYDNEY WEBB, Soviet Communism. Longmans, 1936.

as the servant of the public. On the contrary, his power is if anything exaggerated, especially in Italy and Germany. This exaggeration of the dictator's power implies that there is an emotional need for the tyrant.

Popular expressions of enthusiasm strengthen this impression. The reception given to Mussolini during his tour in 1930 assumed proportions which could not have been the result of stage management, however skilful. When Mustafa Kemal travelled through Anatolia in December and January, 1930-31, peasants walked fifty miles and more to see him. It is possible to induce people to gather in the streets and cheer by police pressure, but surely by no amount of intimidation to walk fifty miles in an Anatolian winter. The crowds which visit Lenin's tomb are another example, but as Lenin is safely dead perhaps it has less weight. My personal experience of Turkey and Germany makes me believe that there is genuine enthusiasm for the dictator in these countries, and other travellers seem to arrive at the same conclusion.<sup>2</sup>

The readiness of foreign observers who have nothing to fear or to gain to share in the emotional experience of hero-worship supports the view that there is an emotional satisfaction in the experience of hero-worship. It is an Hungarian, not an Italian who writes of Mussolini: 'From the conflict of classes and parties, from the dramatic clash of capital and labour, from the chaotic tumult of the twentieth century, in the red twilight of the declining age has stepped forth—the man.' An Englishwoman on Kemal Pasha: 'Yet the first impression Mustafa Kemal Pasha made on me must be terrifying to the strongest nerves. As he folded his arms on his desk, leaned

<sup>1</sup> The Times, January 19th, 1931.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> PROFESSOR KANTOROWIEZ thinks that the dictator is certainly supported by the majority of the people in Turkey and Portugal, probably in Italy and Poland, possibly in Russia and Yugoslavia, certainly not in Austria. Article: 'Dictatorship' in Politica, Aug. 1935.

<sup>3</sup> Il Duce. L. Kemensky, trans. London, 1930.

forward and gazed at me with the strangest eyes ever possessed by man ... Mustafa Kemal seemed as if he would see right down into one's very soul, and I was thankful indeed when the entrance of one of his Ministers ended the strange contest of wills.'1 A Russian describes the overwhelming impression which Pilsudski made on him: 'Quand le maréchal entra dans la chambre, "le vent silencieux", dont parle le Livre des Rois, souffla sur moi. Immédiatement j'ai eu cette impression. Oui, c'est lui le héros, "ens realissimum", "l'être le plus réal" de Nietzsche.'2 Lenin appeared to a German Communist as the prototype of Christ: 'An impression of unspoken and unspeakable suffering was on his face. I was moved, shaken. In my mind I saw the picture of the crucified Christ . . . Lenin appeared to me burdened, oppressed, with all the pain and all the suffering of the Russian people.'s A Frenchman writes the most fervent panegyric on Stalin which perhaps any dictator has inspired: 'He is the real leader — the one of whom the workers used to say that he was master and comrade at the same time; he is the paternal brother who really watches over everyone. Although you do not know him, he knows you and is thinking of you. Whoever you may be, you need this benefactor. Whoever you may be, the finest part of your destiny is in the hands of that other man, who also watches over you and works for you. The man with a scholar's mind, a workman's face and the dress of a private soldier.'4

Another reason for believing that this worship of the ruler is genuine is that it appears to recur in history. In the Hellenistic monarchies and in the Roman Empire it did actually go as far as regarding the ruler as divine. Alexander the Great was the first Greek to be worshipped as a god during

<sup>1</sup> GRACE ELLISON, Turkey To-day.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> DMITRI MEREZHKOVSKY, Joseph Pilsudski. Société des Publications Internaux. Warsaw, 1921.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> K. ZETKIN, Reminiscences of Lenin. New York, 1934.

<sup>4</sup> H. BARBUSSE, Stalin. Flammarion, Paris, 1935.

his lifetime, and his successors inherited his divinity. The Hellenistic kings were adored as gods, not only in Egypt, with its tradition of the king-god, but also in purely Greek States like Athens, where Demetrius was worshipped. Octavius, the successor of Julius Caesar, was deified under the name of Augustus, and sacrifices were offered to him in the same way as to the other gods in the Roman Pantheon. The deification of Augustus, in so far as it is possible to judge of psychological states in any time but one's own, appears to have as its foundation the same psychological impulses as the exaltation of the dictator in the modern State. It was long believed that deification was simply an extreme form of flattery. The Augustan poets were called a propaganda bureau, or it was even more crudely suggested that the references to Augustus were inspired by the same motives as the dedications of eighteenth-century writers. But Rostovtzeff considers that these writings reflect, if not the poet's own feelings, at least the popular reaction to the settlement of Augustus. He is convinced that the cult of Augustus grew up spontaneously and was not imposed from above.1 Even Dr. Bevan, who considers that nothing was meant by the deification of the Greek kings 'except to adulate in an extreme degree', thinks that in the uneducated classes there was 'probably some measure of real faith in the god-man'.2

Deification is, of course, a complex attitude, and it is no doubt true that it was encouraged for political ends, assisted by the movement to fuse the different gods into one supreme deity; and that the people were used to the idea of ascribing divine honours to men, both from the Greek practice of worshipping dead heroes who were never supposed to be more than men, and from the ritual of the Persian and Egyptian Courts. But these factors merely decided the form which the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> ROSTOVTZEFF, Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire. Oxford University Press, 1926. Article, 'Augustus' in the University of Wisconsin Studies in Languages and Literature, No. 15, 1922.

2 'The Deification of Kings in the Greek Cities' in English Historical Review, 1901.

adoration of these great saviour fighters took. The basis was the worship of beneficent power incarnated in the person of an absolute ruler; in the case of Augustus, a ruler who had saved the Roman world from the chaos and bloodshed of civil war. The actual declaration that a human being is divine is forbidden by the mental habits of the modern, as it was sanctioned by the religious thought of the ancient world; but the impulse expressed in this way, which seems so extraordinary to modern eyes, is the same which to-day causes men to exalt the dictator.

The same type of doctrine appeared in Islam in the Shi'ite doctrine of the Caliphate. Orthodox Islam expressly forbids the attribution to the Caliph of any qualities beyond those of a temporal ruler, charged indeed with the mission of protecting the interests of the community and seeing that the religious law is carried out, but incapable of altering or even of interpreting the law. The Shi'ites revolted from this conception. While the Sunni Caliph was much less than a Pope, the Shi'ite Caliph was much more: he himself incarnated the divine light, he was himself divine. The extent of his divinity and the theories by which it was supported differed among the different heretical sects, but the essential idea was the fusion of the idea of God, the ruler of the Universe, with the idea of the ruler of the world.2 The exaltation of Elizabeth as Gloriana by the Elizabethan writers has generally been regarded simply as gross flattery. Modern experience seems, however, to suggest that there was an element of genuine feeling in these effusions.

One of the most striking examples of the fascination which the 'great man' has for the human mind is shown by the frantic attempts of Marxists to fit Lenin into the theory of revolution. If there ever was a theory which destroys the influence of the

<sup>2</sup> DONALDSON, The Shi'ite Religion, Oriental Religion Series. Luzac. See also

article 'Shiahs' in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For Deification see, besides authorities quoted above: 'Deification', Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics; TARN, Hellenistic Civilization, pp. 47-9. E. Arnold, London, 1930.

human individual, that theory is historic materialism, and yet Prince Mirsky says of Lenin that 'he was the individual expression of the October Revolution', and that the only way in which he differed from the 'ordinary sort' of great man was that he was greater, he was 'selfless'. The position of Lenin, and to a lesser extent of Stalin, in the State which aims at the subordination of the individual to the collective whole is one of the most remarkable instances of that dialectical process which evolves a thing out of its opposite.

A primitive form of these ideas appears in the hero myth. Many peoples have myths of heroes who are alleged to have conferred benefits on the tribe or race, benefits ranging from 'civilization' to some special gift. Such heroes were the Greek Prometheus and the Mexican Quetzacoatl, and, in a more primitive environment, the American Indian culture heroes. A later development of this myth is that the hero is not dead but is somewhere hidden or sleeping, and will arise again in the hour of his country's greatest need. This was apparently expected of Quetzacoatl in Mexico before the Spanish conquest and the American Indians are said to have added this attribute to their culture heroes during their war with the settlers. The same story has been told of historical or pseudo-historical figures - Arthur, Frederick Barbarossa, Wenzel of Bohemia, Harold the last Saxon King, and many others. It is not only the existence of the myth which is interesting, but also the ease with which the story becomes attached to historical persons, especially to the national champion of a conquered people or to a personality who symbolized the aspirations of a repressed class. In England the story has been told of Arthur, the ancient British hero; of Harold, Owen Glendower the Welsh Prince, and Monmouth. There was the beginning of such a legend in the refusal to believe that Kitchener was really dead. A similar

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Mirsky, Lenin, Makers of the Modern Age Series. The Holme Press, London, 1931.

story is said to have grown up about Enver Pasha among the Moslem population of Russian Turkestan. The hero myth suggests that the fantasy of a beneficent, all-powerful saviour is one which arises spontaneously in the mind of many people in the face of disaster.

These examples of the attraction which 'the great man' has had for many people of very different periods and very different stages of culture indicates that there is a psychological basis for the rule of the tyrant. The emotions on which the cult of the ruler rests can be deduced from a study of the qualities which are attached to him in his own propaganda and by his own adherents.

The personality presented by the admirers of the dictators is curiously the same. He is not only supreme in his ability to wield power, but also ruthless in the use of it. The character of the dictator as displayed to the public invariably contains this quality of complete ruthlessness and even cruelty. In Turkey there is none of this mock terrorism in the actual propaganda, but foreign observers seem to find a certain pleasure in contemplating the tyrannical aspects of the dictator.

Ces yeux de Gazi d'une bleu ardoise sous les grands sourcils blonds, on ne peut pas les oublier lors qu'une fois ils ont croisés les vôtres. Caressant ou hautain, distant ou brillant d'ironie, il peut devenir implacable. J'ai vu des gens tout à fait boulversés par ce regard, déjà ils étaient à la merci de Kemal livrés tout entier à ce dominateur qui n'avait pas prononcé un mot.<sup>1</sup>

Mussolini said: 'I am the Kemal Pasha of Italy, swift, strong and relentless.' 'Italy has not asked for liberty', he remarked on another occasion. Goering said of Hitler: 'The people know he is just and charitable but also that he has an iron

3 Iĥid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Roger. Noelle. Au Pays du Gazi.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Speech, in Collection of Speeches. ed. di San Severino. Dent, London, 1923.

hand'; and Von Papen said: 'The representatives of the national revolution are men and soldiers who are physically and morally warriors.' Hitler himself declared that 'the leaders must be without the ethics of compassion.'

It is true that there is another side to the dictator. For example, Margarita Sarfatti says: 'It is difficult to withstand an order from the chief; to withstand one of his smiles is impossible.' Hitler, Stalin and Kemal are also and simultaneously praised for kindness, gentleness and self-sacrifice as well as ruthlessness, strength and courage. The 'virtues' of statesmen, however, have always formed a theme for propaganda. What is curious to remark is that traits usually considered defects are as much, if not more, insisted on.

The first element in propaganda consists of the mere contemplation of the dictator's virtues. This is reinforced by a delight in obedience to his will. In obedience to the heroes the ordinary citizen finds the true satisfaction of his own personality: 'Sans doute chacun, l'homme cultivé aussi bien que le paysan, retrouve-t-il en ce chef (Mustafa Kemal) le meilleur de lui-même!'2 Mussolini says: 'The word liberty has been replaced by the words "order", "hierarchy", "discipline", which are to-day the only words which enlist a real fascination on the fierce, restless, bold masses of the younger generation', and Lenin: 'It is true liberty is precious; it is so precious that it must be rationed.' German ideas are similar: 'A hard inward struggle, victory over oneself, and, as a result thereof, absolute subordination which is permanent and which ultimately becomes an enthusiastic and matter-of-course duty - that is Socialism.' Von Papen said in his famous speech, 'The existence of the individual has no exaggerated importance.' Obedience is also the first duty of the citizen in Turkey,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> M. SARFATTI, Life of Benito Mussolini. Butterworth, 1925.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> ROGER. Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> CELIA STRACHEY and JOHN WERNER. Berliner Börsen Zeitung, December 6th, 933, quoted in Fascist Germany Explains. Victor Gollancz, 1934.

although this obedience is supposed to be a voluntary tribute of gratitude and not a disciplinary exercise, as in Italy and Germany. 'From a single word of the Gazi we derive the strength for bringing about the most difficult changes. That is how the change in the alphabet has taken place, that is how we revolutionized the language, etc'. This delight in obedience is reinforced by the penalties for disobedience. The dictatorships of modern Europe are harshly repressive, nor is there any attempt to conceal this harshness except for foreign consumption. These precepts apply to the whole body of citizens. The demands are proportionately greater for the members of the dictator's party. 'Punishment is always deserved', is the third point in the Fascist decalogue. Hitler says: 'The soldier should learn to be silent, not only when he is dealt with justly, but he should also learn when necessary to endure injustice in silence.' This is a type of propaganda very different from anything put forward by democratic statesmen, and it would appear most unlikely to be successful; yet the dictators do secure large numbers of adherents and rouse the most violent enthusiasm.

An explanation of authority and subordination has been sought in the hypothesis of two instincts: the instinct of submission—or, as MacDougall calls it, the instinct of selfabasement—and the instinct of self-assertion. These two instinctive tendencies are said to run all through human societies and to be found among the gregarious animals. Even the loosest and most casual associations are alleged to exhibit the interplay of these instincts. 'When children and adults are together we see also a tendency to become the leader, if possible, and to follow when dominance has been established.'2

If submission is an instinctive reaction, the emotional attractions of the dictatorial form of government would be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> MILLEYET, November 3rd, 1934.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> WOODWORTH, Dynamic Psychology. Columbia University Press, New York, 1925.

explained. This view was held long before MacDougall systematized the theory of the instincts. Galton identifies what he calls the slavish instincts, which he believes to be present in men with the gregarious instincts. The 'slavish aptitudes' in man are the direct consequence of his gregarious instinct and are present in gregarious animals. Galton proceeds to illustrate this from his observations of the behaviour of the Demara cattle. It appears that these cattle have a natural aversion from taking the lead so great that when they are herded it produces considerable inconvenience, as no one of the herd will precede another, and they remain in a huddled mass. But occasionally there arises among them a natural leader. He knows that it is his mission to produce order from chaos, and proceeds to walk firmly in front. When this happens all the cattle, falling into their natural order, follow him with joy. Also, when the cattle are grazing in the fields, the majority, with that indifference to the safety of the whole often noticed in democracies, just eat, while the natural leaders stand on the outskirts of the herd watching for enemies. Similar descriptions of leadership among cattle have been given by various writers. Dr. Zuckerman has shown how dominance and submission are involved in the social life of baboons, and how some animals are able to tyrannize over their fellows.2

Ribot, who first used the phrase 'negative self-feeling', describes the submissive attitude as follows:

It has for its basis a feeling of weakness and impotence. It shows itself by arrest of movement: its gestures are concentric and consist in belittling instead of aggrandizing, of lowering instead of raising. It is related on the one hand to sadness and on the other to fear. From this source flow with different adaptations humility, timidity, modesty, resignation, patience, cowardice, want of self-confidence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> F. GALTON, Inquiry into Human Faculty. Macmillan, 1883.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> S. Zuckerman, Social Life of Apes and Monkeys. Kegan Paul, 1932.

MacDougall, who lays most stress on the instinctive basis of submission, follows Ribot in describing the characteristics of submissive behaviour, but he connects it with the passive attitude in sexual relations and with ordinary bashful behaviour—e.g. the child hiding its head in the presence of strangers. He also provided the instinct with its accompanying emotion of negative self-feeling; this, however, though not so clearly defined, was implicit in Ribot's description.

From these quotations it will be seen that the conception of the submissive instinct is both vague and muddled. Below are examples of the varieties of behaviour that have been called submissive:

(1) The passive acceptance of a leader without previous struggle.

(2) The passive acceptance of a leader after a previous

struggle

(3) The active following of a leader, the leader being

already imposed.

(4) The active following of a leader, the leader being deliberately chosen.

(5) The dependent attitude to religion.

(6) The passive or feminine attitude in sexual behaviour.

(7) Bashful behaviour or shamed behaviour.

The connection between these activities is simply one of behaviour. One might almost say that they are merely analogous with one another. We see people and animals performing what appears to be the same action, and therefore postulate an instinct to explain that action. But it is perfectly well known to us from our own experience that men may submit from a variety of motives. There is, to begin with, true indifference. The interests of many people lie outside the sphere in which they are asked to obey. We have no reason to believe that is not also true of animals. The only way in which we can discover why men submit is to ask them.

An examination of the examples quoted above shows that they are not examples of one tendency. Between the passive acceptance of a leader and the active following of a leader there is a very great difference; the mental state accompanying the one may be the exact opposite of the mental state accompanying the other. The passive acceptance of a leader where nothing is demanded except the recognition of his authority calls for no action that might not have arisen from submissive tendencies. That such behaviour occurs in human society is no doubt true. The substitution of one autocratic dynasty for another would be a good example, but it is difficult to believe that such behaviour is accompanied by any emotion at all, certainly not with the emotions connected with hero-worship. It is, of course, possible that negative self-feeling in an extreme form, a recognition of our complete and absolute unimportance and impotence, might look to an outside observer like indifference. Such a mental state might make one consider any act of approval superfluous. But that this attitude is prevalent can be rejected on common-sense grounds, and in any case it is misleading to call the 'negative' attitude by the same name as the very positive attitude involved in the active following of a leader.

This fact is made clearer by a concrete example. To call the attitude of the Egyptian peasant during the intervention of the British Government in Egypt by the same name as the behaviour of the Turkish peasant, because both attitudes involved the acceptance of a 'leader', is ridiculous. The unsuitability of calling Lord Cromer a leader at all makes this more obvious. There is a complete divergence between both the behaviour and the emotions accompanying the behaviour. In the first case nothing was required except a continuation of habitual behaviour, while the second calls for violent exertions of a complex kind extending over a long period; it also involves the defiance of traditional authority. There are,

it is true, in both cases elements of 'submission', characterized by acceptance of orders and notably a feeling of being less than another personality. But this latter emotion is not the negative self-feeling described by MacDougall and Ribot. Analysis will show that an increase of positive self-feeling, rather than a diminution is felt. What recruit to any cause felt self-abasement on joining it? The self, it is true, may become in a sense less important, but there is a feeling of added value, which leads to the desire to be 'worthy' of such a leader. It is not abasement of the self which is felt, but a merging of the self in something greater. This merging does not involve a loss, but rather a gain. The emotion felt is typically positive self-feeling as described by MacDougall.

The active following of a leader is more 'submissive' than passive acceptance, in the sense that the desire to exalt the leader is called out, sometimes to a fantastic extent. But it must be remembered that this may be a manifestation of self-assertion. 'My leader is as much better than other leaders as I am better than other men.' There is no doubt a large element of this in the glorification of national leaders: they reflect glory on the whole nation and raise the self-feeling of every member of it. (This point will be returned to later in connection with identification with the leader.)

The passive attitude in sexual relations is merely analogous to social submission. It is probably a true instinct, but it is appropriate to a particular situation and a reaction to that very definite situation. Again, no negative self-feeling is involved except in pathological cases. It is also doubtful how far the behaviour of an individual in a sexual situation is necessarily the same as his behaviour in other situations. It is true that Freud believes that one can deduce from the sexual behaviour of the individual what his social reactions are likely to be. But in many cases it seems probable that behaviour in a sexual situation may be compensation for the repression of certain

tendencies. If, as Havelock Ellis says, Bismarck's sexual life was strongly tinged with masochism, this would appear to be the explanation.

The acceptance of a leader without a previous struggle by gregarious animals might be used as an argument for the instinctive nature of submission, but if the leader is accepted after a previous struggle the instinct might just as well be called the instinct for accepting the inevitable. Even if the leader is accepted without a struggle it is by no means clear that true submission is involved. In a herd of Demara cattle the majority seem to feel no impulse to assert themselves. Animals who have leaders are apparently divided into those with 'functional' leaders and those with 'attribute' leaders. In the first case the leader performs some function, as with the Demara cattle; in the second he becomes leader because he is in the possession of attributes - strength, courage, etc. In the first case, for all we know to the contrary, the leader may have some special skill, and the rest may accept him because they have no desire for his place. No other individual may, in fact, wish to be the leader. In that case the other cattle do not truly submit, any more than the average human being 'submits' to not being an artist or some other person who performs services requiring special skill. In the case of the 'attribute' leader we may suppose that the other members of the pack would prefer to be the largest and the bravest; but they are not, and therefore they have no choice but to obey the individual who is. Again there is no true submission.

All that emerges from a study of gregarious animals is that some animals have solved their social problems by the acceptance of a leader, a situation which seems analogous to leadership in human society. It is difficult to accept an instinct of submission as an explanation. All we can safely say is that the wolf and human type of leader is a 'basic' form of social organization — i.e. that it is found in the simplest of organiza-

tions known to us and therefore that it is probably an easy form and will be found to recur in more elaborate forms and under different disguises in every grade of human society. The conditions tending to encourage the development of leadership would be an increasing inequality among the members of the herd and an increasing specialization of function. In human society this is exactly what has occurred. The difference between the most capable and the least capable human being is immense, and this difference has been accentuated by divergence in education and by the increasing specialization involved in the process of civilization. Both these processes have narrowed the number of potential leaders. Not only must the leader be among the few really able human beings, but in certain circumstances he must also be a specialist. For example, in a military situation the only leader who is adequate is a soldier.

The other psychologist who has attempted to construct a psychology of society is Freud. His explanation starts from the experience of the individual. The individual is educated for society in the family, which contains as its most powerful member the father. The child's first experiences lead him to believe that the father is all-powerful; he is on the whole benevolent, but he interferes with the child's pleasures from the earliest age. He is also an object of jealousy because he has claims over the mother. As the child ceases to be a baby, the father's claims are in the majority of cases preferred before the claims of the child. The father brings the element of fear into the child's life by punishment and becomes in one respect a terrible figure; especially as by him the child is taught the consciousness of guilt. It is true that children grow up, but every individual, to a greater or lesser degree, wishes to return to the state of childhood where all his wants were provided without effort on his part, and the experience of his early years is entangled with his whole personality.

Therefore there is a tendency to seek a leader who will stand in the same emotional relationship as that in which his father used to stand to him. He will have for this leader boundless love and trust, but he will also have feelings of hostility. These hostile feelings are really directed towards his own father, who roused them by forcing him to relinquish certain pleasures, and who especially roused the child's jealousy by his sexual relations with the mother. The child wished to have his mother all to himself and to this he believed his father to be the only obstacle. Normally these feelings are repressed, both in relation to the real father and to the leader. But this hostility explains the pleasure which is felt on the death or fall of even a beloved leader. Besides the identification of his father with the leader, the individual will also identify himself with the leader, just as he used to identify himself with his father. Freud lays great stress on the importance of the leader to a group. 'Let us venture to correct Trotter's pronouncement that man is a herd animal and assert that he is rather a horde animal, an individual in a horde led by a chief.' Freud recognizes, as do other psychologists, that the chief may be a symbol, or an idea: for example, the 'idea' of the whole community may serve as a leader in a democracy. This substitution of a symbol for an individual was often regarded as a result of the advance of culture, and the possibility of it withstanding a political storm was not questioned.

This theory accounts admirably for the existence of dictators, but it does not explain why some periods are democratic in tendency and others autocratic, or why men have ever escaped from the domination of some father figure. The answer lies in changing political circumstances. It is true in a sense that all political change is brought about by psychological change, but this platitude does not carry us very far. It is quite possible that the psychological change itself may be brought about by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Ego and the Id, International Psycho-analytical Society. Hogarth Press.

some change absolutely outside human control: for example, a famine brought about by a crop failure may cause a revolution. But in general, human and political events are inextricably mingled. A defeat in war may cause a change in a people's attitude towards their ruler. This defeat, it is true, was the result of a change in the psychology of another people, but to the conquered race it is in the same category as a harvest failure.

The study of psychology developed in a period of unusual social stability, a period in which there was no opportunity to study the effects of such phenomena as defeat in war or revolution. An example of the effect of this limitation is the assumption of all social psychologies that people of a certain cultural level would remain permanently content with the 'symbolic' leader and that there would never be a collapse of the institutions which stood between the citizens and emotional reality, bringing with it a return to a more primitive form of government. The reactions to social institutions change with changing circumstances. The same man who in a peaceful and untroubled period regards dictatorship as a joke or an insult to human nature, may under the stress of war or disaster be prepared to exchange individual liberty for security, and may even feel an emotional need to cling to some dominating personality.

The psychological characteristic of periods in which dictators appear is the immense importance of political events to the individual. For the average person in a period of stability, politics are not of great importance, nor do statesmen arouse any particular emotion in the majority of those they govern. But in periods of violent conflict the community is threatened, and not only the community as an abstract idea: people see the world which they have known, as it were, melting away. They are cold, hungry, impoverished, frightened and often in actual physical danger. The everyday life of the

citizen is affected, and there is also a vast, incomprehensible menace, an economic crisis or war. The fear which falls on people in such circumstances is a paralysing fear, because the situation leaves no room for action. Any self-assertive tendencies are inhibited because sources of information are not accessible to the ordinary person; he does not know what is happening, and if he did know he would be incapable of understanding. How could the Turkish peasant understand the complications of the world situation in 1922, the Italian the economic crisis, the Russian the famine and civil war which swept over him, the German worker the complex results of war and economic crisis? He is reduced to the position of a child in an incomprehensible world; his reaction resembles that of the ordinary adult in the face of illness.

In illness, too, we are confronted with a situation in which we can neither understand nor act and yet which is of immense, of vital, importance to us. Professor Flugel describes the way in which the crisis of illness reduces the adult to the emotional state of the child: 'the sense of helplessness which (laymen) feel in these situations being similar in many respects to that frequently experienced in early years when, as children, we were dependent upon the efforts of our parents in many of the important affairs of life'.1 The child, however, does have parents, or at least grown-up people, who are able to deal with the situation. Childhood experience teaches us to wait for the intervention of grown-up people - that is, people who understand and are powerful enough to take action. This attitude is naturally encouraged by ambitious men who wish to canalize the stream of popular sentiment in their own direction; but that the image of a 'saviour' does arise spontaneously in the minds of many people in the presence of danger is suggested first by the hero myths, and secondly by the experience of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> FLUGEL. See Psycho-analytical Study of the Family, International Psycho-analytical Society. Hogarth Press.

War. In England, the desire for someone who could save them from the disaster which threatened them led people to fix on the enigmatic personality of Lord Kitchener as the destined saviour, and to magnify both his abilities and his power. This desire for a hero was probably intensified by the feeling that the abstract institutions did not in the time of violent emotion give an adequate emotional response, and that what the British people needed to help them through the War was not an abstract symbol but a human being. It also must be remembered that we accepted the 'leader' as the basic type of organization, appearing in the most primitive communities and in animal communities.

In times of difficulty there will probably be a psychological need to return to a simpler, more easily assimilated, form of government. There may also be a technical necessity. The institutions of highly-organized democracy may be incapable of working, either through lack of experience or through physical obstacles - for example, civil war. There are two chief forms of primitive political organizations: primitive democracy and primitive leadership. If it is a choice between these two forms, leadership can be adapted more easily than democracy. Primitive democracy is distinguished from modern organized democracy by its dependence on the emotional reaction set up by the actual presence of a member of the same group. Primitive leadership is equally dependent on the presence of another being, the presence of the leader; but by modern technical inventions a leader is able to be present to many people at the same time. All that is required of a leader is that he should appear and speak or smile. By these means it is possible to get the illusion of personal leadership. There is no way in which it is now possible to create the illusion of primitive democracy - i.e. the illusion of living in a community in which every member is personally known to every other.

The way to autocracy is thus prepared by a collapse of all the psychological impulses which work against submission. This psychological preparation is really important; it was probably a factor in the failure of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera that no psychological need was felt for a strong ruler. To persuade people to give up their liberty, great inducement must be offered. The saviour-tyrant must be a saviour from real danger, not from the inconveniences of inefficiency. The Spanish dictatorship was a last expedient to save an unpopular monarchy; it was not a dictatorship of the inevitable kind, like that of Napoleon or Mussolini. The situation must be desperate before a dictator arises from a democracy. The dictators of European history - Augustus after years of civil war, Cromwell in England, Napoleon in France — all appeared at a time when things could hardly have been worse. In modern Europe social chaos has appeared again as a result of war and revolution, and with it has come the tyrant.

In modern communities a man did appear who was able, or appeared to be able, to control the storm. It must be recognized that dictators really do perform a function, and therefore that there are what may be called rational grounds for gratitude and devotion. Mustafa Kemal did in fact beat the Greeks and Pilsudski the Russians, to take two quite uncontroversial benefits, and all these rulers preserve a certain framework for life. For their exertions they receive a full measure of gratitude, and this perfectly rational gratitude strengthens the irrational tie between the ruler and his subjects, the tie which is expressed in the father - and child - relation. It is not necessary to accept the full implications of psycho-analytic theory in order to admit the reality of the relation. It has always been a common place of political metaphor to call a successful statesman the father of his country. The attitude of dependence is in both cases the same. Children are dependent on the father for the necessities of life, as the members are dependent on the ruler. In dictatorship

# THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

the relationship is enhanced: people feel that their fate really does lie in the hands of the ruler. Propaganda naturally emphasizes the ability of the ruler to control events. The ruler begins to arouse the emotions which the individual used to feel towards his own father. Even when the dangers that originally threatened the individual and caused this feeling of helplessness have been overcome, the dictator's display of force fosters the continuance of childish reactions by reminding him of his powerlessness. It has not always been observed that some terrorism is designed not so much to cause fear as to emphasize the uselessness of rebellion. The perception of this not only inhibits action but also causes a tendency to look to the ruler for directions for every occasion of life and so to fall naturally into the parent-child relationship.

Once the dictator is established, various other factors tend to enhance the emotional relationship between the ruler and his subjects. Many people find childhood the most enjoyable part of life, and for them this kind of political guardianship is like a delightful return to the past, with some of the advantages indeed diminished but with others in compensation. The ruler in many ways fulfils the role of father more satisfactorily than many real fathers. He is able to provide most of the advantages with few of the disadvantages. He therefore runs less risk of raising hate impulses. For the majority of people the government of any country does not interfere greatly with the things which they really care about. Therefore the ruler, having once pacified the country, ordinarily diffuses an atmosphere of protection which provides an excellent stimulus for the love impulses displaced for the father. But there does also appear to be a demand for the harsh qualities of the father. Passages which seem to show a satisfaction in the harshness of the dictator have been given above. The adherents of a dictator seem to like to dwell on his ruthlessness. It is probable that any ruler who attempts to restore order is bound

to be 'cruel' to some section of the population, but the cruelty of the modern dictator appears to be one of his most admired attributes. Mussolini's character may be described as 'cruelly sentimental', says one of his admirers. Ludwig describes how he said to Mussolini: 'After all, a dictator can then be loved?' and Mussolini replied: 'Yes, provided the masses fear him at the same time. The crowd loves strong men.'

The dictator is also supposed to be above the ordinary human affections. 'He [Mussolini] calls no one friend; no "intimate friendship", "a minimum of personal feeling", might also be taken as Mussolini's rule in life. Apart from the cause to which he devotes himself and the idea which he incarnates, he holds aloof from the world.'2 We are told by an admirer of Mustafa Kemal that no one has ever seen him laugh. Occasionally a slight smile plays about his lips, but that is all.<sup>3</sup> The 'iron' Marshal of Poland enjoyed much the same reputation. Everyone will remember that during the War Lord Kitchener was supposed to be made of the same unbending steel. The reason for this remoteness seems to be partly envy. Most people have at some time wished to be free from all effective ties, and in so far as we identify ourselves with our leader we feel free in this sense also. The reason is also partly jealousy. The leader is a 'father', a more powerful, a more wonderful father than the real father we once had; therefore he must not make us jealous by having favourites among his children. Even if the whole Freudian explanation is not accepted, as long as there is an emotional tie between the leader and his followers there must obviously be a tendency to feel iealous of his personal friends and of his private life. Mr. Armstrong, in his attack on Mustafa Kemal in Grey Wolf,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> EMIL LUDWIG, Talks with Mussolini. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Allen and Unwin, 1935.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> M. SARFATTI, Mussolini. Butterworth, London, 1925.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> 'Mustapha Kemal' in *Revue de Genève*. 1929. This story was repeated in n, October, 1933.

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said that he had no friends. In the article published in a Turkish newspaper refuting the book, it is curious to notice that, although that particular accusation is perhaps the easiest to disprove, the writer did not say that the dictator had friends, but that it was absurd to say that a man was friendless when he had a whole nation for his friend.

When the ruler is once established, other influences are at work which tend to strengthen his position. Power as an idea has a fascination for the human mind irrespective of the way in which it is exercised or of the way in which it was acquired. The desire for power is probably in some form, disguised or open, common to all human beings. It seems first to arise as a tendency to assert oneself over one's environment. The random movements of babies may be an expression of this tendency. Later on the child learns that pleasures of various kinds can often be obtained by self-assertion, and the tendency to selfassertion is fused with positive self-feeling into a definite attitude towards power, which in the young child is always a desire for power. This seems to be shown by an investigation undertaken by Miss Macauley of University College, Exeter, into the nature of children's ideals. A questionnaire was issued to selected schools in Exeter. The basis of selection was to get samples of each of the more important social or economic groups. Among the questions asked were the following:

(1) What person whom you have ever known or of whom you have heard would you most wish to resemble?

(2) Make a list of the reasons which made you choose this person.

Altogether 2,420 papers were received, 270 of them being written by students. 50.5 per cent of the children gave as a reason for their choice the possession of power and wealth. The investigation, says the inquiry, 'shows clearly that the supreme desire of children up to the age of thirteen or fourteen

is for power'. A curious point is that children give as their ideal the figures which are held up to admiration by their teachers, but not for the qualities which the teachers have pointed out as worthy of admiration. 'It appears on the evidence of the papers that the child up to the age of thirteen selects those attributes of power and estate which most appeal to him in the life of Christ, and make only slight mention of the moral qualities of the Saviour.' The typical reason for choosing Christ is 'He was very powerful', 'He is the King of Kings, the Lord of Lords'. The same kind of reasons are given for choosing the King. Children even 'wrongly attribute to their ideals the only qualities they can conceive of as desirable'. Fifteen per cent of the children gave the answer 'to do good' as their reason, but this answer was given only by the older children, and looks suspiciously like a disguise for the desire for power, but one more possible and more morally respectable than crude power.

It is tempting to think that one can perceive, instead of an instinct of self-assertion and an instinct of submission, a broad tendency to self-assertion which either pervades the whole personality or, by unity with other elements, becomes a sentiment: a desire for power. It is clear that for most people there are few opportunities for the exercise of power. The desire to exercise power is circumscribed, not only by the conditions of life, but also by the nature of the individual himself. The desire for power as a vague wish is common to everyone. The desire for power as a passion is the rarest of all human motives. The ordinary man desires power but not courage, power but not responsibility, power but not hard work, and power on these terms is not to be had.

What happens to the desire for power which seems to be so clear and well-defined in the mind of the child? It can obviously seek such disguised outlets as the desire 'to do good', but the opportunity 'to do good' on any yery striking scale is also

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absent. In morbid individuals a repressed desire for power can find satisfaction in petty cruelty, but this outlet is barred both by the moral feeling of the individual and by the views of society. There are two possible ways of dealing with the repressed desire: it can be turned into its opposite, a pleasure in submission to the power of others; or the desire for power can be gratified by identifying oneself with a powerful individual. The first is known to be possible by the alterations found in abnormal individuals in whom these tendencies have taken a perverted form. The researches of Freud and his school have shown that masochism (pleasure in the infliction of pain on oneself) is closely connected with sadism (pleasure in the infliction of pain on others).

The tendency to submission in normal individuals must meet with great difficulty in finding satisfaction. Success in daily life depends on the repression of submissive tendencies. The true masochist separates one part of his life and seeks ecstasy in physical pain. In the normal individual the tendency is too slight to desire such a strenuous outlet, and even in abnormal individuals fear and pain are only pleasurable up to a limit; beyond that limit life itself is threatened. This limit in the normal person is reached very soon. The kind of fear inspired by dictators fulfils the condition of being slight in degree and existing rather as a potential threat than as a fact. There are few people who really wish to make themselves conspicuous in opposing the government. The threat of repression bears the same relation to real repression as the fear aroused by reading a detective story bears to the fear aroused by being really threatened with murder. The 'cruelty' of the modern dictator may be thus a source of pleasure to those of his subjects who are not in danger of personally experiencing it.

The second method of dealing with the repressed desire for power is by identification with the powerful individual. Nietzsche perceived this disguise of the desire for power: 'The

idolization and apotheosis of the commander as a kind of compensation and indirect self-enhancement.'1 Identification is assisted by nationalism, which likes to see the nation incarnated in its hero: Mussolini as the typical Italian; Mustafa Kemal as a sort of summary of Turkish history; Lenin as the individual expression of the Russian or the proletarian soul. 'Tout race aime s'incarne dans un héros. Pilsudski est ce héros à la mode antique.'2 Identification of oneself with the hero is probably implicit in all submission. Both aspects of the power complex are thus satisfied. The intoxication of wielding and of submitting to power are simultaneously experienced, and impulses can be thus indulged without any blame attaching to oneself. The cruelty of a dictator often gratifies his subjects because they feel that it is they themselves who are indulging in it. Identification is helped by the vagueness of the figure of the dictator in the popular mind. The comparison between Mussolini and St. Francis and between Mustafa Kemal and Christ show that these persons are so unreal to the general public as to be fantasy figures.

Identification shades into another attitude towards the dictator: an attitude of admiration towards the dictator as a spectacle. To many people there seems to be an emotional satisfaction in thinking that there is at least one human being absolutely free and absolutely powerful. Mustafa Kemal's latest biography said of the Gazi: 'The scandal of his private life was known to all, but it only made him the more popular... He was their idea of a ruler: he might be cruel, vicious, spiteful and treacherous, but he was strong and decided. His vices were national vices.' These remarks infuriated the Turkish Press; but the activities attributed to the Gazi have in reality probably a merely symbolic value. The conception of a man

<sup>1</sup> The Will to Power.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> CARENCY, Josef Pilsudski. Renaissance du livre. Paris, 1929.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> H. C. Armstrong, Grey Wolf. Arthur Barker, London, 1937.

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untrammelled by any restraints is curiously comforting to the human heart. This seems to be the explanation of the Turkish habit, puzzling to the European observer, of telling such stories about their leader. The fascination which the figure of Napoleon has for so many people appears to be due to the same cause. Havelock Ellis had justified Napoleon's career, against H. G. Wells, on the ground that his life was a great work of art. 'He is a poet of action, as Jesus was, and like him he stands apart.'1 The admiration for the dictator as an artist is akin to the hero-worship of actors and sportsmen. In normal circumstances hero-worship exists, but is scattered among a number of objects, each group and even each individual having their own hero. But under a dictatorship the hero fills the whole scene and will naturally attract to himself all the emotion previously diffused. He will direct to himself, the feelings which one man may have for a cricketer and another for a film star, and, according to well-known observations on crowd emotion, these feelings will be intensified by the knowledge that they are shared.

It is clear also that the dictator takes something from religion. The similarity of the effusions quoted above to a certain sort of religious emotion is obvious. It is notable that the cult of the ruler tends to arise in periods in which men have lost faith in the traditional religions. But this is not so important as to be the cause of dictatorship, as a recent book argues. Elizabeth roused the same kind of emotion as does the modern dictator, and so did Cromwell to a minor degree, both in strongly religious periods. But an all-powerful ruler, ready to reward virtue and punish sin, is clearly a complete substitute for some types of religion. A God in Heaven becomes unnecessary if there is a God on earth. The attitude is clearly expressed in the popular song in which the Athenians invoked Demetrius's protection against Actolia: 'The other gods hear

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> HAVELOCK ELLIS, The Dance of Life. Constable, London, 1923.

not, or they give no heed; but thou art here and we can see thee, not in wood or stone, but in very truth.'1

Beside his ability to gather up all the stray remnants of emotion, the ruler gets other support from the fact that he is not only a personality but also a symbol. In the case of the hero myth this is most obvious, and in some types of government the symbolic function is the only one the ruler performs. The ruler in this aspect is both a symbol which 'signifies' something, and an emblem which 'stands for' something. The function of a symbol is to collect and express in simple form a number of extremely complex facts. In the word 'England' are comprised a large number of facts, geographical, political and cultural, which to explain adequately would involve a large number of words and probably convey no very clear idea in the end. Here the word itself is the symbol. But visual stimulants are more easily impressed on the memory and provide a sharper psychological shock. The symbolic ceremony of hoisting a flag brings, to reinforce the sentiment, aesthetic pleasure and also remnants of magical ideas. The most elaborate example of this type of symbolism is a coronation.

The value of a symbol for propaganda purposes consists in the fact that it is both concrete and vague. Its concreteness focuses emotion, and its vagueness allows it to collect round it emotions which are really in conflict with one another. The flag of a country focuses into a concrete sentiment the vague sentiments which people feel for the familiar landscapes, the literature, and the political idea of their country, but its vagueness allows people to include their own emotions and to be ignorant of or to exclude the emotions of others. The most diverse aspirations may cluster round one flag and lead to exactly the same behaviour if the 'flag' is threatened. To one man the Union Jack may mean the extension of the Christian religion,

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in TARN, Hellenistic Civilization. See note, p. 91, above.

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to another the growth of the export trade. Our private ideals are still private, but the community is strengthened.

In monarchy and dictatorship the ruler is himself the symbol. He interprets and focuses the national sentiment as concretely as does the flag, with the advantage of an added vividness and an added secretion of emotion. The flag is only charged with emotion as symbolizing something else, but the man has value both as himself and as a symbol. It is true that the personality may cause confusion; but to many people the ruler appears to be so vague as to be merely a fantasy figure. The comparison between Mussolini and St. Francis, and Kemal Pasha and Christ, attributes to these dictators qualities the very opposite of those they in fact possess. It is not a question of exaggeration. It is no doubt an exaggeration to say that Mustafa Kemal is the greatest soldier of history, as has been said, but he is at least a soldier. To suggest that Mussolini resembles St. Francis means that qualities are ascribed to him for which he has repeatedly expressed the greatest contempt. It appears from this fact that there is no difficulty in seeing in the ruler as a symbol any meaning one may wish to find there. The impression one gets from Bolshevist literature is that Lenin as a personality, if he ever existed in the mind of the Russian people, remains only as Lenin the symbol.

People are encouraged to treat the dictator as a symbol. The conventionalized portraits of Mussolini crowned with the laurel wreath of the Roman Emperors really represent Mussolini as the symbol of the continuity of Italian history. The Poles are urged to see in Pilsudski an incarnation of the heroes of Polish romantic literature. Mustafa Kemal said: 'There are two Mustafa Kemals: one purely mortal, who will die, and one who will live for ever in the life of the Turkish nation.'

The tendency is for these personality-symbols to encroach on the ideas for which they stand, to attach to themselves as persons emotions which were first given to the idea which they

symbolize. People are first unable to separate the two ideas. There is a fusion between a man and his policy which may in the end enable a man to repudiate his policy. The fact that Mustafa Kemal is known as the Gazi, 'the slayer of infidels', has probably greatly helped him to destroy the Moslem structure of Turkish society. He originally gained power as the champion of Islam, and was therefore able to combine his own image with the image of Islam in the mind of the people and to attach the 'conditioned' emotions aroused by this idea to his own personality. It is clear that a man is a dangerous symbol. 'Left to themselves, symbols are barren facts'; but a man is not a barren fact: we tend to get an emotional reaction to a human being quicker than to an idea. Loyalty to a man is 'easier' than loyalty to an idea. What may be called the 'shifting' nature of symbolism occurs even in ordinary symbolism, and arises from the arbitrary nature of the connection between the symbol and its meaning. If the symbol has emotional value in itself, it is likely to absorb the thing for which it originally stood, so that Mussolini becomes Italy instead of merely symbolizing Italy.

The symbolic aspect of the ruler explains far better than any theory of racial psychology the tendency of Oriental people to return to some form of autocracy. A symbol relates always to past experiences. The conception of political as opposed to social democracy has been entirely foreign to Sunni Islam; the only reality the office of ruler or president can symbolize is the reality of a Sultan. People whose past experience contains only the autocratic ruler, whether as a reality or an idea, will return to it again and again until other conceptions have become familiar to them.

The experience of Hitler shows that a conscious demand for a tyrant can be created by propaganda. But it is probable that the psychological basis of dictatorship becomes really important rather in the consolidation of the dictatorship than in the

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seizure of power. The situation must be prepared by political conditions which threaten the life, sentiments or interests of large numbers of people. These conditions modify the tendencies which work against the acceptance of autocratic government. The fact that impulses of self-assertion, dominance, etc., are inhibited by the circumstances means that other and contrary impulses are stimulated. These impulses are, of course, reinforced by rational motives. They can, in fact, only be powerful in so far as they are so reinforced. As Mussolini says: 'If you would lead them [the masses] you must guide them by two reins, enthusiasm and interest. He who uses one alone is in grave danger.' The dictator will not be able to rouse sentiments of devotion in those he has directly and deliberately injured. The class which is known as 'the people' is the least likely in ordinary circumstances to be so injured. Not looking forward themselves to the exercise of power, they feel little resentment towards the man who engrosses it. This fact possibly explains the tendency of democracies to produce tyrants, noticed so often since the Greeks observed it.

This reaction can no doubt for a long time be frustrated by a public opinion which is deeply hostile to the idea of autocracy. A reproduction in England of the state of Italy in 1922 would probable make many Liberals into Fascists and induce many more to tolerate Fascism. But a repetition of the German position would probably not shake the faith of many Englishmen in democracy. It is not so much the absolute state of disorder which is important, as the relation between the disorder and public opinion as a whole. Countries like Germany, used to a highly efficient authoritarian government, will be driven to reaction by an amount of disorder which would be regarded in Spain, for instance, as the normal state of affairs.

#### CHAPTER III

# THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND AND THE THEORY OF AUTOCRACY IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

That people are led to autocracy by two motives, its emotional attractions and its efficiency as an instrument, can be clearly seen in the theories advocating or defending autocracy which have from time to time appeared in European political thought.

Political theory is of two kinds. It deals either with the particular problems of the age - for example, the problem of religious toleration raised by the religious wars of the sixteenth century; or with some ideal concept which is for ever attractive to men's minds. In all periods of social confusion or instability a school of thought has appeared which has advocated autocracy as a means of attaining security. These writers and the circumstances in which they tend to appear strengthen the view that dictatorship is a reaction to a crisis and that it is the efficiency of dictatorship which constitutes its chief appeal. There is also another type of autocratic theory: the theory which advocates autocracy as the ideally best form of government. This theory can best be described as the theory of the true King. It has appeared in all periods, even in those in which public opinion was most hostile to authoritarian government. The continual recurrence of the idea shows the emotional appeal of the autocrat.

The theory of the true King is the theory of the rule of one man because he is the best — best in the sense that he is endowed with all the qualities necessary to a statesman. These qualities differ with the view taken of the end of government. To Greek thought the end of the State was to make the 'good

life' possible or even inevitable for its citizens; therefore the quality most required in a ruler was a knowledge of the philosophy by which the good life might be both discovered and attained. With us, other qualities are in more demand. This theory attaches essentially to the dictator and not to the hereditary monarch. In the latter context the idea of true Kingship has a wholly different meaning. The true King is he on whom the rules of succession cause to devolve the Crown. The incongruity of the idea of the true King and hereditary monarchy was not perceived by the Greeks, who were more prepared to tolerate hereditary monarchy than the rule of a dictator. Under the Roman Empire, however, the theory attained a certain practical importance and its incompatibility with father-to-son succession was realized. The Greeks held the idea rather as a pleasing fancy than an explanation of any existing, or as a basis for any future, government.

The theory that the rule of the ideal statesman is necessarily the best is supported by four chief arguments. The first is that justice demands that each man should be treated according to his qualities, and that therefore the pre-eminently good man is the natural ruler. This definition appears in Plato, Aristotle and also Isocrates. Although it is plain that Aristotle only included monarchy in order to make the list of possible constitutions complete, yet at the same time he states quite clearly the theoretical justification of monarchy. 'For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master over him who can work with his body, who is a subject and by nature a slave.' If this statement is true it is obviously conceivable in theory, however unlikely in practice, that there might appear an individual so pre-eminently endowed with the gift of seeing with his mind that he would be the natural and inevitable ruler. That the idea was current among the Greeks is shown by Isocrates, who uses it to justify an actual King:

"I imagine that we all believe that it is altogether monstrous that the good and the bad should be thought worthy of the same privileges, and that it is of the very essence of justice that distinctions should be made between them, and that those who are unlike should not be treated alike but should fare and be rewarded in each case according to their deserts. Morality makes highest awards to the best man, the next highest to the next best, and so on."

The second argument, which receives its most finished form in the Statesman of Plato, is the inadequacy of fixed rules of law to meet all emergencies and to treat each case with justice. The static nature of law is contrasted with the dynamic nature of human society. Law is compared with the instructions which a wise ruler would leave for his deputies if he were compelled to leave his kingdom. However good the rules laid down might be, no one would prefer them to the living wisdom of the King himself. The law is always striving to reduce the immense variety of human nature to a single pattern, 'like an ignorant and brutal tyrant'.2 This is the conception of law which has always been held in the East, although it has never been formally set out in words. It is, of course, most opposed to the ideas of all countries influenced by Roman conceptions. The supremacy of law was a fundamental assumption in all aspects of democratic thought. Nineteenth-century theorists would have said that the rule of even a bad law is better than the unrestrained will even of the best and wisest of men. The modern tendency to autocracy is, however, in one aspect largely a revolt against the supremacy of law, and a reversion, no doubt mainly unconscious, to the Platonic view. The idea of the modern sociologists that the whole economic and sociological background must be taken into account in judging the criminal is an example of this return to the Platonic view. The idea of the inadequacy of law is also in one sense a philosophic version of the common

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> ISOCRATES, Letter to Nicholes, Loeb translation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Statesman.

idea that democracy is incapable of dealing with a crisis such as war, and that in such circumstances any constitutional hindrances should be swept away if they interfere with the full activity of the personal ruler. In Plato's Statesman this idea is connected with the observed fact that political ability is rare and that, as there will be few really first-class draught players, there will be still fewer Kings. From this it is inferred that any true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two, or at any rate of a few.

The third consideration arises from the view that government is an art like other arts, such as medicine or seamanship: to be inspired it must be exercised by an individual personality, and that personality must be free and not bound by rules. If the King is to produce 'the divine harmonies of a great statesman'1 he cannot be hampered by rules probably quite inapplicable to the special circumstances. Plato admitted that in actual fact it was almost impossible to find the true King and that law is in reality necessary. The philosopher King of Plato has two aspects. On the one hand, he is an artist related, however distantly, to the 'Superman' of Nietzsche and the 'Hero' of Carlyle. On the other, he is a scientist in the possession of a particular kind of skill. The majority of human beings have not the ability, moral or intellectual, to acquire this skill. Although the idea that the true King is in fact the King, whatever his actual position, is capable of developing into a doctrine approaching that of the 'ruler' as an end in himself, Plato's theory remains utilitarian: the true King is invested with the functions of a ruler for the sake of his subjects, not for himself. There is no such worship of the King as a personality as appears in Carlyle and in modern dictatorship.

This utilitarian aspect was still further insisted on by those who applied the theory of true Kingship to the Roman Empire. After the government of the Roman Emperor had passed into

<sup>1</sup> ALDOUS HUXLEY, Proper Studies.

the hands of one man, some of the Stoics attempted to endow the Emperor with the attributes of the true King. The creation of the Roman Empire was due to administrative necessity. Such philosophy as condescended to political questions at all believed in the fundamental equality of all men and was therefore by implication opposed to absolute monarchy. The senatorial opposition under the Caesars appears to have been animated by Stoic ideals, or at least supported by Stoic philosophers. But there was also a tendency to explain the necessity of monarchy by the Stoic doctrine of the degeneracy of human nature. Human beings had once lived in a state of innocence, though not of 'virtue'; in this condition they required no government, or only the fatherly advice of the best men. From this happy existence they had degenerated, but only to find the higher concept of conscious virtue in adverse circumstances instead of merely living in instinctive accordance with natural law. There seem to have been two views on the existing political institutions, one of which emphasized the contradiction between the idea of human equality and autocratic government of any kind, the other of which emphasized the necessity of a ruler in the existing depraved state of human society. Among the philosophers, Seneca accepted the Emperor as an administrative necessity. His view is interesting as the view of a man who was familiar with the workings of the Imperial Government:

He [the Emperor] is in fact the link which ensures the cohesion of the public services; he is the breath, the life, which sustains all these millions who, left to themselves, would be a useless weight and an inevitable prey, if the 'spiritual' guidance of the ruler was taken from them.'

This language has been called 'rhetorical', and it is suspicious in that it was addressed to the Emperor himself. But whether

or not it was in part flattery, it contains a profound truth: at that date the Emperor was the only link left which could bind the Empire together. Seneca's subsequent remark that the day the town (Rome) ceased to obey, she would cease to rule the world, shows that practical considerations were not entirely absent from his mind.

Although he says somewhere that true monarchy is the best form of government, Seneca shows no enthusiasm for the 'true King', though fragments of the doctrine appear in other Stoic writers. The most he seemed to have hoped is that the autocrat would refrain from the more obvious forms of oppression, such as wanton cruelty. But with the succession of Nerva and Trajan, the first of the 'good' Emperors, the theory of the true King revived. The theory can be seen in the panegyric addressed to Trajan by Dio Chrysostum.<sup>1</sup> The Emperor was conceived as the servant of his subjects. His only claim lay in the fact that he worked for the good of all, and the justification of his rule was the dissensions which had been introduced into society by the passions of men. The people remained in theory the source of law, and the Emperor was only invested with the power of making law because they wished to delegate their authority. There is a curious similarity between the Roman doctrine and the National-Socialist idea that the dictator represents the people although he is not elected by them. The introduction of Christianity, however, invested the Emperor with a supernatural sanction instead of a philosophical sanction.

The idea of the true King is not a political theory. It is a description of the virtues of the ideal ruler rather than a constitutional theory. To become a political theory it would have to add to itself some ideas as to how the ideal ruler might be chosen. The importance lies in two facts. First, it has been revived in modern Europe and forms a part, and an important part, of the apology of modern dictators; secondly, it shows the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> DIO CHRYSOSTUM, De Regno. See F. FRANCIS, Dion Chrysostum. Paris, 1922.

attraction which the idea of kingship seems always to have possessed. The contrast between the good King and the tyrant goes far back into Greek history and appears in literature long before philosophy developed it. The true King was originally the paternal ruler of the heroic age, more a chieftain than a king in the modern sense. The development of this simple idea into a philosophy and its reappearance in the nineteenth century seems to suggest that it possesses a hold on the imagination of men. The idea of true kingship was, in the Middle Ages, submerged under the theory of the divine right of kings and was not revived until the nineteenth century, when it appeared again, in a very different form indeed, in the work of Carlyle and Nietzsche.

Carlyle's conception of the 'Hero' and his place in human society is essentially an idea of true kingship expressed in terms rather of history than of politics. Carlyle's political views are particularly interesting at the present moment because they were a reaction to the problems created by the industrial revolution and reproduce in many ways the Fascist reaction to the same questions. There is in Carlyle the same denunciation of liberalism and of the idea of individual rights, the same hysterical rejection of the findings of economists, the same desire to return to an order of society ruled by simple moral ideas, and the same belief that a 'Hero' was the only instrument for social reform, as are characteristic of National Socialism and Fascism.

Two distinct strands of thought lead to the exaltations of the 'Hero'. Carlyle was profoundly moved by the material condition of the working class and the moral conditions of all other classes, and he was convinced that human progress was created by 'great men'.

"For I take it Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the history of the great men who have worked here . . . All that we see

standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer, material results, the practical realization and embodiment of thoughts that dwell in the great men sent into the world."

Men were in fact 'led' by heroes, whether they recognized the fact in their political institutions or not. The democratic idea that all men were equal was absurd and, in so far as it caused men to reject the guidance of the Hero, harmful — harmful because it hampered God's plans for the world and also produced the moral impoverishment of the ordinary man himself. Carlyle insists on the necessity of 'Hero-worship' for the sake of the worshipper, not for the worshipped.

"Worship of a Hero is transcendent admiration of a great man ... It is at this hour and at all hours the vivifying influence in man's life. Religion, I find, stands upon it, not paganism only, but far higher and truer religions—all religions hitherto known. Hero-worship, heart-felt, prostrate admiration, submission, burning boundless, for a noblest Godlike form of man—is not that the germ of Christianity?"

This theory was sanctioned by Carlyle's religious convictions. The proper government for the earth was a copy of the government of the Universe. 'The Universe itself is a monarchy and hierarchy... a most free commonwealth of "voters"; but with eternal justice to preside over it, eternal justice enforced by Almighty Power.' 'A very model of constitutions this.' 'Find in any country the ablest man who exists there, raise him to the supreme place, and loyally reverence him. You have a perfect government for that country... It is the perfect State, an ideal country...' 'What he tells us to do must be precisely the wisest, fittest, that we could anywhere or anyhow do or learn; the thing which it will in all ways behove us with right loyal thankfulness and doubting nothing to do.' No

<sup>1 &#</sup>x27;The Hero as King' in On Heroes and Hero-worship.

doubt there are administrative advantages in autocracy, but the language Carlyle used about the autocrat shows that his views were founded on the emotional desire for some such figure, rather than on a perception of the technical merits of dictatorship.

"The Commander, he to whose will our wills are to be subordinated and loyally surrender themselves and find their welfare in so doing, may be reckoned the most important of great men. He is practically the summary of all the various figures of heroism: priest, teacher, whatsoever of earthly or of spiritual dignity we can fancy to reside in a man, embodies itself here, to command us, to furnish us with constant practical teaching, to tell us for the day and the hour that we are to do."

We owe the Hero obedience and worship, but finally he exists for us. Carlyle's conception of the true King remains utilitarian. The ruler is created to fulfil a function, he is 'the shepherd opposed to the Lord'. Carlyle had practically no influence on contemporary political thought, but the change of mind about many great historic figures was undoubtedly initiated by him.

Nietzsche's idea of the superman is to some extent similar to the idea of the true King. But the character of the superman was transformed by two influences—the incorporation of the idea of evolution, and the revolt against the moral concepts which had dominated Europe since the triumph of Christianity, or, as Nietzsche himself would have said, since Plato. Nietzsche had no political philosophy in the ordinary sense and no particular interest in politics, but his influence was enormous, particularly his influence on men of letters, and his main ideas are obviously capable of being applied to politics. Both National Socialism and Fascism claim that some of their ideas are derived from Nietzsche, and the debt is probably greater than they

<sup>1 &#</sup>x27;The Hero as King' in On Heroes and Hero-worship.

realize. It is true that their borrowings consist, not so much of what Nietzsche actually preached, as of what popular opinion believed that he preached, but this is perhaps true of every writer who is said to have influenced contemporary ideas.

The ease with which Nietzsche's ideas are translated into political terms arises largely from the expression which he used. The phrase, for example, 'the will to power', appears to have conveyed to many of his admirers a directly political meaning, whereas the term is used in a sense peculiar to Nietzsche. It is obvious that the philosophy which regarded the existence of a stone as an expression of the will to power used the word in quite another sense than that usually employed. His conception of the nature of the being who should supersede man is directly derived from his view of the nature of the universe. He regarded the universe as composed of centres of 'will', each striving for power. The intensity of their striving measured the intensity of their life. In human life the will to power finds expression in various activities, not only or even chiefly in those connected with material power, but also in art, in science, in love. From this it follows that the mind is merely an instrument in the struggle for power. As thought is thus only an aspect of will, it possesses no greater certainty than intuition; in fact, the intellect misleads and is an inferior weapon. The desire for power is, then, the desire for life in its fullness, and the man who has it to the highest degree is the highest kind of man. Dissatisfied with human beings as they appeared in nineteenth-century Europe, Nietzsche conceived the idea of a higher man who should evolve from existing humanity.

If the aim of humanity was the production of a being higher than itself, it is clear that many of the traditional ideas of morality must be revised. In fact, Nietzsche's revolt against accepted moral ideas appeared first in his thought, and the conception of the superman seems to have arisen rather from

the contemplation of the new values than the values from the contemplation of the superman. These values spring from two sources. First, from the acceptance of life, that joy is experience, which he found in pre-Socratic Athens and to a lesser extent in certain periods of European history. This attitude he contrasted with the negative attitude of Christianity, with its acceptance of death, expressed in the teaching that it was essential to crush impulse. Secondly, the idea of evolution, which led him to the superman, undoubtedly required a revolution of ethics. The welfare of the majority of men which, in modern times, has generally been considered the end of government, is of no account. Humanity itself has value merely as the raw material from which the superman might be produced. If humanity itself is thus in reality valueless, how can the individual human life matter?

It is difficult to say whether Nietzsche thought that the world might finally be inhabited entirely by supermen, or whether he conceived the superman as living in the world of ordinary men. If the former, the idea has no political applications, but while the concept of the superman in itself has no political significance, those great men who are the forerunners of the superman have a political aspect for two reasons. The actual men whom Nietzsche selected as forerunners of the superman all tend to be of the 'tyrant' type. He professed an admiration for the early Greek tyrants, for the despots of Renaissance Italy, and on occasions for Napoleon. This attitude of the heroic tyrants made many critics consider the conception of the superman as more political than in reality it is. Secondly, there seems to be little doubt that Nietzsche did regard power over other human beings as an essential element in the development of those 'Lords' who were the raw material out of which the superman might arise. His idea of a

<sup>1</sup> See 'The Lords of the Earth' in *The Will to Power*, vol. 11, translated A. Ludovici. Allen & Unwin.

possible development of a race of 'Lords' shows this. The future 'Lords of the earth' will be 'a new vast autocracy based upon the most severe self-discipline in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist tyrants will be stamped upon thousands of years; a higher species of man which, thanks to the then preponderance of will, knowledge, riches and influence, will avail themselves of democratic Europe as the most suitable and supple instrument they can have for taking the fate of the earth into their own hands, and working as artists upon man himself. The time is coming for us to transform all our views on politics.'

In this passage are seen two ideas very characteristic of a certain aspect of modern thought—the idea of the immense amount to be achieved by 'artist tyrants', and the idea of an aim beyond, and even contrary to, the actual happiness of the majority at the moment. It differs, however, from most modern presentations in that the ruler is himself an end, partly because of the value of his own personality, partly because it is only from him that the superman can arise. 'The value of a man... does not lie in his utility, because he would continue to exist even if there were nobody to whom he could be useful. And why could not that man be the very pinnacle of manhood who was the source of the worst possible effects for his race: so high and superior that everything would go to rack and ruin from envy?'

The idea that the great man exists for himself provides a more valid defence for the cruelty and tyranny of the great man than does the view of Carlyle that the moral defects of the Hero ultimately work for the good of his subjects. The subordination of the majority is necessary, not because they will injure themselves without guidance, but because they will prevent the emergence of the higher being, without which human life has no meaning. The incorporation of a kind of immortality through the theory of eternal recurrence increases the importance of individuality.

12

Nietzsche's conception of the superman in politics bears some resemblance to the conception of the modern dictator. The man as an end in himself appears in *The Will to Power*. 'The Revolution made Napoleon possible; that is its justification. We ought to desire the anarchical collapse of the whole of a civilization if such a reward were to be its result.' In another aphorism he draws a contrast between two types of ruler, 'the Shepherd' and 'the Lord'. 'The shepherd as opposed to the Lord (the former is only a means to the maintenance of the herd, the latter the purpose for which the herd exists).'

The political aspects of these ideas are strengthened by Nietzsche's view that democracy would prevent the emergence of the superman. Believing that all activity was caused by the will to power, he considered that democracy, humanitarianism, and Christianity were the expressions of the will to power of the weak and mediocre. Democracy is the last development of the slave morality of Christianity. The purpose of democracy, in a sense, was exactly to prevent the emergence of that being greater than man which it is the sole purpose of humanity to evoke. The idea of the true King may appear to be among the eccentricities of political thought, but even apart from Nietzsche's influence on Fascist theory it shows the attraction which the great man has always exercised on men's minds.

The second idea of the autocratic theory, the idea of the efficiency of autocracy, is akin to the idea of the ruler as an instrument for effecting some particular purpose. Both these ideas are essentially practical. They are the solution of the problem of order, and they recur again and again in European political thought. The idea of the strong man is equally a reaction from the failure of democracy or the failure of a weak king. The conception of the true King is, on the contrary, ethical. In Greek political thought, it was Plato whose objections to democracy were aesthetic rather than administra-

tive, who was attracted by ideal Kingship; while Isocrates, who was profoundly moved by the condition of Greece, saw in Philip of Macedon the instrument by which salvation might be attained. This idea of the efficiency of the concentration of power in the hands of one man is the kernel of all defence of autocracy. The idea of the true King provides a decoration, the theory of the absolute sovereignty of the State a philosophical justification, for tyranny, but the fundamental reason for the establishment of autocracy is the danger of insecurity. This kind of autocratic theory is obviously a reaction to external circumstances. No one advocates autocracy for these reasons in periods of safe and efficient democracy.

The true King, on the other hand, seems chiefly to attract adherents in periods when he has no living representatives. The theory insists essentially on the technical advantages of autocracy. As the circumstances for which a strong man is required are different in every case, it is impossible to summarize the arguments in his favour, but they can be divided into two main groups, concerned first with the administrative, and secondly with the psychological superiority of autocracy. Arguments for the greater effectiveness of monarchy are always contrasted with the democracy which it is desired to overthrow. For example, Isocrates compared the permanence of officials under a king with the haphazard administration of the elected officials of the Greek democracies. As every function of government was then carried on in a democracy by elected officials, the argument had much practical importance, but it is completely inapplicable to any modern authority. As the arguments for the concentration of power in the hands of one man are so essentially practical, it is only when they are combined, as in Machiavelli or Hobbes, with a general political theory that they remain interesting.

In some periods these writers are conservative in the sense that they desire to return to a previous form of government;

sometimes they are revolutionary in the sense that they desire to establish a new form of autocracy. In some cases the tendency expressed by political theorists has been translated into actual systems of autocracy, as for example the Tudor Monarchy, and the French Monarchy in the seventeenth century. In other cases the attempt has failed or has never seriously been made. There was no concerted effort to give any practical form to the rather vague aspirations of fifthcentury Greece towards monarchy. In so far as the desire for order had any practical effect, it resulted in acquiescence in the Macedonian hegemony rather than in the rise of dictators within the Greek cities themselves.

This kind of theory only appears when the existing institutions have failed. Conservative theory only turns to autocracy when the constitutional government has become obviously incapable of dealing with the situation. The German Conservative writers of the early nineteenth century, whose ideas were essentially a reaction to the failure of the French Revolution, were in favour of hereditary legitimate monarchy, because it actually existed and was perfectly capable of solving the problem of order. People are only prepared to accept a tyrant when all other governments have failed. The thought which is a reaction to conditions of chaos is essentially practical and essentially conservative: practical because it is concerned with a definite and desperate situation; conservative because it cannot afford to antagonize any help in the task of constructing a barrier against the approaching tide of anarchy. The advocates of autocracy are Conservative because they turn to that element in the existing system of government which seems to promise the possibility of strong government. The autocratic thinkers only become revolutionary when the existing constitution has no element which is capable of becoming both strong and permanent. In fifteenth-century France the monarchy had, as the 'politique' writers saw, the capacity of becoming the

source of authority and the instrument through which order might be maintained. At other periods an oligarchy or even a legislature might possess the necessary qualities; as Hobbes declared, sovereignty might equally reside in one person or in a house of representatives. The necessity of what the English Puritans described as 'setting up a single person' only occurs when there is no institution which is capable of developing into the government. Even then the action of the single person is often legalized by a fiction that it is a mere continuance of the original constitution. In the Roman Empire the transition from Republican government was effected by the declaration that the Emperor ruled by the will of the people who had chosen to surrender to their representative the power which lay in them alone. In the Florentine Republic, Cosimo di Medici never altered the constitutional forms or openly claimed the supreme power. It was only under Lorenzo, after three generations of tyrannical rule, that the head of the House of Medici was openly recognized as the legal ruler.

As the autocratic thinkers in all periods have been concerned with particular evils and anxious to preserve as much of the old order as might be consistent with the effectual concentration of power in one hand, their arguments tend to be inconsistent with one another. Bodin, arguing that absolute monarchy is the best form of government, naturally adduces quite different reasons from those of Hobbes when he argues that the State, under whatever form the government is organized, must be absolute, or those of Machiavelli when seeking a Prince to deliver Italy.

This particular nature of autocratic theory is accentuated by the fact that, while in democratic theory democracy appears as an end in itself, the advocates of kingship often desire the rule of one man merely as a means of achieving some other end. In Dante's desire to revive the power of the Roman Emperor, as in Machiavelli's advice to the Prince, the ruler himself is

simply the instrument through which the salvation of Europe or the unity of Italy is to be attained. As the ends desired are different in every age, the arguments advanced in favour of monarchy are also different and frequently totally inapplicable to any other period. For example, the religious background of the fifteenth century made the divine right of kings an essential element in any theory which attempted to increase or to stabilize the position of the king; in modern anti-democratic ideas this theory finds no place.

The most famous of all books on autocratic government is Machiavelli's Prince. It was believed for at least two centuries after its publication that the Prince contained Machiavelli's final views on government and that he advocated a ruthless and unscrupulous despotism. This view has been decidedly refuted. The only sense in which Machiavelli can be described as an advocate of autocracy is that he saw in the strong ruler an instrument for a particular purpose, the purpose of saving Italy from foreign domination. Machiavelli's attempt to produce a coherent system arose from his preoccupation with the state of Italy. Machiavelli was in theory a democrat, as can be seen in the Discourses. He believed that democracy was the healthiest form of government. But he thought the psychological state, the diffusion of public spirit, caused the democratic forms; he never believed that democratic forms could produce the public spirit. In his acceptance of autocracy there are four elements: his theory of history, his theory of human nature, his preoccupation with the disastrous condition of his time, and the impact on his mind of the work of Caesar Borgia.

Machiavelli considered that men were predominantly antisocial, in the sense that they were primarily concerned with their own interests. This would not in itself make government so difficult, but selfishness is accompanied by an insatiable desire for power. The political importance of the imperfect

character of humanity lies in the fact that men will always prefer their own interest to that of the community. Even though public spirit may be sufficiently developed in a community to allow the establishment of democratic government, yet this system carries within itself the seeds of its own decay in the selfishness of its citizens. A knowledge of human nature alone would lead us to think that all forms of government are inherently unstable, and this opinion is reinforced by the teachings of history. Government goes in cycles; monarchy degenerates and the power is seized by an oligarchy until the oligarchy itself degenerates and is succeeded by democracy, which through the failure of public spirit leads to anarchy, and monarchy reappears.

These theories are important, because they must have greatly influenced his attitude to the tyrant. It follows from both these theories that whatever one's personal preferences may be, it is useless to attempt to reintroduce democratic government once it has collapsed, or to fight against a tyranny once it is established. Both arise from a hopelessly corrupt mentality, and the full cycle of change must be gone through before conditions are again ripe for democracy. But Machiavelli had an object, the deliverance of Italy from foreign domination. Conditions in Italy being as they were, the problem was to discover an instrument capable of undertaking the stupendous task of organizing resistance to alien domination. His preference for autocracy was largely caused by his mission to Caesar Borgia. His knowledge of what had been effected in the Romagna made him realize that a tyrant, by merely serving his own ends in an intelligent way, could enormously benefit his subjects. There is nowhere in Machiavelli the slightest hint of any moral superiority on the part of the tyrant. The true King of the Stoics, the selfless hero of Bolshevism, are equally absent from his mind. Nor is he impressed with the administrative advantage of dictatorship. Although he writes

on war, he nowhere draws on the familiar comparison between the competence of a king and the muddles produced by democracy. He simply thinks that, once people have become so demoralized that tyranny is possible, then the more effective the tyranny the better for everyone concerned. Machiavelli's language is unfamiliar, but the proposition, translated into modern terms, is simply that in certain conditions democracy is impossible and that in circumstances in which one is debarred from hoping for democratic government the interests of the State are bound up with the interests of an efficient ruler.

The connection between political theory and political events can be seen with exceptional clearness in the case of the French writers known as Les Politiques. The thought of this school is particularly suited for sociological investigation because with the exception of Bodin, who, though he reached the same conclusions, can hardly be included among the politique writers - it contains no thinker of outstanding originality. The politique authors are so numerous that the danger of taking the reaction of one individual exception for that of the average is ruled out. These writers, starting from the point that the continuance of the wars between Huguenots and Catholics was intolerable, attempted to find a power which could either effect a reconciliation or impose a compromise. As the civil wars dragged on, the possibility of a reconciliation appeared more and more distant, and those who desired peace above everything else were driven to assert the absolute power of the king as the one institution capable of restoring order. 'What was wanted, it was felt, was not restriction but simply universal obedience to a directing will.'1 They started from the point of view that anything, even the toleration of Huguenots, was preferable to the civil war. The early politique writers appealed to the common sense of both sides, but it apparently became obvious to them that there was no hope of agreement and a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> J. W. Allen, History of Political Thought in the 17th Century. Methuen, 1928.

settlement must be imposed by some higher authority. They found this higher authority in the monarchy. They accepted it as the one institution which seemed to have the potentiality of developing sufficient moral authority to restore peace. It is not so much the arguments by which they supported this contention which are interesting — their theory is often based on premises not now accepted by anyone — but the unanimity of their opinion that the salvation of France lay in absolute monarchy.

In spite of the much greater originality and the great importance of Hobbes in political theory, the basis of his thought seems to be fundamentally the same as that of the politique writers. He also desired, above all, a state of security, and it may be guessed that his famous description of the life of man in a state of nature as 'nasty, brutish and short' was largely derived from the state of England from 1642 to the end of the Long Parliament. His solution also was the omnipotence of an absolute State, whether that State was organized as a monarchy or a democracy. He found in the preservation of order the reason for government, and although he himself had defended the royal prerogative, he argued that, if a government and people were automatically dissolved, the private citizen was at liberty to reconcile himself with any government in actual possession of power. In order that the government might adequately perform its great task, it must be absolute.

Men establish government to defend them from each other. In order 'to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another... they confer all their power and strength upon one man or upon one assembly of men'. This passage illustrates what Hobbes considered the purpose of government, and also illustrates the fact that in moments of civil conflict the police functions of government come to overshadow all others in

the eyes of those who, like Hobbes, wish to be allowed to live their own lives in peace. If autocracy is the price of this peace, they are prepared to pay it.

After the French Revolution it appeared to most French conservative thinkers that the one hope of social stability was the re-establishment of the French Monarchy. The fact that an autocratic institution actually existed, or rather, had actually existed in the immediate past, prevented them from developing any new theories. As the theoretical basis of the monarchy had been the divine right of kings, they simply returned to this idea. Their thought was conservative in every sense of the word, except in so far as they desired to abolish even those slight restrictions on the power of the King which had existed under the ancien régime. Their ideas were also slightly clouded from the point of view of a student of autocratic ideas in that they also seem to have been actuated by an instinctive love for the system under which they had grown up.

The religious phraseology in which the philosophy of the two most famous of the legitimatist writers is couched possibly lessened their influence, but when reading them one feels that they were Catholics because they believed Catholicism to be essential to the monarchy, rather than monarchists, because they believed monarchy to be a Christian institution. In any case, a great many of their arguments would remain unaffected if the entire supernatural framework were removed. For example, the basis of De Bonald's philosophy is the existence of God, who created all things and therefore created society as well. It follows that rebellion against society is rebellion against God. But his theory of the relations between man and society are equally plausible without divine sanctions. In his view the individual, as such, has no rights against society, for society has made the individual what he is and any value he may have is due to the collective whole, not to the individual. To take a concrete example: the man of genius owes to society

everything which makes his genius valuable; without the ordered framework provided by society his talents would have been useless. This view of the individual can stand alone as a sociological generalization without any religious support and has thus stood in the works of Lenin and others. It is plain that the source and relation of modern ideas are more complicated than appears at first sight.

De Maistre came to the same practical conclusions by rather a different route. He starts from the revelations of Christianity, but again much of his theory is common to many political thinkers, though expressed in a language of his own. His remark that 'man is reasonable in intelligence and perverse in will' is but another way of saying that man possesses both social and anti-social impulses. Government is necessary because man is at the same time 'moral and corrupt', reasonable in intelligence and perverse in will; otherwise he would be at once sociable and unsociable, and society would be at the same time necessary and impossible. The necessity of government is demonstrated in criminal courts: man must be governed as he must be judged, and for the same reasons. Everywhere there is not a 'sentence' there is a fight. Man is 'reasonable', at least in intention, on occasions when the question does not concern his own interest. It is this which makes sovereignty and therefore society possible. The corruption of human nature might appear an argument against monarchy. It is true that kings share the vices of other men, but the cases in which the sovereign will be tempted to act badly are much fewer.

"Sovereignty is for us a sacred thing, an emanation of the divine power, which all nations in every age have always put under the guard of religion, but which Christianity has above all taken under its particular protection in bidding us see in the sovereign an image of God Himself."

In spite of this consideration, the necessity of government does present us with a dilemma. Unconditional oaths of fidelity expose all men to all the horrors of tyranny, and unregulated resistance to all those of anarchy. It appears that we must choose either tyranny or anarchy. The dilemma is solved, however, by the sovereignty of the Pope, and through him the moral values of Christianity, or rather of Catholicism, over kings.

These theories were for many years regarded as merely eccentric, but if Marx is to be called great because he has had great influence, it is impossible to deny the same title to De Maistre. His influence on the theorists of the 'Action Française' is obvious, and the 'Action Française' inspired many of the ideals of Italian Fascism. With the growth of democracy, doctrines of autocratic government of this type appear to have vanished never to reappear again. But in revolutionary periods revolutionaries defend autocracy for exactly the same reasons as do the conservatives — as an efficient instrument for creating and safeguarding the kind of society they want. In spite of a difference in phraseology, the Communists believe in autocracy for exactly the same reasons as did De Maistre. The Communists are as certain as De Maistre that it is ridiculous to talk of the rule of justice, men being what they are - products of economic forces. The recurrence of the autocratic idea in political thought, and the fact that it has appeared in countries and periods of such very different character, strengthens the idea that there is a real basis, both in administration and in psychology, for the present revival.

# AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES IN DEMOCRACY

THE administrative efficiency and the emotional attractions of dictatorship have an application in all ages, no matter what the intellectual background may be; but there were certain nineteenth-century developments, both in ideas and in organization, which in themselves tended to produce autocracy and had a profound effect on the actual form which autocracy took. Dictatorship is not, either in ideas or administration, such a complete breach with pre-war Europe as might be supposed from the apparent victory of Liberal ideas. It is a logical, although unexpected, development of pre-war tendencies in democratic no less than in autocratic countries. The dictators found in the autocratic theories of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries plenty of material from which to concoct their creeds. From the point of view of organization the dictator's party is clearly an adaptation of the mechanism of party government to the needs of autocracy. The growth of autonomous associations within the state, which appeared at first sight to favour the syndicalist organization of society, ultimately simplified the task of the dictator and made it easier for one man to control the multitudinous activities of modern life.

The sources of National Socialism in the German romantic attitude have already been pointed out, but many of the political theories of the nineteenth century—even theories which appeared to be democratic—can now be seen to have prepared the way for the acceptance of autocracy. The two dominant ideas of nineteenth-century Europe were individualism, in the sense of the supreme value of human personality;

and collectivism, in the sense of a growing feeling of the importance of the community, whether this expressed itself as Socialism or as Nationalism. In both of these ideas there is one aspect which finds its completest expression in dictatorship, in the all-powerful State controlled by the all-powerful human being. Collectivist theories, whether Nationalist or Socialist, lead directly to this consummation; individualist theories take a more devious route through hero-worship and through the worship of human personality dissolving into worship of those forces which give birth and nourishment to the personality. In most cases these forces express themselves in the national State. Both the worship of individuality and the depreciation of individuality tend to the justification of violence.

In spite of the subordination of the individual to the collective purpose in dictatorship, the dictatorial State is saturated with hero worship. The dictator has even stolen some of the attributes of God. This attitude is, of course, antagonistic to the conception of individualism which flourished in the period when individualistic doctrine appeared to be triumphant. At that time it was linked to Liberalism, and to a respect for all human personality. This attitude implied political liberty in order that everyone might have a chance to develop his potentialities, and in order to prevent that cramping of personality which tyranny was thought to produce. But at its birth in the Italian Renaissance individualism tended to an attitude more akin to that of modern dictatorship, an attitude which was fundamentally regardless of the claims of society. The Reformation moralized individualism and harnessed the idea of the full development of human personality to the idea of the social good. But in its origin attention was concentrated on activity as the expression of personality, not on activity as moral purpose. Neither Machiavelli's Prince nor Marlowe's Tamburlaine inquired what social benefits would result from his activities; simply

Nature, that fram'd us of four elements
Warring within our breasts for regiment,
Doth teach us all to have aspiring minds.
Our souls, whose faculties can comprehend
The wondrous architecture of the world
And measure every wandering planet's course,
Still climbing after knowledge infinite
And always moving as the restless spheres,
Will us to wear ourselves, and never rest,
Until we reach the ripest fruit of all,
That perfect bliss and sole felicity,
The sweet fruition of an earthly crown.

It is clear that individualism of this kind could develop on the one hand into tyranny and on the other into hero worship. The subsequent development of thought tended away from this conception, and the influence of the Utilitarians was so profound that even the supporters of autocracy advocated that method on the grounds that it was the best means of securing the welfare of the governed.

In the later years of the nineteenth century, however, a group of writers, of whom only Sorel was directly concerned with politics, produced a conception of autocracy extremely close to that of the Renaissance. Indeed, Nietzsche, the most important, was directly inspired by Renaissance models. These writers exulted in the violence and illegality of the historic tyrants, and regarded as virtues those qualities which had been previously denounced even by defenders of autocracy. This latter Nietzschean view has been incorporated into the doctrines of Fascism and National Socialism. It professes a delight in the autocrat for his own sake, not for any purpose which he may serve, and is essentially different from the practical defence of autocracy as the most efficient form of government.

Beside individualism conceived as hero worship, both

Fascism and National Socialism proclaim their belief in individualism in the ordinary sense. Hitler says: 'Our movement must develop by every means personality. One must never forget that all that is valuable in humanity resides in individual value, and that every idea and every action is the fruit of the creative strength of a man.' Mussolini, too, has always insisted on the part the great man plays in the development of culture. He says - frequently - 'A hierarchy must culminate in a pin-point.' The means by which the dictators propose to teach men a respect for personality is clearly shown by Hitler's words: 'One must not forget that admiration for the one who is great not only represents a tribute of gratitude to greatness, but also a virtue which binds together and unites all those who experience the gratitude.' He adds: 'To renounce the rendering of homage to a great spirit is to deprive oneself of an immense force, that which emanates from the names of men and women who have been great.'1 Compare Mussolini: 'There is a lack of leaders; what we want is to have the few who can guide the many, men strong in faith and in selfsacrifice, who will temper like steel the excited feelings of the multitude.'

Respect for personality is, then, to be taught chiefly by the worship of great personalities, but these régimes do also incorporate one practical aspect of the doctrine of individualism: the aspect of equal opportunity, of the carrière ouverte aux talents. Modern dictatorship does not wish to reinstate a privileged class. Hitler and Mussolini both proclaimed in almost the same words their determination to open the highest offices of State to anyone, whatever his social origin. Mussolini, in one of his early speeches, said: 'For fifty years generals, diplomats and bureaucrats have been taken from the upper class and from a certain limited number of families of rank and position. It is time to put an end to all this, if we want to

infuse new energy and new blood into the body of the nation.' Hitler, in Mein Kampf, says: 'The racial State is not . . . to maintain one social class in the possession of the predominant influence which it has exercised hitherto; its task is to search for the best brains amongst the members of the community and to confer on them employment and dignities.' Bolshevism, it is true, has shown some disposition to create a privileged class, but in theory this is conceived as a temporary measure only, and in practice the discrimination against class enemies appears to have been relaxed in the last Bolshevist decrees. Communist doctrine, of course, definitely rejects the value of human personality, but individualism was never widely spread in Russia, and even in Russia the supremacy of society has been overlaid by hero worship. Equality of opportunity in the sense of the abolition of legal privilege now appears so obvious as to be a part of common sense to most Europeans, but it was in fact only introduced into Europe by the French Revolution. This conception of equal opportunity is the point where Nietzschean individualism and Liberalism meet.

Nietzsche's influence on the dictators themselves is well known. Hitler and Mussolini have both claimed him as a source of their inspiration. Mussolini once declared that he had taken the words 'live dangerously', the most famous of Nietzsche's phrases, as the slogan of his life. Nietzsche's works are placed in the official bibliography of National Socialism, and it is probable that he influenced Lenin through Sorel. Lenin himself denied that he was affected by Sorel's ideas, and of course to an orthodox Communist the suggestion is sacrilege. There is, however, a distinct similarity between their views as to the role of force, a similarity which may indeed merely be a theoretical insight in Sorel and a reaction to actual events in Lenin. But Sorel was by far the most eminent of those Socialists who pointed out that the capitalist system would not slide to revolution of its own accord and

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that the proletariat must organize, must take risks, must fight as other revolutionary movements, such as Christianity, had had to do in the past. It was this thesis which Lenin defended against Kautsky and the German Marxists, who were horrified by the cruelty of the Russian Revolution.

Sorel himself could hardly have existed without Nietzsche. He was the first writer to combine the 'Heroic ethics' of Nietzsche with the Marxist conception of the role of the proletariat in history. In the Reflections on Violence he refers with obvious sympathy and admiration to Nietzsche's ethics, and seems to share fully in Nietzsche's admiration for the Homeric Warrior, who exulted in cruelty and bloodshed. But he expostulates that Nietzsche was wrong in thinking that the heroic virtues are linked to an aristocracy. They can be produced in the proletariat by a recognition of the social values which Nietzsche neglects. Of course, Nietzsche himself would have been furious at this concession to current morality, and it is in fact completely inconsistent with Nietzschean philosophy. But Sorel is saturated with some of Nietzsche's ideas. Sorel says: 'Proletarian violence not only makes the revolution certain, but it seems also to be the only means by which the European nations - at present stupefied by humanitarianism - can recover their former energy.'1 If the word 'proletarian' is left out, the passage reads like a quotation from Nietzsche.

The combination of this justification of violence with the idea of the victory of the masses makes the exaltation of violence particularly vicious. Nietzsche's theory was framed for the individual. The individual is fully conscious of his acts—in fact, the readiness to accept the burden of this responsibility is one of the signs of the great man. There must be no attempt to shift the responsibility on to a party or a creed, or even to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> GEORGE SOREL, Reflections on Violence. Translated T. E. Hulme. Allen & Unwin.

argue that the end justifies the means. There is no end except the full development of personality. The Sorelian attitude allows the cruelty to be increased while the responsibility is borne by the proletariat or historic forces. It is possible to forget that in reality it is a man who kills and tortures. Nietzsche may encourage cruelty, but at least a price — courage — is exacted for its exercise; Sorel encourages the cruelty of cowards. Sorel's influence on Mussolini is direct and avowed by both master and pupil.

Nietzsche's importance probably does not lie in his effect on the dictators themselves. Rulers have never found it difficult to justify their actions or to turn any theory, from Christianity to Communism, to their own ends. His ideas seem to be serious rather in their effect on those young men who were to make up the dictator's party. His influence, both before and since the War, on the student and the young intellectual has been enormous. John Strachey has paid a tribute to his influence in destroying 'the cloying traditions of English Liberalism for English intellectuals', and has described him as a bridge between the accepted doctrines of English politics and Communism. In France and Italy Nietzsche's influence was indirect, and lay rather in inspiring other writers who in turn moulded the ideas of their contemporaries. D'Annunzio and Maurice Barrès were the great literary influences of their respective countries, and both were the pupils of Nietzsche, although both at times denied their indebtedness. Even Jaurès attempted to reconcile the attractions of the heroic creed with Socialism, and declared that the proletariat was the 'hero' of Nietzsche. Three aspects of Nietzsche's thought have entered into the official theories of Germany and Italy: anti-intellectualism, expressed chiefly in a belief in the superior power of faith, courage, and instinct over reason; a repudiation of all forms of materialism, a denial that even happiness is the object of life, much less economic or material

welfare; and the assertion of the value of the individual personality. All these ideas, with the exception of the last, are found also in Bolshevist thought.

Anti-intellectualism was of course a strong tendency in prewar thought. William James, another of Mussolini's 'spiritual fathers', according to Mussolini's own statement, also asserted the primacy of will and the powerlessness of reason. Pareto and Graham Wallas, between whom there can have been no greater contrast in outlook and methods, both pointed out the strength of the irrational forces in political behaviour. Bergson invented a philosophy which made the will not only the centre of human personality but also the centre of the universe. An ethical revolt against the intellect can be seen in the works of D. H. Lawrence, and Aldous Huxley's doctrine of the complete man is in the same tradition. The distrust of reason and an assertion of the barrenness of the intellect has been one of the main intellectual tendencies of the twentieth century. It would be hard to find a more perfect expression of the National Socialist attitude than this passage from D. H. Lawrence: 'My great religion is a belief in the blood, the flesh as being wiser than the intellect. We can go wrong in our minds, but what our blood feels and believes and says, is always true.'

Lawrence, of course, was not concerned with politics, and the element of truth in the anti-intellectualist attitude should not blind us to the other truth, recognized by none of these philosophers except Nietzsche, that, while rationalist ethics allow freedom of choice between different impulses, if we trust in 'what our blood feels', then we must accept all the impulses in human nature. As Nietzsche said: 'With every degree of man's growth towards greatness and loftiness he also grows downwards into the depths and into the terrible.' A belief in yielding to instinct is generally accompanied by a refusal to believe in half the instincts of humanity. The danger of this

sort of creed in politics is that it puts no restraining force on anger or cruelty. There is, perhaps, nothing which seems more inherently right to 'the blood' than to injure those who stand in the way of what is believed to be right. Writers like D. H. Lawrence are generally profoundly uninterested in social reactions and therefore ignorant of the fact that tyranny is also a psychological impulse. The result of the incorporation of the ideas of these gentle idealists into politics has been amply demonstrated all over Europe. The distrust of reason has been incorporated into the creed of both National Socialism and Fascism. The two doctrines, although both clearly influenced by Nietzsche, stress different aspects of anti-intellectuality. In Italy it is the superiority of will, belief and courage over reason which is asserted; in Germany it is rather the relative nature of all political judgment.

Fascism can claim to be pragmatic in a more real sense than can National Socialism. The doctrine in Germany definitely preceded the action; in Italy the doctrine grew up after the conquest of power. In origin the Fascist movement was a spontaneous reaction to the state of disorder in 1922 and to the failure of Socialism. A doctrine would have probably been fatal to the Fascist Party, which incorporated men with every sort of interest and every sort of ideal. Mussolini said in 1921: 'We do not believe in dogmatic programmes, in that kind of rigid frame which is supposed to contain and sacrifice the changeable, changing and complex reality ... We permit ourselves the luxury of being autocrats and democrats, conservatives and progressives, reactionaries and revolutionaries, legalitarians and illegalitarians.'1 At the time it was not so much a luxury as a necessity, but there is no doubt that the Fascist leaders found the way prepared for them by the many contemporary thinkers. They were appealing to minds which had absorbed Nietszche, D'Annunzio and Sorel. Anti-

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in H. FINER, Mussolini's Italy. Victor Gollancz, 1937.

intellectualism in Fascist theory is less an assertion of the primacy of instinct than a defence of the party's lack of programme. Fascism 'does not possess an armoury of theoretical doctrines, because every system is an error and every theory a prison'. Apart from the practical convenience of this attitude, which leaves to the Duce a wider choice than is given to the Secretary of the Communist Party, it was invaluable in combining those whose only bond was anti-Socialism.

In Fascism there is a declaration of the supreme value of will or spirit, and a philosophy of 'myths' obviously taken from Sorel and Pareto. The great value of the 'myth' of the supremacy of will and spirit to a country such as Italy, which lacks the material foundation of greatness, is obvious. In fact, the exquisite subtlety with which each national doctrine is adapted to the national situation is such as to make even the convinced sceptic think again about the group mind of the idealist philosophers. Italy, a comparatively small country with no raw materials, adopts the theory that it is the will to conquer, not economic or geographical conditions, which determines the fate of nations. Russia, remarkable for her natural resources rather than for any use her population has ever made of them, is filled with the conviction that numbers, size and raw materials must win in the end. Germany, the one European country with large numbers of compatriots outside its national boundaries, adopts a theory which gives her an excuse for indefinite expansion.

The National-Socialist denunciation of the intellect is philosophic rather than practical; it arises from a desire for the fullness of life. It is, however, debased, a variation of the Romantic attitude. Although Goethe has been admitted only with reluctance to the National-Socialist pantheon, owing to his lack of interest in the National Crusade against Napoleon, yet the idealistic side of National Socialism is perfectly summarized in the lines:

Grey and ashen, my friend, is every science And only the golden tree of life is green.<sup>1</sup>

From this belief the ideas on education in *Mein Kampf* are clearly derived: the insistence on physical beauty and on physical training, the latter to develop not so much the perfect body as the perfect will. 'Thus sport is not only designed to make the individual strong, agile and bold, but it should also harden him and teach him to support trials and reverses.' This is accompanied by a tendency to exalt will; the ideal man in *Mein Kampf* is endowed with 'a virile and haughty energy'. The barbaric virtues, in the Nietzschean sense of 'barbaric', are cultivated.

The reproach of barbarism does not touch us any more than any other argument born of superficiality. If it is true that we are still in contact with force in its brutal state, we do not the less understand how to use it and direct it. It is very difficult for us to consider a state as morally inferior only because it has not yet definitely separated from Nature, because it has not yet traversed the last phases of humanization. The more the soul tends to pass from movement to immobility, and that not only on the social plane . . . the more it loses a certain form of internal freedom which manifests itself in a readiness for sacrifice, in the lack of interest in wealth, and even in heroism. The more the soul abandons itself to Destiny, to becoming, to movement, the more it accepts, the more real its transformation, the stronger its faith. Life has more prizes than existence and the springs of life are ready to gush out there, where demons strike with their hammers the fragile walls of the soul.2

The romantic attitude to personality is supported by the view that all thought is so conditioned by its environment that the idea of abstract thought unrelated to special needs and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Faust. <sup>2</sup> FRIEDRICH SIEBURG, Germany My Country. London, Cape, 1933.

special circumstances is ridiculous. Carl Schmitt considers it doubtful whether such a thing as intellect separable from and independent of each racial entity can exist at all. 'Could classical geometry have been created just as well by some intelligent negro as by the Greek Euclid?'1 The similarity between this theory and the Marxist interpretation of culture is obvious, the only difference being that race takes the place of the system of production as the factor determining the nature of the culture. Benn takes a different standpoint, seeming to believe that action is thought: 'Fundamentally it is history alone which thinks. There was thought on Sinai when the Decalogue came down and the trumpets and smoke went up from the mountains; the milestone which showed the way to Rome and Byzantine thought.'2 This idea, though expressed in romantic phraseology, is very near to the Marxist conception of the historic process which creates the whole concept of culture, unaffected by the conscious efforts of men.

Bolshevism is also fundamentally anti-intellectual in that, while retaining the intellect as an instrument, it also denies the possibility of disinterested thought. The central doctrine of Marxism, the materialist conception of history, is itself an anti-intellectual theory. Marx regarded all thought as a function of the productive system. Not only political systems and ideas are conditioned by the material environment, but also religion, science and philosophy are weapons in the class struggle.

"Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions—in one word, man's consciousness—change with every change in the conditions of his material existence and in his social life? When the Christian ideas succumbed in the eighteenth century to rationalism, feudal society fought its death battle with the

<sup>1</sup> CARL STAAT SCHMITT, Staat Bewegung, Volk. Hamburg, 1933.

GOTFRIED BENN, Der neue Staat und die Intellectuen.

revolutionary bourgeois. The doctrines of religious freedom and liberty of conscience simply gave expression to the rule of free competition within the domain of knowledge."<sup>1</sup>

The ultimate basis of this view is the idea that any recognition of the non-material factors in human history is inconsistent with thorough-going materialism. As Lenin somewhat naively puts it: 'If materialism in general explains consciousness as the outcome of existence, and not conversely, then materialism as applied to the social life of mankind must explain social consciousness as the outcome of social existence.'2

The subsequent development of Marxism has tended to develop this side of Marx's teaching. The kind of attitude expressed in such phrases as 'religion is the opium of the people', 'all art is propaganda', denies the possibility of thought except as an expression of the class mentality. For example, a modern Marxist critic says: 'Classicism, let it be stated without further preface, represents for us, and has always represented, the forces of oppression. Classicism is the intellectual counterpart of political tyranny.' It is impossible for the individual thinker to escape from the pressure of social events and, even if he could, there is nowhere to escape to. No fact or theory is true except for the particular system of production which invented it.

Nor is this all. It is possible for a few intellectuals to escape from the outlook of their class. Indeed, Lenin was one of them. But in general the ordinary individual is bound by two chains: first, the general conditions of production of the period; and secondly, his class interests. 'The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.' This theory is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Communist Manifesto.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> LENIN, 'Karl Marx', printed in *Marx. Engels. Marxism*. Martin Lawrence, London, 1934.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> HERBERT READ, Surrealism. Faber & Faber, 1937.

seen most clearly in the applications, especially to literature. One Communist critic says: 'A literary work is a social and not an individual phenomenon. It originates according to laws of inevitable necessity. To search for the author in an artistic work is to pay attention to secondary things.' John Strachey finds that the melancholy of A. E. Housman is due to the unconscious reflection of declining capitalism in his verse. This sort of criticism is more fundamentally anti-intellectualist even than that of the National Socialist; a slight but amusing example is Lenin's explanation of any point in which Hyndman differed from Marx by the former's bourgeois prejudices.

In theory Bolshevism rejects the other aspects of the antiintellectualist movement. There is in official theory no exaltation of the will over the mind, but in the applications of Communism to literature the Russian Communists have followed Jaurès in endowing the proletariat with the virtues of the Nietzschean hero. 'Revolutionary Romanticism' is a respectable school of Soviet literature, and it is obvious that a book like Babel's Red Cavalry is psychologically much nearer to Fascism than to Communism as understood in Western countries. Gleb Struve, the historian of Soviet literature, thus describes the book: 'Babel's stories of the Red Cavalry are not realistic snapshots of its everyday life; they are full of hyperbolism, of romantic exaggerations, of peculiar pathos, where the cruel and the heroic merge into each other.' Maiahovski's poem '150 Million' also exhibits a certain exaltation of action as opposed to thought:

> Down with the world of romanticism; Down with the defeatist singers of dirges, The pessimistic faith of our fathers;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Reavey and Slonim, Soviet Literature. Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1933.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> The Coming Struggle for Power. Victor Gollancz, London, 1932.

<sup>3</sup> GLEB STRUVE, History of Soviet Russian Literature. Routledge, London, 1935.

Down with the madness of possession in all its forms. Be athletically valiant with tense muscles, Full of the religion of action.

There is a most curious parallel between the Fascist assertion, now almost a platitude, so frequently is it made, that the 'greatest Fascist work of art was the March on Rome', and this passage from a review of Russian literature by a Communist critic: 'The first incomparable work of literary constructivism was published in March 1917. Its authors were the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and it was called an appeal to the people of the world.' The following description of Bolshevist literature is also extremely close to Fascist declarations: 'We have known the gloomy romanticism of Byron, we have known the mighty force and terrible romanticism of Gorky. We are learning the joyous, full romanticism of Bolshevism, full of fervour, insight and will.'

Both Fascists and Communists have a habit of referring to Hamlet as a type of all of which they disapprove, not to Hamlet as a work of art but to the actual character of the Prince. This 'heroic' attitude to life involves contempt for the bourgeois values. There is in Fascism a rejection of the ordinary aims of statesmen. It scorns the utilitarian doctrine of the welfare of the people as the aim of government. Fascist writers have repeatedly declared that they are uninterested, not only in economic questions, but even in happiness. Mussolini lays down that 'Fascism denies the materialist conception of happiness as a possibility, and abandons it to its inventors, the economists of the first half of the nineteenth century; that is to say, Fascism denies the validity of the equation, well-being happiness, which would reduce men to the level of animals, caring for one thing only — to be fat and well fed — and would

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. <sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quoted in Reavey and Slonim, Soviet Literature. Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1933.

degrade humanity to a purely physical existence.' Nor is this only a theory worked out after the seizure of power. Mussolini said in a speech in 1920: 'We do not promise people happiness either here or hereafter.'

In Germany there is the same turning away, not only from the preoccupation with economic questions, but also from happiness as an ideal, either for the individual or for the State. 'The will to happiness', says Sieburg, 'is lacking in us, and the idea that it is possible to work and struggle for individual happiness is not only foreign to us, it is positively revolting.' Hitler, of course, offered the unemployed the hope of work, but National Socialism has never made any concealment of the principle that economic considerations will always be overruled by the imperative needs of the nation as a whole. 'Whether we now achieve a position of material happiness is of little importance, as the coming generation will not judge our work as to whether the pioneers of this resurrection had enough bread, but their judgment will be on whether we have accomplished historical works.' a

Connected with this rejection of the bourgeois values is the cult of violence. In the cult there are two distinct elements: the age-old justification of the means by the end, and a quite new delight in violence for its own sake, imported into political literature by Sorel and into the novels of the pre-war period by D'Annunzio. Official Bolshevist theory contents itself with the justification of the means by the end. Lenin said: 'Great questions in the life of nations are settled only by force.' Trotsky's Defence of Terrorism can be summarized in the words: 'No other ways of breaking the class will of the enemy except by the systematic and energetic use of violence'.' In the literary expression of revolution, however, there are symp-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> BENITO MUSSOLINI: The Social and Economic Doctrines of Fascism. Hogarth Pamphlets.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Śieburg, op. cit. <sup>3</sup> Goebbels, Der Angriff. September 14th, 1933.

toms of the Sorelian cult of violence for its own sake, especially in the work of Babel and the revolutionary romantics. The argument that the end justifies the means is by no means confined to dictators or even to politicians. Philosophers, from Plato downwards, have been haunted by the idea of 'doing men good against their will'.

Both the utilitarian and the aesthetic defences of violence are contained in Mussolini's speech to the Fascists at Bologna in April 1921: 'However much violence may be deplored, it is evident that, in order to make our ideals understood, we must beat refractory skulls with resounding blows ... but this necessary violence must have a character and style of its own, definitely aristocratic.' On another occasion he spoke of 'the great, wonderful, relentless violence of the decisive hour'. These phrases contain both aspects of the Fascist attitude to violence - the defence of violence as necessary to achieve the party's aim, and the aesthetic pleasure in violence. It is more difficult to cite the National-Social views, because, while so much has been written in explanation of the doctrine, no books have received official approval, and even men like Rosenberg, among the first adherents, may at any moment be repudiated. But the general impression is undoubtedly correct that National Socialism preaches the virtues of courage, ruthlessness and strength and despises the Christian ideal. Von Papen's speech on the beauty of death on the battlefield is another example of the heroic attitude. 'Der Gott der Eisen', although written for another national revival, is included in the National Socialist song book, and probably reflects the National Socialist attitude as well as any writing:

God makes his iron to grow, he wishes for no slaves, He gave to man in righteousness his spears and pikes and blades. He gives to man his bravery, the anger of hot breath Which man keeps keen in combat fierce, till bloody fight brings death.

Modern dictators are on the whole proud of their cruelty rather than otherwise. In the whole history of political thought there has never been so frank an admiration of brutality for its own sake. There is nowhere the least concealment of the government's cruelty except for purposes of foreign propaganda.

The tendency to exalt war found in both Italian Fascism and in National Socialism is connected with the heroic attitude. It is undeniable that war is the ultimate affirmation of courage, the ultimate denial of the rationalist outlook on life. Therefore any heroic conception of the good life must, in theory at least, consider war one of the noblest of human activities; though it is fair to point out that Goebbels objected to Von Papen's attitude and said: 'We [the Nazis] do not say it is beautiful to die in war; we say to die is always bitter, but even that we will do for our country.' The deification of violence was undoubtedly influenced, especially in its first and theoretical stages, by the Darwinian doctrine of the struggle for survival. Scientists now complain that it is a crude misconception to suppose that evolutionary theory in any way justifies cruelty or tyranny. Although this is true in the strict sense, the theory does undoubtedly produce, and must produce, a shift in the moral angle.

It is curious that the rise of modern tyrannies was preceded by the vindication of the historic tyrants. Before the publication of Carlyle's life, Cromwell was regarded simply as an adventurer who had aimed at the supreme power from the first moment he entered politics and had made religion the screen for its designs. Carlyle's conception of the great statesman, who was also a great man, attempting to establish the ideal State in the midst of the chaos and self-seeking of his time, changed both the popular and the learned idea of Cromwell. Firth and Gardiner both accepted it in its essential points. Mommsen's estimate of Julius Caesar, though it was

not accepted so unreservedly, wrought a similar change. Caesar had been regarded as the tyrant who wantonly overthrew the free republic of Rome to gratify his own ambition. Mommsen showed a man grappling with almost insoluble problems, bringing order and justice to the provinces oppressed by Rome, protecting the poor against the rich and the rich against the resentment of the poor, and saving not only the Roman State but also the priceless legacy of law which Rome left to the world. The radical sympathy with Napoleon invaded the most respectable histories.

The changed view of these men arose primarily from the attempt to achieve a more scientific attitude to history and to understand the problems as they appeared at the time, not to judge by what was expected in the nineteenth century. There is no doubt that this method did give a more accurate picture of the past, but it had, with other factors, an influence in destroying the belief that democracy was always and everywhere the best form of government. And the historians did not only show that the main lines of the autocrat's policy was often justified. In general they defended every action of their heroes. Their defence of cruelty ran on the lines that it was absolutely necessary and that in the circumstances cruelty was the one way to achieve the end, that end which entirely justified the means. Froude defended the cruelty of Henry VIII, Carlyle the methods of Frederick the Great, Creighton those of the Borgia.

It is easy to see how useful the cult of the tyrant and the exaltation of violence might be to a dictator, but less easy to see how Nietzsche can be hailed as the prophet of the totalitarian State. How can the writer who put among fundamental errors: 'To regard the herd as an aim instead of the individual. The herd is only a means and nothing more', whose whole work is pervaded by its hostility, not only to the modern State, but

also to the idea of patriotism; who declared himself to be a good European, be considered as the prophet of Das dritte Reich? The reconciliation of Nietzschean individualism with the totalitarian State has been achieved in two ways: by resolving the respect for personality into hero worship; and by a mystical nationalism which regards the nation as the fulfilment of all that is valuable in individuality.

A complete acceptance of Nietzsche's doctrine seems to produce a certain uneasiness. There are few who can bear the moral isolation involved in the creed of the Superman. Most writers influenced by Nietzsche in the end sought some kind of social justification for their activities. The individualism of Maurice Barrès and of D'Annunzio turned into patriotism. The arguments through which the individualist becomes a believer in authoritarian government are most clearly seen in the development of Barrès. His early work was animated by the idea that the aim of life is the free development of personality. He was apparently led to his later authoritarian views by two considerations: first, that modern democracy stifles the kind of personality which he desired to develop; and secondly, that personality itself is determined by the environment into which a human being is born. It is the nation which on further reflection claims the worship previously accorded to the Moi.

He says that the change in his attitude arose from his recognition that the individual personality was entirely supported and nourished by society. 'Idée banale', as he very truly remarks, and thus he seems to have developed towards a conception of individuality not very different from that of the Marxists. But 'society' in his theory is not the sum of economic forces, but the nation. It is the nation which forms the individual, and all that is valuable in individuality is derived from the national culture. 'We are not the masters of the thoughts which are born within us. They do not come from our intelligence. There are no personal ideas — even the most rarefied

ideas, even the most abstract judgments, the infatuated sophisms of metaphysics, are ways of general feeling, and are found in all beings of the same organism, beset by the same images.'1 This development is not only interesting in itself, but also repays examination, because almost exactly the same path was trodden by the German romantics in their journey from individualism to worship of the State. Not only Fichte and Friedrich Schlegel, but even Hegel, accepted with enthusiasm the assertion of the value of individuality made by the French Revolution, and their subsequent repudiation of liberty was caused largely by a conception of nationalism akin to that of Barrès. Fichte wrote in 1794: 'Political society is no part of the absolute purpose of human life, but only a possible means towards the promotion of a perfect society ... The final aim of all government is to render itself superfluous'; and he had declared earlier that man was subject to the moral law alone and no one had the right to impose national law in conflict with this moral code. From the Fichte of 1794 to the Fichte of the 'Speech to the German Nation' there is a change indeed. Here is the nation become the noble-minded man's chief hope on earth, because 'people and fatherland are a support and guarantee of eternity on earth'. In order to serve his nation he must be ready to die that it may live, and that he may live in it the only life for which he has ever wished.2

The change was brought about partly, of course, by the excesses of the French Revolution and by Napoleon's attack on Prussia, but partly also by consideration of the question, how can the moral aspirations of the individual best be fulfilled? It became obvious that the yearning for moral perfection is not satisfied by a preoccupation with the self, and that even from the individualist point of view an object outside the self is necessary if the fullest development of the personality is to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> MAURICE BARRES, Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme. Paris.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> G. FICHTE, The Vocation of the Scholar.

attained. The German nation appeared to these writers as the realization of those longings for moral perfection which even the most intense individualism cannot but recognize as being but imperfectly fulfilled in the isolated human being. As de Ruggiero says: 'Towards this figure [the German nation] the romantic mind turns with the same love with which it had previously beheld itself, and there finds in a higher degree the same liberty which presides over the birth of individuals'.1 attitude in the end involves a change in the whole political outlook. For Fichte, as for Hegel, true liberty could only be found in contributing towards the purpose of the State, even to the extent of total sacrifice of individuality. Other romantic writers, perhaps the best known of whom were Friedrich Schlegel and Savigny, came to regard everything German - law, social organization and political institutions - as creations of the sacred German spirit and therefore to be regarded with the same reverence as was owed to the nation itself. Schlegel even became a Catholic because in the Middle Ages Germany, through the Holy Roman Empire, had played a predominant part in Europe and therefore Catholicism was part of the true German character. The same impulse led others to a glorification of the Reformation because Luther was a German. This philosophy is similar to that of the action Française, although there is no evidence that any of the action Française writers were directly influenced by German ideas.

Individualism is thus reconciled to the supremacy of the state in two ways: by personifying the state in a personality, and by going beyond the individual to the social environment that has produced him and there finding the origin of all that is valuable in the individual. Here the nationalist theories meet and embrace the collectivist theories. These theories arise from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> History of European Liberalism, trans. R. S. COLLINGWOOD. Oxford University Press, London, 1927.

two quite distinct and, in fact, frequently opposed sources: Socialist theory and the philosophic theory of the state. In Fascist theory both these streams meet to form a complete theory of state supremacy.

Both Italian Fascism and National Socialism have incorporated the idealist theory of the state in their philosophy. Bolshevism, although absolutely opposed to idealism, reaches somewhat the same conclusion by declaring the primacy of society over the individual. In Communist theory society is not the national state, but in fact the only form of organization which it was possible for the Socialists to seize was the national state, and in practice society has been identified with the nation. The philosophical theory of the state derives ultimately from Hegel, although whether he would recognize it as a black or a brown shirt may well be doubted.

The theory of the totalitarian state contains three propositions: first, that the state has an existence of its own, separate from the lives of the citizens composing it; secondly, that this life finds an expression in a will, which contains and transcends the will of all the citizens; and thirdly, that the general will is actually embodied in the government. Certain corollaries follow from this view. The life of the state is superior to the life of the individual because it is both the sum of the lives of all individuals which have been, now are, or in the future will be subjects of the particular state; and also because there resides some quality in the state which makes its life a higher life than that of the individual in the same sense as that in which the life of a man is considered to be higher than the life of the cells which compose his body. As the general will is expressed in the government, fundamental disagreement with the action or the policy of the government both cannot really take place and is fatal to the existence of the state. Disagreement cannot really take place, because the general will contains the real will of every member of the community. That is to say, the highest

good of the individual consists of his co-operation in the life of the state; but he is in actual fact often prevented from realizing the identity between his own good and the good of the state, partly by intellectual and partly by moral inability to perceive life in its totality.

To take the most extreme example, it is contended that the criminal in reality consents to and even desires his own punishment. There is, of course, a certain sense in which this is true on the ordinary plane. It is probable that every murderer, at any rate before he had committed the murder, would have agreed that promiscuous killing makes ordered society impossible. It may also be plausibly argued that all criminals have accepted the rights which the state confers on all its citizens, and that an acceptance of rights implies an acceptance of duty. For example, protection from theft carries with it an obligation not to murder. But this does not seem to be what is meant by the philosophers. Their theory implies something more. The highest good open to man is self-realization within the state. The criminal has by his crime cut himself off from that possibility. The only contact he can have with the state that is, with the good — is with the state as avenger. Since no man would, if he realized the full implications, cut himself off from 'good', therefore in reality the criminal wills his own punishment. Fundamental dissent from the policy of the state in this view obviously destroys the state. If it exists on the plane of the real will, the state ceases to be a state. The only case in which this dissent on the plane of the real will seems possible is the case of the relations of a conquered nation and its conquerors, which would admittedly not be that of a state at all, in any but an external and purely legal sense.

Fascism makes the full Hegelian claim that true liberty can only be found in submission to law, and goes far beyond Hegel in identifying the ideal state with some particular historic state. 'Fascism is for liberty. It is for the only liberty which can be a

serious thing: the liberty of the state and of the individual in the state, since, for the Fascist, all is in the state and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has any value, outside the state.' The state, says Professor Rocco, can have ends quite distinct from, and even opposed to, the ends of the individuals composing it. 'Hence the necessity, for which the older doctrines make little allowance, of sacrifice, even up to total immolation of individuals, on behalf of society.'

Sieburg, who is not a Nazi but who is sympathetic to the new dispensation, thus explains the Nazi attitude to the state: 'The State is becoming total and embracing all those private spheres in which human existence has hitherto detached itself from the State and allowed itself a certain degree of neutrality. This neutrality, which to liberally-minded people seems the chief and essential condition for the noble blessings of private life and their enjoyment, is repudiated as weakness, and even often as deliberate cowardice. There are to be no more private Germans; each is to attain significance only by his service to the State and to find complete self-fulfilment in its service. Thus ... there are to be no more human beings in Germany, but only Germans.' Liberty in the Hegelian sense is indeed admitted. 'It is very clear that liberalism is only a stage towards anarchy and so is the enemy of the State. There does exist a liberalism which maintains and reinforces the State, which desires the freedom of the individual in order that he may the better serve the State.'2

The philosophic theory has, on the whole, been associated with Conservatism, although there seems no particular reason why the state thus conceived should not be a Socialist state, and in fact it did exercise an influence on German Socialist thought through Lassalle. The Bolshevists in theory totally reject it, but they have themselves produced a theory of the

<sup>2</sup> Sieburg, op. cit.

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in International Journal of Ethics, October 1935.

relations between society and the individual, and a conception of the true nature of liberty which approximates to the idealist view, though without the element of mysticism which is inherent in the latter.

Communist theory tends to deny not only the value but the very existence of the individual. If the consciousness of men is determined entirely by their social existence, then it is obvious that the sense of individuality is an illusion, and this is in fact what Communism in its purity does say. It is true that since the National-Socialist revolution in Germany there have been symptoms in Russia of an attempt to reconcile the freedom of the individual with Communism, but it is plainly inspired by motives of national defence. Modern disciples of Marx are quite definite in rejecting individualism. 'Marx discovered that "individual" was nothing more than a focus of the interplay of social forces, and, what is more, of unconscious social forces ... It would in my mind be entirely wrong to mitigate the impact of Marx's theory, not merely that the individual is an illusion, but that his sole concrete reality is that of a cell of social organism governed by unconscious laws.'1 Gorky took the same view: he considered personality 'as only part of the true reality which is represented by the mass', and destined to be superseded by a sort of collective consciousness. It has generally been recognized that certain personalities have a kind of greatness of their own. This greatness, however, in the Communist view, comes entirely from the social conditions which they represent: they are, in Bukharin's words, 'a coagulated mass of compressed and tightly interwoven social influences'.2 This, of course, is the view held by the French legitimatist writers of the nineteenth century.

This conception of the relations between society and the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> MIDDLETON MURRY, The Necessity of Communism. Jonathan Cape, 1932.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> N. I. Bukharin, and others, Marxism and Modern Thought, trans. Ralph Fox. Harcourt Brace, New York, 1935.

individual leads to a conception of the Communist State very similar to that of Hegel. The Communists, of course, declare that the State is autocratic only for the transition period between capitalism and Communism, and that after the establishment of real Communism the State will 'wither away'. There is, however, no reason to consider this a likely development from Communist doctrine; in fact the Communist denial of individuality implies that society shall be so organized that the State shall be supreme, by whatever name the State is actually known.

The Socialist and national conceptions of the supreme community meet in the Bolshevist and Fascist dictatorships: in Bolshevism simply because Russia is conceived as the fatherland of the proletariat, but in Italy and Germany there is a fusion of the two ideas through a realization of the importance of the National State to the worker. As early as 1921 Mussolini said: 'We deny your internationalism, because it is a luxury which only the upper class can afford; the working people are hopelessly bound to their native shore.' Rossi, the organizer of the Fascist corporations, had been a Labour leader to the United States, and the factor which turned him from a Socialist to a Nationalist was the inferior position of the Italian worker as compared with the native-born American.

The German Fascist Party has adopted a similar attitude. 'Our Socialism is iron justice, as Adolf Hitler said at Nuremberg; i.e. it is not only an economic but a political hierarchy. It fights against Versailles and against Franco-European imperialism. A Socialist policy of suppressed nations links us with the nations of the Near East against the capitalism of the Western Powers.'

Beside the definitely political ideas, anti-intellectualism in general also probably tended to weaken faith in democracy,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Schlesishe Hochschule-Blätter, No. 2, November 1933: quoted in Fascist Germany Explains.

even among those who were not attracted by creeds of violence and did not need excuses for their actions. The revelations of the very insecure basis of human judgments made successively by Freud, Pareto, Graham Wallas and the behaviourist school of psychology induce a certain scepticism as to the value of government by discussion. After all, even Mill said: 'Liberty as a principle has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind has become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.' If men in reality behave, not according to any rational standards, but according to whether they loved or hated their parents, then they are incapable of being improved by any discussion whatever. Equally, if the human mind simply consists of automatic reactions to outside stimuli, human judgment can hardly be considered reliable enough to be an adequate standard for political action. Logically these theories should have undermined all political and social doctrines with the exception of equilibrium economics, for this is the only social theory in which adjustment takes place without conscious intervention. That these theories did tend to the destruction of faith in democracy rather than in autocracy is to be attributed chiefly to the fact that democracy was the system of government in existence in the countries in which they first appeared. They would probably have contributed to a loss of faith in any system actually in existence.

There were also certain negative criticisms which undoubtedly helped to weaken the attachment felt by large numbers of people for existing institutions. The revolt against the concept of law has actually only flowered in the legal codes of the dictatorships, but it was in full bud before the War. This revolt has two quite distinct and unrelated sources. There is first the Marxist view of the relative nature of law, and secondly there was the humanitarian effort to get society to take a wider and more scientific view of the relation of the criminal to society.

The Marxist view of law is too well known to require detailed explanation. The Marxist believes that law is simply a weapon by which the possessing class retains its property against the claims of the proletariat. This view has had an influence far beyond the ranks of orthodox Marxists. Professor Laski, for instance, says: 'The law of any given age is a function of the way in which economic power is distributed in that age. The substance of law, broadly speaking, will be determined by the wants and needs of those who dominate the economic system at any given time.'1 This idea was widely spread in Germany and in Italy, in which latter country indeed it had a certain amount of support from the general corruption. Quite apart from the accuracy or inaccuracy of the Marxist approach, it clearly works to destroy regard for the law as such. There is always, among many people, an impatience with the law because legal rules do not always coincide with moral rules, and a feeling that legal etiquette should be disregarded if, by doing so, it is possible to secure conviction for some particularly unpopular criminal, or to prevent conviction in a case in which popular sympathy is on the side of the criminal. There is generally a great unwillingness to wait for the legal removal of constitutional obstacles to action which is clearly necessary or beneficial. This impatience, which arises from a failure to realize the benefits of the rule of law, is naturally greatly strengthened by Marxist propaganda, which reaches its fullest influence only when it has reached an even cruder stage than in its original presentation. It is hardly surprising that there is small resistance to Fascism from a working class drenched in Communist propaganda.

The humanitarian desire to reform the law in the interests of the criminal, though in origin completely different, tended also to weaken the ordinary conception of law as a fixed rule

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> H. LASKI, The State in Theory and Practice, Allen & Unwin, 1936; see also 'The Judicial Function' in Politica, November 1936.

unalterable by special circumstances; in its more extreme form at least, it comes very near to a repudiation of the ordinary conception of law and a return to the Platonic theory of the inadequacy of written codes. When Professor Laski says that the whole sociological background must be taken into account in the judgment of any crime, he comes very near to Plato's first reason for preferring the rule of man 'possessing wisdom and royal power' to the rule of law. 'The differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule.' Consideration of the special circumstances of each prisoner involves different sentences for the same crime and a return to the Oriental conception of law as a series of judgments on isolated crimes instead of a code. Although starting from a different point, the humanitarian in the end reaches a conception of law very near to that of the dictatorship. This, of course, is no argument against law reform, but it is an indication that the older Liberal attitude to law as the defence against autocracy had largely died out.

In fact, most of the changes in legal machinery made by the dictators have been advocated at one time or another by legal reformers. Prens, the Belgian criminologist, suggested that the jury should be replaced by two or three assessors to assist the judge, and that a greater discretion should be left to the judge and less weight given to the formal nature of the charge. Humanitarian projects of this kind appeared in a period in which the danger of encroachments on personal liberty by an arbitrary government seemed very remote and it was natural for legal reformers to concentrate on reforming the criminal code in accordance with the new psychology of crime. The function of law as a safeguard of the ordinary citizen was dis-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Ensor adopts the suggestion as to a panel of lay assessors to advise the judge. R. C. K. Ensor, *Courts and Judges in France*, *Germany and England*. Oxford University Press, 1933. Similiar suggestions have been made by American law reformers.

regarded. Both these reforms have been carried out in Germany, Italy and Russia. But, natural as this was, it also tended to weaken the psychological obstacles against autocracy, in that it destroyed the nineteenth-century belief that a bad law was better than a good autocrat. After all, the logical conclusion of the theory which wishes to treat each criminal as an isolated case is the complete discretion of the judge.

This intellectual atmosphere was important in two ways: it weakened the general attachment to democracy by denying and depreciating the democrat values. Cruelty and oppression were less shocking in theory because they were already familiar in literary and philosophic sources. Here these ideas were probably a minor influence, as they must have affected only a minority. But they clearly had an immense influence in determining the exact form which the new autocracy should take. Just as the Turkish dictatorship is, in spite of its revolt against Islamic ideas, clearly and obviously influenced by Mohammedan ideas of government, so the Fascist and Communist dictatorships conform to the ideas familiar in those countries.

The difference between the autocratic states is due to the difference in intellectual background. Germany, Italy and Russia, although the Fascist States are so hostile to the Communist State, have in reality many ideas in common. Fascism and Communism are similar, because they are the result of various modern tendencies both in ideas and organizations. Fascism derives from the same attitude as Communism, but it is modified by the conditions of Western Europe. In Russia the active part of the population, the industrial workers, valued nothing in the Tsarist State, while the peasants were so obsessed by their desire for the land that they allowed the Communists to seize the government. But in Italy and Germany the working classes had both a sentimental and a material interest in the existing system. Fascism is essentially

an attempt to secure the benefits of Socialism without giving up the familiar background which is dear to everyone in Western Europe, including the industrial working class.

The similarities between the governments of Italy and Germany are not mere copying on Hitler's part, but exist because the political ideas and hopes of all Western European nations are roughly the same. It required a crisis to allow the dictator to seize the government, but even the dictator had to include in his programme the two ideas which dominate modern politics: nationalism and social reform. The difference between the Fascist dictatorships and the national dictatorship arise from the difference in public opinion. Turkey and Portugal are practically untouched by socialist ideas, and Poland is still largely dominated by liberalism. The kind of public opinion which must be conciliated in these countries is therefore entirely different from that in typically 'modern' countries like Italy and Germany. In these countries the theories discussed were widely accepted before anyone believed that they might one day have a practical application, but they influenced chiefly either intellectuals or those who were active in politics. It was rather the general extension of government control and government intervention which tended to weaken the opposition of the general mass of the people to dictatorship.

From the administrative point of view, also, dictatorship is a development from previous organization rather than a sharp break with the past. Dictatorship has incorporated the external forms of democracy, and dictatorship is an exaggeration of the general tendency in modern government towards the growth in power of the executive. Modern autocracy has made use of the party machinery of democracy. All dictatorships have a party, and in those which can be considered as particularly modern, the Fascist and the Communist, the party is the most important part of the

government. The party retains certain democratic attributes. Membership is voluntary; the members are not directly paid for the large amount of work they do; the leaders rely on enthusiasm for the idea to keep the party together. But the most important of the party's democratic aspects is that it is designed to allow the ordinary citizen, who is neither a professional politician nor a civil servant, some share in the government. This does not, of course, exhaust its purpose. The propaganda and terrorist aspects of dictatorial parties have been widely recognised, but it is important also to recognize the other and democratic side of this organization. It is not only a new element in autocracy — there was nothing like it in the absolute monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - but it is difficult to see how such an organization could have been perfected without a previous experience of democracy. The political party is definitely a democratic conception: it implies that the ordinary citizen has a right to express his views and that the government is accessible to influence by its own supporters. It would have been impossible for the idea of a political party to appear in a really autocratic state without the example of democracy. The only historic autocrat who had any organization comparable to the modern party was Cromwell, and his party was also democratic in origin. The Russian Communist Party was clearly copied from democratic models.

The dictator transforms the party system into an autocracy by the simple process of making his own party the only legal political organization. But this transformation, although it radically alters the nature of the government, is also in one sense a development of democracy itself. After the appearance of parties with clearly-defined programmes, political development can take two alternative courses. Either the parties will come to recognize, tacitly if not explicitly, that opposition is necessary and that there will always exist two or more parties in

the state; or else there will arise a desire in one party or the other, or in both, to make all competing parties illegal. The first alternative must be chosen if democracy is to survive, but it is by no means inevitable. In the early days of democracy, it would have been difficult to get the ordinary members of the advanced parties to realize that there would be a permanent place in the democratic system, even for opponents of democracy itself, as long as their opposition remained constitutional. Many of the more simple-minded adherents of the various political creeds, even in England, would probably find it hard to concede their opponent's right to exist. It is out of democracy itself that the extreme socialist parties have arisen, demanding the suppression of every other party. This demand is quite spontaneous and is in no way manufactured by the leaders to suit their own ambitions; it is in fact the natural result of an enthusiastic political faith.

It is clear that in this aspect dictatorship is a development of tendencies inherent in a democratic system itself; tendencies arising from a misunderstanding of the nature of democracy. Professor Laski is clearly right when he says that the services which parties have rendered to the democratic state are inestimable, but clearly wrong when he includes amongst those services that they are among 'the most solid obstacle we have against the danger of Caesarism'. Nothing is easier than for the democratic party itself to evolve into an instrument of dictatorship. This historical destruction of democracy through its own parties is assisted by the modern developments of government from the administrative side. Dictatorship and democracy are not proceeding in opposite directions but on parallel lines. The executive of a democratic government is, of course, a very different thing from a dictator; but in democracies the power of the executive has been increasing both with and without the conscious desire of the government and citizens. Without any deliberate intention, the power of

the executive has been growing in three directions. The legislature has in every country, except France, become progressively weaker as against the executive. There has been in all countries an enormous growth in departmental law, which, as far as it can be said to be under the control of anyone, is under the control of the executive. In federal constitutions the central government has everywhere encroached on the federal units.

In all the democratic constitutions except France the power of the executive has steadily increased, and in this one exception it has not increased because the French constitution was devised with the express object of preventing its growth. When the Third Republic was established, it seemed to French democrats that the danger to guard against was the danger of the President's once again making himself dictator. The Third Empire had produced a great distrust and jealousy of the executive power. The possibility of a weak executive making it so difficult to produce a government at all, that the very fact that the legislature was all-powerful might itself create a demand for a dictator, did not occur to anyone. Lord Bryce discussed this tendency in the last edition of Modern Democracies, published in 1922, when the present revival of autocracy had hardly begun. But even then he pointed out 'the disposition to trust one man, or a few led by one, rather than an elected assembly'. This tendency was not outside but inside the democratic constitution itself, and had already shown itself even in the State governments of the United States, where public opinion was fervently democratic and where the emergencies of a national crisis were obviously not the cause.

In England the power of the Cabinet has increased and the power of the House of Commons decreased. This tendency has been exaggerated; it is absurd to talk about a Cabinet dictatorship, because the Cabinet remains dependent on the House of Commons. The House can always revolt against the Cabinet.

But the initiative in government has passed to the Cabinet. This, of course, is partly due to the nature of legislative assemblies whose function is criticism rather than suggestion. A legislative assembly is not constructed to perform executive duties. But the Cabinet's power is also due to its command of the time of the House. Measures not favoured by the government have a very small chance of reaching the Statute Book, because the mass of legislation introduced by the government in every session requires the whole time of the House if it is to be dealt with. Democracy has insisted on government intervention to an ever greater extent in an ever wider field, and democracy has thus produced the conditions which tend to remove the power from the legislature. The sheer amount of work which has to be got through means that the government is forced to monopolize the time of the House.

The discipline exercised by the parties over their members has been continuously growing. This is an inevitable consequence of the development of party government. If the government is to be efficiently carried on through the system of opposed parties, the party leaders must be able to depend on the votes of their followers. This involves the subordination of the individual member to the party. Although there still remains, even in the most rigid party, a place for a few independent members, they must be very few. The majority must vote, except of course in exceptional circumstances, as the leaders decide. Anything else would produce sheer chaos. Unless the government of the day can depend on a solid block of votes, it will be forced to resign or condemned to complete inaction. In France we have an example of the instability produced by a situation such as this, and it has proved a serious danger to the continuance of democracy. Strict party discipline is, then, an essential element in modern democratic government. From the purely theoretical point of view this is not necessarily an undemocratic tendency, but in practice it leads

to an increase in the power of the party leaders, an increase which tends to strengthen the executive still more.

The same development has occurred in other democracies. The growth of the power of the President in the U.S.A. since the election of 1933 is a political platitude and is so great as to lead some writers to refer to it, most inaccurately, as a dictatorship. But even before the War the importance of the President was steadily growing. Wilson said, as long ago as 1910: 'Much the most important change to be noticed as the result of the war with Spain upon the lodgment and exercise of power within our federal system, is the greatly increased power and opportunity for constructive statesmanship given the President.'1 Roosevelt's attempt to modify the legal checks which the American constitution has placed on the power of the President is a clear example of the modern tendency to extend rather than limit the power of governments and the power of the executive. Such an alteration in the American constitution may be desirable or undesirable in practice, but it is a clear example of the fading-away of the theory that it is dangerous to allow supreme power even to an elected executive. The same evolution has been taking place in the States' government. The legislature has gradually been losing its powers, either to the people through the process of the referendum, or, more frequently, to the State Governor. Bryce says that, if a man of exceptional character appears, 'he counts for more than he would have done forty years ago'. This tendency in the U.S.A. is not a result of any conscious anti-democratic sentiment; it is simply a reaction to administrative conditions.

This strengthening of the executive has been the conscious aim of constitutional revision in some European states. Up to about 1926 constitutional changes within the democratic framework were always in the direction of more complete democracy. Since then the tendency has been reversed. The constitutions

<sup>1</sup> WOODROW WILSON, Constitutional Government in the United States, 1910.

of Estonia and Latvia have been modified by increasing the power of the President, and there was a strong movement in Finland for creating something almost like a presidential dictatorship. These countries are not only politically, but also socially among the most democratic in the world. When the Estonian constitution was established in 1920, the aim was to be as democratic as possible. Therefore there was no president; the President of the Council of Ministers performed the ceremonial functions of head of the State when necessary, as well as the active functions. By the Constitution of 1935 a President is created with very considerable powers. He is elected directly by the people for a period of five years and is therefore independent of the legislature. He possesses the right of dissolving the legislature, a right denied to the executive in many constitutions. In Latvia the same transformation has taken place. Here the President was part of the original constitution, but he was meant to be and he remained a figurehead. The new constitution has given him very wide powers. Like the Estonian President, he is directly elected by the people and has the right of dissolution, and he can also declare the country to be in a state of siege, a right unprecedented in any democratic constitution, except those of South America.

Other democratic governments have attempted to deal with particular problems by taking special powers. For example, in Czechoslovakia, by the law of June 9th, 1933, the government was granted special powers to prohibit, and in other ways control, the political parties. But as this was itself a result of the appearance of Fascist parties in Czechoslovakia, it is perhaps less important as evidence of the general trend. In 1935 the government of Belgium was granted the power to issue decree laws, not requiring the consent of the legislature, to deal with the economic situation.

All authorities are agreed that this evolution is due primarily to the increase in the amount of work which governments have

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to do and to the fact that a great deal of this increase is of a kind not suitable for discussion by legislatures. For example, Professor Laski, in his Democracy in Crisis, says that the political questions of the nineteenth century were of the kind which both led themselves to eloquent debate and naturally interested the ordinary man, while modern problems, being chiefly concerned with technical economic questions, are extremely difficult to understand and particularly unsuited for eloquence. Lord Eustace Percy<sup>1</sup> also considers that the loss of prestige of democratic institutions is largely due to the preoccupation with economic questions, with which, in their present form they are not fitted to deal. Public opinion has in no way resisted this development. In fact, in so far as it has interested itself in the matter at all it has continuously demanded that governments shall perform more and more functions.

The same causes have led to an enormous growth in the power of government departments to issue rules and regulations which are binding on citizens. On the Continent administrative law of this type always existed, but English writers used to pride themselves on the fact that administrative law was unknown in England. The necessity for this power arises, of course, from the increase of government activity in every sphere. It is impossible for the legislative assembly to consider every case in which the statute may have to be applied, and the pressure on the time of the legislature occasioned by the immense body of legislation with which it is now the business of all governments to deal, makes it more convenient to block out the measure in broad outline and leave the relevant ministry to make the regulations necessary for its application. The Town Planning Act, 1925 (15 Geo. V, c. 16), is an example of the extended powers given to government departments in England. By section 1 the Minister was given the right to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Government in Transition, Methuen.

decide whether or not land is likely to be used as building land; by section 7 the Minister is made the final judge in any dispute over whether 'any building or work contravenes a town planning scheme'. From this decision there was no appeal. The same powers have been granted to other ministers in a wide variety of subjects, of which one of the most striking examples is the power given to the Minister of Health in the Factory Act, 1937, to make special regulations for any industry he may think fit. The tendency has been both attacked and defended, but its warmest advocates can hardly argue that it is democratic. It is undemocratic because it so greatly increases the power of authorities of all kinds to interfere with the activities of ordinary citizens.

Another instance of this tendency to centralization is the weakening of federal units. This has by no means been confined to dictatorship. In Germany, although Hitler has proceeded farther and more quickly to assert the supremacy of the Reich Government, it was the Constitutionalists at Weimar who made the first attempt to restrict the rights of the separate States.

In the United States the power of the central government has grown at the expense of the States. This has been brought about simply by the development of communications not by any deliberate design. But it has been sharply accentuated by Roosevelt's policy. The whole purpose of his administration has been to accept responsibility for economic conditions and to use the whole resources of the nation to cure the depression; such a policy cuts across State rights and operates to remove large areas of administration from State control. The same development on a smaller scale has also occurred in England, where the responsibility for the able-bodied poor has been removed from local authorities and where an agitation is going on for the government to take control of air raid precautions. Exactly the same considerations involve the removal of responsi-

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bility from the State to the federal government under federal constitutions. Federal governments have also been driven to an extension of their authority because no one State can be allowed to fall considerably below the administrative standards of the country as a whole. Nor is it desirable that there should be great variations of policy between the different States: for example, that one State should have a system of compulsory free education and another State should not. But this purely administrative centralization is bound to be accompanied to some extent by political control. The facility of communications also tends to destroy the basis of separatism, by destroying the special character of various States.

This general tendency to centralization is not anti-democratic in theory. Indeed it is based on no theory, but is merely an attempt to deal with problems as they arise. Nor is it undemocratic in the sense that it puts any restriction on the free discussion of political theories or the free organization of political parties. Where it is undemocratic is that it removes government farther and farther from the influence of the ordinary citizen. Modern society is interfering more and more with the everyday lives of the people. At the same time government, through the general tendency to centralization, whether this tendency is expressed through the growth of the executive or the weakness of local units of government, is removing the actual operations farther and farther from the sight of the ordinary man.

The fact that the authorities to which these powers are given are democratically-elected bodies ought in theory to neutralize this influence. But although it does, of course, diminish the authoritarian aspect of modern government, it certainly does not abolish it. Large municipalities with enormous powers over the daily life of their inhabitants do not really appear to the majority of people to be in any way controllable by them. In order to defend oneself against government intervention it is

necessary to understand the workings of local government, the implications of the party programme and the way it is possible to exert influence or to protest against interference. No one can pretend that the average citizen is in this position in any modern State. Even in London it is probable that the London County Council officials, who insist that children's teeth shall be attended to and that public houses shall be shut, seem as autocratic to many people as if they were appointed by a dictator.

The organizations which have grown up to protect the interests of the working class only modify this general effect in a minor degree, partly because one of the aspects of trade unionism itself is to weaken personal initiative and to introduce further regulations and restriction into working-class life, and partly because these institutions themselves are not and cannot be psychologically democratic. The only organizations which can be really democratic in the sense that every man in them can play a consciously important part are small organizations, and small organizations are not powerful organizations. Directly a trade union develops beyond a certain size the inherent tendency of all organization to oligarchy appears, and the association is divided into leaders and led. This consideration does not, of course, mean that working men would not miss the right of free associations and resent their abolition, but simply that the development of working-class organizations does not counteract the influences making for authoritarian government.

Another way in which democracy has prepared its own downfall is through the bribery which every democratic party has thought it necessary to include in its programme, a bribery not always material. The propaganda of parties has wholly obscured the real nature of government by apparently abolishing the limits to what governments can effect and by painting a Utopian and an almost entirely false picture of the party's

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future achievements. The parties between them have created an atmosphere in which governments will do everything and personal exertion hardly seems to be required. The government will subsidize inefficient firms, the government will prevent wages or profits falling, the government will finally entirely remodel human existence. A dictator can, however, play the game much more effectively than a democratic party. Once in power, surrounded by machine-guns and secret police, it is improbable that he will be asked to carry out his promises in reality. He can therefore include the most fantastic pledges in his programme, while at the same time he offers to those more robust spirits who are slightly disgusted by the ordinary appeals a policy of discipline and sacrifice.

The politicians are hampered in attempting to counteract the dictators' propaganda by the timidity most of them have shown in enforcing the real situation. Since they have never spoken the cold truth before, it sounds exceedingly cold in contrast to the glowing promises of a Hitler or a Lenin. The absolute certainty of all Continental observers that any party which went to the country with the programme of the English national coalition in 1931 must be completely defeated, throws considerable light on the eclipse of democracy in Europe.

It is not apathy about politics, but rather an excessive interest which creates dictatorship. The votes in the Reichstag elections never fell below seventy-five per cent of the total, and in the elections immediately before Hitler's appointment as Chancellor they rose as high as eighty-two per cent in September 1930, and eighty-five per cent in July 1932. The idea that the government can do anything causes everyone to take an interest in politics, in the sense that they believe that anything could be done if only the politicians were not too stupid or too selfish to do it. The subjects of modern democracies feel a sense of power; their lives are such that they wish to use it; they know in a vague way what they want, but they are incapable of

filling in the details. Is it surprising, when a Hitler or a Lenin promises to achieve all they desire for the small price of that liberty which their own leaders have for years been telling them is valueless, that they should close with the bargain?

Added to these psychological influences, modern conditions have made an autocracy administratively easy to organize. It used to be said that never again would one man be able to control the immense complexity of a modern state. The exact reverse is true. Given that the conditions make dictatorship psychologically possible, never has society arranged itself in so convenient a form for the autocrat. The concentration of population in large towns makes the persuasive side of autocracy known as propaganda easier. Both capital and labour are organized in associations in a concrete form. Bribery and terrorism can be employed to induce those associations to conform to the government's wishes. Instead of millions of anonymous subjects, there are associations which are financially and legally vulnerable. They have funds to be confiscated, leaders who can be arrested, and a hold over their fellows which can often be carried over from one regime to another. Gleichschaltung would have been impossible, or very much more difficult, in the pre-industrial era. It is much easier to control a trust or cartel than the twenty separate industries which it replaces. To a minor degree this is true also of the numerous cultural associations of the modern world. They all present avenues of propaganda, a means by which the government can get into personal contact with its subjects. The developments of the modern Press have also assisted the autocratic movement. Newspapers with millions of readers present a means of propaganda undreamt of by past tyrants, and the creation of a censorship automatically hands over this instrument to the government in power.

The whole tendency of modern government from the administrative aspect is to give more power to the government

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and to concentrate that power on one particular branch, the executive. It is obvious that this must have an effect on people's attitude towards government as such. What this will be can be quite plainly seen in the general acquiescence in government interference. But besides this, it suggests that modern conditions in themselves produce a tendency towards a more authoritarian type of government. It is easier to persuade people to accept an authoritarian government in the guise of government by some definite human personality than in any other form. Personal loyalty gives the emotional basis which authoritarian government otherwise lacks. But it seems unlikely that the social service State would have transformed itself so rapidly into an autocracy, or into such an extreme form of autocracy, unless at the same time there had been a crisis which destroyed the familiar background of life. Fascist parties have developed in all European countries, which shows that Fascism, no less than Communism, is a reaction to modern conditions; but they have only been successful in those countries where there was also a crisis of some kind involving danger to the continued existence of the State.

If this analysis of dictatorship is accepted, a certain light is thrown on the policy best suited to preserve democracy. It seems clear that rather more is required than a 'United Front against War and Fascism'. If dictatorship has certain emotional attractions, it is desirable not to create conditions which will increase those attractions. The conditions which will produce a desire for a strong man are violent crises and weak and unstable governments. There are some kinds of crisis which it is not possible to avoid, but there are others which are deliberately produced or made worse by those who loudly proclaim their hatred of dictatorship. Democrats should surely avoid the state of affairs which makes the ordinary citizen consider anything preferable to the existing situation. Democracy requires that every party shall be prepared to compromise. If

certain parties refuse to do this in the belief that it is they who will gain by the resulting crisis, they can hardly complain when they find themselves in concentration camps. The Italian Liberals and Socialists undoubtedly brought their fate on themselves, but the Italian was the first anti-Socialist dictatorship, and they might be pardoned for thinking that the crisis in Italy would end in the same way as the crisis in Russia. But the folly of these parties in other countries, who, having seen what has occurred in Italy, Germany, Spain and Poland, still think that the best way to fight Fascism is to create as much disorder and inconvenience to the ordinary citizen as possible, is incredible. It is true that the National Socialists in Germany did as much as the Communists to foment disorder, but they were enormously helped to seize power by the prevailing fear of communism, a fear which can be well understood after reading communist literature, with its bloodthirsty threats against the bourgeois. The Communists take the greatest pains to give ample warnings to their enemies and then seem surprised when the enemies take steps to defend themselves.

Nor is an abject capitulation before popular agitation a good way of defending democracy. The Italian Government was too frightened to keep order itself and therefore tolerated the Fascist squads. The Polish Government was too frightened of the people to tell them that economies were necessary to balance the budget. Democratic governments can act with all the necessary vigour and without the inevitable cruelty of dictatorship, as we can plainly see from the English and French war experience. But they cannot act if the party leaders are obsessed with the idea that democracies cannot bear to hear the truth. There is a type of democratic statesman to be found in all parties who believes that government is best carried on by telling the people what these statesmen believe they wish to hear. Apart from any other consideration, the present enthusiasm for discipline and heroism in Europe shows that there

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was a general misunderstanding as to what the people did want to hear.

If the general tendency of governments is to weaken the democratic atmosphere even in democratic countries, the best defence of democracy would seem to be a policy designed to counteract this tendency.

#### CHAPTER V

# THE PROBLEMS OF AUTOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

THE fact that there is a real basis for dictatorship, that it is not merely a result of class manœuvres or mass hysteria but is a real solution to a real problem, does not tell us whether this solution is adequate. The question of the merits of dictatorship falls into two parts: first, can dictatorship solve successfully the problems of autocracy; and, secondly, is dictatorship a good form of government compared with democracy?

Every form of government has its own problems. The change from democracy to dictatorship does not mean, as one might suppose from some Fascist arguments, that all difficulties are automatically solved. The peculiar troubles of democracy are indeed remedied, or rather avoided; but not only do the perennial problems of all governments remain; the institutions of autocracy themselves raise new questions. The success of the system depends on the extent to which these questions are solved.

The method of autocracy is the greatest possible concentration, as the method of democracy is the greatest possible diffusion, of power. Diffusion and concentration appear to be the antithesis of each other, but they both have the same foundation: they are variations of the equalitarian State. This may seem an absurd statement in view of the organizations of many autocratic states in which there existed classes and even castes. If, however, these states are closely examined, it will be seen that in fact these classes or castes were conceived as equal in a special sense. Although they had different functions, they all had the same claim to the care of the state. Even when

a man was legally obliged to live his life within a certain class, his interests were not to be sacrificed to those of anyone richer or more powerful. Of course, his interests were often interpreted in a narrow or a mistaken way. Nor was the ideal ever reached in actual fact, any more than the ideal democracy has ever been attained. Autocracy can also exist for the specific purpose of safeguarding the interests of a special class, but this kind of dictatorship belongs to the type of dictatorships which is not a method of government but the instrument of some special policy.

Under the Mohammedan autocracies political equality was absolute, no class or section being supposed to have claims to political superiority. In the Roman Empire the Emperor was always considered the popular institution as opposed to the Senate and the other remnants of the Republican organization, and as the defence of the poor against the rich. In 22 B.C., when the concession of Augustus to the Senate seemed to foreshadow a return to senatorial government, crowds besieged the Senate House demanding that the dictatorship should be conferred on Augustus. As the real power, the military power, fell more and more into the hands of the poorer classes, the power of the Emperor became more and more absolute. Septimus Severus and his immediate successors seem to have had a real sympathy with the peasants, but their good intentions were constantly thwarted by the necessity of satisfying the army's demands.

Both democracy and autocracy, then, postulate the complete political equality of every member of the community, the right of every single individual to the equal protection of the State. The task of both is to bring this idea to something approaching reality. Democracy attacks the problem by giving an opportunity and a legal right to everyone to look after his own interests, autocracy by creating an office in which the whole power of the state is centralized. By the very completeness of

his authority the despot is thus detached from any special class and dedicated to the country as a whole. Each method gives rise to its own peculiar difficulties. Roughly speaking, democracy automatically solves all those problems which are produced by autocracy, and autocracy automatically solves all problems produced by democracy. For example, the question of securing the consent of the governed is in democracy already settled by the process of election. It is the first difficulty which faces the dictator after the seizure of power. Conversely, the question of allowing for the rights of unpopular minorities is one of the chief difficulties of democracy. Under an autocrat it is removed by the authoritarian nature of government.

In discussing the problems of autocracy it is necessary to remember the psychological motives on which autocracy is based. The fundamental idea is the idea of an autocrat infinitely wiser and infinitely more powerful than the ordinary man. This exaltation of the ruler is characteristic of all autocracies, in whatever form the claim is actually expressed. The ruler may be chosen by God; he may be more virtuous as well as wiser and more powerful, but he may equally be more wicked. Any policy or institution which tends to weaken this idea of the ruler, however useful or rational in other ways, is incompatible with the autocratic state.

It may be useful here to contrast the organization of the governments based on political equality with those of the aristocratic type of state. The problems of the former are not easier, but they are less complex, than those of the latter. To take a specific example, the question of recruitment for government services: under any constitution the first requirement is efficiency, which entails securing the best man for any particular post. There is nothing in democracy or autocracy which conflicts with this necessity. In an aristocracy, however, the necessity of securing the predominance of a particular class complicates the internal organization of the government

services, because the aristocratic State is bound to confine the choice to members of a particular class. When the autocrat openly depends on a special class, the position resembles that of an aristocracy. In modern Europe the classic example of this kind of dictatorship is the Russian, where the question of efficiency is entangled with the needs of the proletarian dictatorship.

The special difficulties of autocracies are partly the difficulties which beset all government looked upon from a peculiar angle, and partly the difficulties engendered by the system itself. There are first the problems which face the dictator immediately on the acquiring of power; they are essentially problems of organization. The whole political machinery must be so arranged that it can be controlled by one man. The concentration of power is limited by the capacity of one human mind, as the diffusion is limited by the necessity of action. It is needless to dilate on the checks which the nature of the government itself places on democracy. In any State above a certain size direct democracy is impossible. Representative government is the only alternative, and in spite of all the democratic safeguards ever invented, the representative will be more powerful than the represented.

An analogous boundary is placed to the concentration of power by the limits of one human mind. The autocrat is always forced to delegate some of his authority to others. Autocrats have tried various expedients for overcoming the limitations of their own personalities. There is first the simple one of ignoring them and attempting to carry out, or at least to supervise, every detail oneself. The most famous example of this type was Frederick the Great. Every single decision was referred to him, even of the most minute particulars: for example, foreign visitors who wished to watch a review had to apply to Frederick in person for a permit. In general, rulers only try to do everything themselves when they are forced to

do so by the lack of intelligent and trustworthy agents. This does not, however, seem to have been Frederick's motive. It is possible that no other method occurred to him, or that he was debarred by temperament from the ordinary delegation of authority. The most remarkable fact about his government is that, judged by results, it was effective. It is the prerogative of genius thus to disregard the recommendations of textbooks. One of the chief difficulties in discussing autocratic government is that its organization must depend on the idiosyncrasies of the ruler. It seems, however, safe to say that the example of Frederick is not likely to be followed in the modern world. The Shah of Persia, it is true, pursues this policy, but its inconveniences are obvious, even in a country so undeveloped as Persia. The increase in the functions of government make it every year less and less possible. The system is not only inefficient, but it decreases the power of the ruler. Delegation of authority multiplies this power: first by multiplying its effectiveness, and secondly by making the autocrat the representative of a particular class, which is thus in a peculiar way bound to the dictator.

Some autocratic systems have been based on bureaucracies, in which the entire work of the government is done by paid and permanent servants of the State and there is no official recognition of any other influence. The necessary co-ordination between different departments has been attained partly by the person of the autocrat and partly by the Council, which corresponds to some extent with a Cabinet meeting in modern constitutions. There is, however, the other plan of keeping the council, in which broad courses of policy are discussed, separate from the bureaucracy which carries out the policy. The object of the separation is to reduce the power of the councillors. The condition of the organization is that the civil servants are presumed to be more devoted to the autocrat than the councillors. The organization supposes that any opposition forthcoming

will proceed from the Council and not from the civil service. These conditions are exactly reversed in modern dictatorship. The cabinet composed of adherents of the dictator's party will be the last to oppose him; civil servants may be opposed to the change of government. The dictator can insist on obedience, but not on enthusiasm. With the second generation of the autocratic system, however, circumstances are changed. The civil service recruited under the new conditions will be enthusiastic, and the direct dependence of promotion on the despot will enable him to control it.

Stalin both acquired and kept power through his hold on the bureaucracy. As the dictatorship becomes mature, the question of the efficiency of the advisory council is likely again to rise. Louis XIV, one of the most thorough-going autocrats who ever lived, ruled through councils. These councils were always presided over by himself and the members were simply summoned at the King's will; no office carried with it the legal right to be present, although naturally the members tended to be officials.

This system has the disadvantage that the interests of administrative efficiency and the desire to preserve the predominance of the ruler pull in different directions. The more fluctuating the membership, the more absolute will be the King's authority and the less competent the government. Administrative necessities force the ruler to make the councillors more or less permanent, and permanence gives the members the status and opportunities of Cabinet ministers. A council with occasional membership is clearly impossible under modern conditions. It is estimated that it takes a Minister nearly six months to learn the details of his department, and he must understand the official routine before he can make effective changes or reforms. The advice of men unconnected with practical administration is seldom valuable.

A more practical course would be the policy of reducing ministers to the position of mere clerks. This seems to be

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Mussolini's object in holding the more important offices himself. A concentration of offices in fact abolishes the Cabinet minister and divides his work between the autocrat and the permanent head of the department. In an established system there does not seem to be any administrative necessity for political heads of departments at all. In the revolutionary period they are, of course, essential to push the dictator's policy, being themselves possibly the only people in the department wholeheartedly in sympathy with it.

The objection to a possible abolition of the Cabinet is that it would weaken the party. The party is a wholly new weapon of autocracy. It is in certain respects analogous to the device, frequently employed by despots, of choosing as servants those who are likely to be particularly dependent on them. Louis XIV, for example, rigidly excluded from his council the nobles, who, possessing sources of power and consideration independent of royal favour, would probably have shown themselves less submissive than the bourgeois. He selected his ministers from amongst his clerks, and his displeasure, which for Richelieu or Condé would have meant a not unpleasant sojourn in their country houses, carried with it for Louvain or Colbert deprivation of all that made life worth living.

The slave household of the Ottoman Sultan developed the principle to its farthest extent. The Turkish Empire was ruled by the children of the Christian subjects. They were removed from their parents at the age of eight and were carefully educated for their work. Only the most intelligent were chosen for those services which led to high office; the others formed the corps of Janissaries. From the selected few came every official of the Empire with the exception of the Grand Vizier. There were no limits to the power and wealth to which they might attain, but, even when they were governors of provinces and sons-in-law of the Sultan, they remained his personal slaves. Each generation had to start afresh; the sons of the

officials were free Mohammedans and, with the rest of the Mohammedan population, were debarred from the government services. It is curious to remark that this organization is the nearest attempt that has been made to fulfil the philosopher's dream of a class specially designed by nature and training for government. The system solved, with one exception, all the problems of autocratic government. The peculiar constitution of the officials made them a shield against the dangers which beset absolute sovereigns. Their birth made it impossible for them to seize the throne for themselves. The Mohammedans would never have suffered the elevation of a Christian slave to the Caliphate; a repetition of the Ummeyid usurpation was impossible. Their birth equally prevented them from uniting with the aristocracy against the Throne. The fact that the whole government was in their hands helped them, indeed, to prevent the formation of an aristocracy in the Western sense at all. Their education made it unlikely that they would have popular sympathies, and the tribute of children levied on the Christians deprived the subject races of their natural leaders. The only problem the institution failed to solve was the problem of patriotism and public spirit.

After the treatment of the Jews in Germany it seems rash to say that anything is impossible in the modern world, but the system of a class of administrators trained for government seems at least unlikely, although such an organization is not inconsistent with the ideas of either Communism or Fascism. Even an approximation to it, the attempt by autocrats like Louis XIV to choose administrators who would be specially dependent on them, is difficult to-day. The one exception is the Communist State, where the nationalization of every activity automatically makes everyone in any branch of government service economically and politically dependent on the autocrat. The problems of the Communist State are, however, radically different from those of other dictatorships.

The constitutional position in the autocratic countries differs according to their previous constitutions, but the essential organization is everywhere the same. Every government, even the most democratic, must have at its disposal a minimum of force for police purposes and also in order to deal with political disturbances. Equally there is a limit to the power which even the most autocratic government can exercise. Subiects must give some kind of consent, or at least acquiescence. It is true that, with the application of science to armaments, the amount of consent is rapidly diminishing, but the minds of rulers have not yet adjusted themselves to the new conditions; besides, they prefer enthusiasm. The institutions of dictatorship can be divided into those concerned with coercion and those concerned with the organization of consent. Some, of course, perform a double function: for example, the corporations of Italy and the Reich Chambers of Germany are partly instruments for the coercion of various trades and professions, and partly the means of persuading various classes to accept the ideas of the dictatorship. The function of the party differs in the different types of dictatorship. Where the dictatorship is military in origin, as in Turkey and Poland, the party is solely concerned with propaganda. Where the dictator is a politician and not a soldier, the party has its own armed section.

Dictators, however, are almost as unwilling as are democratic governments to revert quickly or openly to military force. It may also be considered undesirable to use the national army as a party instrument, either because it may not be entirely devoted to the dictator, or because the dictator fears to increase its power. Where, as in Poland and Turkey, the dictator is himself the army leader, then of course the army is necessarily the dictator's instrument. In Russia also the army is the weapon of the dictatorship, but here the position is rather different from that in other countries, because the dictatorship itself

created the army. A complete reconstruction of the army was necessary, partly owing to the revolutionary nature of the dictatorship, which made it impossible to reconcile the existing army with the new government, and partly because the army had practically ceased to be an army as a result of desertion and conflict of opinion among the officers.

In Germany and Italy the dictator had forged an instrument with which to seize power. The Fascist squads and the Storm Troops were already organized as a means of coercion. In both these countries in the early days of the dictatorship it was doubtful how far it was safe to use the army for civil disturbance, and these quasi-military formations were used as a means of enforcing the government's will. In Germany the Storm Troops still remain, though they have not since June 30th, 1934 been nearly so powerful. There is also a special bodyguard of picked and faithful men known as the S.S. Guard, who are supposed to be the special instrument of the Leader himself. During the first year of Hitler's rule these Storm Troops had the same power of arrest as the ordinary police, but this right has been curtailed.

As the situation becomes more normal, however, the dictator tends to rely on the police force and the law courts to impose his will, with armed force as a last resort only. In order to return to more legal methods it is necessary for the dictator to control the processes of law. As the independence of the judiciary is the strongest guarantee of democracy, so the control of justice is an essential safeguard of dictatorship. This control ranges from a method of terrorism to a mere device for administrative reform. Control is often confused with mere corruption, which is a symptom of inefficiency and serves no useful purpose. Under an efficient autocracy justice should be as impartial for ordinary offences as in an efficient democracy. Control can be secured in two ways—either by the creation of a special court for trying political offences, or by

the power to appoint and dismiss judges and the simultaneous curtailment of the rights of the individual citizen.

The governments of Italy, Russia and Germany use both these methods. With a strange similarity, all three have created lay assistants to help the judge, even in non-political cases. These assistants are naturally persons particularly attached to the régime. There are also extra-legal and secret tribunals for political offences. The other dictatorships have not created special tribunals. In Poland those accused of political offences are tried in the ordinary courts and the trial is given full publicity. In the trial of the members of the opposition in 1931, the accused were allowed to make long speeches attacking the government. The revelations of the treatment of the prisoners which occurred during the trial probably lost Pilsudski a certain amount of support among the middle class, but the majority of the population appeared to be quite unmoved. Pressure on judges from the executive is not organized in the form of party advisers as it is in Russia and Italy. But by the law of August 2nd, 1926, the administration of justice was brought directly under the control of the President, and he is thus in a position to dismiss judges and to organize the procedure in the courts. The Government of Turkey in the period immediately after the Greek War had special courts for dealing with political offences, but these have now been abolished. It is, however, extremely unlikely that the courts would disregard the wishes of the government. The trials even of political offenders seem now, at any rate, to be fair.

One of the chief means by which dictators make themselves feared is the diffusion of an atmosphere of terrorism. Although a private citizen caught spreading these stories might be punished, it seems likely that the police themselves encourage and even in some cases invent them in order to intimidate the population. For example, Monkhouse thinks that in Russia

some of the best stories about the tortures of the G.P.U. were devised and disseminated by this organization itself. It seems possible that this is done in Italy and Germany also. Secrecy is also part of terrorism. The other conveniences of secret trials to the government are obvious, but the fact that they are secret makes them doubly terrifying. The same consideration applies to the Secret Police. The essential purpose of the Secret Police is to collect information and to forestall conspiracies, but the fact of their existence and that no one knows if his friend is a member or not deters people from active conspiracy and even from grumbling.

The chief instrument of propaganda is the dictator's party. In the early days of the dictatorship the party is also concerned with the organization of force, but as the situation becomes more normal the government tends to depend on the ordinary institutions of the police and the army, and to use the party more and more as a propaganda machine and a spy system. The party works through what is generally described as a democratic 'façade'. These elections, which people who live under a democracy regard simply as a farce, are in fact a demonstration that the government desires the approval and co-operation of the people. The insistence with which the dictator demands the citizens' vote does in a way form a link between the government and the people, even though there is no possibility of securing a change of government. This aspect of elections is particularly strong in countries where the government was previously completely autocratic. No doubt it is a new and startling fact to the Russian worker or the Turkish peasant that the government should care sufficiently about his opinion to press him to vote.

The party in Germany, Russia and Italy is a very different organization from the democratic party. The democratic party is open to everyone and imposes no particular discipline on its members. Membership entails support of the party in

a general way, but the party organization has no control over any of the ordinary members and very little over the officials of the local groups. The executive can to some extent choose what candidates it will put forward, but even this power is, in England at any rate, extremely limited. In theory members can presumably be expelled, but this authority is never exercised in practice. Under a dictatorship the position is very different. In Italy and Germany it is impossible for the ordinary citizen to join the party at all: the Fascist and the National Socialist parties now only accept candidates from the youth organizations. In Russia those wishing to join the Communists were graded according to their class origin. Workers and Red Army soldiers of proletarian origin were allowed into the party without any period of probation provided that they were sponsored by two party members each of one year's membership. Agricultural labourers had to produce two sponsors of two years' standing and to serve a six months' probation. Peasants not employing the labour of another had to have three sponsors of two years' standing and were only admitted after a year's probation. No person employing labour could join the party. The 'toiling intelligents' had to be proposed by five Communists each of five years' party standing, and their period of probation was five years. Stalin said, when the new constitution was introduced, that all Russian citizens might join the party. Apparently this means that 'class origin' is now no bar to membership.

Membership entails a standard of behaviour, very strict in Russia, fairly strict in Germany, much more loosely interpreted in Italy. Of course, in every case the first requirement is strict political orthodoxy, but beside this a fairly austere moral code is imposed, in theory at any rate. Sexual lapses are now frowned on in Russia. Fascists are not supposed to frequent brothels or to indulge in boasting, and of course in all countries conviction on a criminal charge after joining the party

means loss of membership. Whether the individual accused of unbecoming conduct is actually expelled or not probably depends on his general usefulness and also, of course, on his place in the party hierarchy. High officials in all these countries are able to behave in a way which would inevitably bring retribution on the ordinary member. The Communist Party makes the greatest claims: it can, for example, send a member to any part of Russia at any moment. No private affairs, however urgent, are supposed to stand in the way of political duties. The party cell exercises the strictest supervision over the private life of every member, giving him advice on his love affairs and his clothes. In capitalist countries, even in the totalitarian States, it is impossible to demand such devotion. A worker, whether he is a party member or not, must stay in his job. In Poland and Turkey the party is not closed, and anyone can join it. There are no youth organizations or Storm Troops, and nothing is demanded of the members except general support.

The party fulfils the functions of the specially dependent class which previous autocrats sought in a bureaucracy, in slaves or in a lower social class, but does so on a broader and more ideal basis. The dictator controls his party in a more personal and a closer degree than he can control the general administration. Adherence is voluntary; the members are in agreement with his ideas and are under the spell of his personality. The tendency of the organized party is to expand the limits of personal power.

Two main problems confront the autocrat in connection with the party. There is, first, the problem of his own relations with the party, and secondly there is the problem of the relations of the party to the rest of the population. Students of politics have noticed the tendency of even democratic parties to abdicate their rights of self-government and to ask for nothing but guidance from their leaders. The overwhelming

influence exercised by the executive committee of the great democratic parties is astonishing, when it is remembered that in general they are not supported by dazzling success or by the glamour of a great personality. The English Labour Party is in theory opposed to this domination, and yet at the Labour Party's conferences the proposals of the executive were before 1931 always accepted. It needed the stimulus of the disastrous election of 1931 to rouse them to revolt. This is due partly to the greater information possessed by the executive, partly to the inability even of the majority of those interested in politics really to think about them, and partly to the pressure exerted by the idea that it is above all necessary to preserve a united front. The shortness of the time allowed for the party conference makes it difficult to organize effective opposition.

None of these influences is weaker, and some of them are stronger, in a dictatorship. For example, the necessity of keeping a united front is increased by the greater severity of the penalties of failure. The dictator and his party are bound together in somewhat the same way as a gang of bandits. Parties are divided into those with rigid creeds and those who are united rather on the basis of political convenience. To the latter category belong the parties of democracy and the People's Party in Turkey, together with the government bloc in Poland. A rigid, defined and elaborate creed to some extent circumscribes the power of the ruler, because there is a limit to the extent to which the leader can influence the party. It would be, for example, difficult for Stalin to become an anti-Communist. There is, however, a great field of practical action in which the creed gives no guidance. There is nothing in the theory of Communism to suggest the policy of the Five Year Plan; the institution of the plan was, however, the most important act of Stalin's reign. This tendency to autocracy, which is apparently natural to all parties, is augmented under dictatorship by theory and by organization.

The Fascist and National Socialist Parties are hierarchical, both in theory and in practice. The idea of hierarchical organization is that one person shall be at every stage responsible. This not only serves the purpose of efficiency but also tends to isolate individuals, for purposes either of reward or of punishment. This system has the advantage of diminishing the danger of jealousy or of personal attachment. In general those above and below him in the hierarchy will not resent his dismissal or reproof, nor will his promotion seem to them unfair. Responsibility, too, has the added advantage that it gives, even in a small sphere, definite proof of both loyalty and ability.

Some autocrats have rejected the hierarchical organization in favour of a number of officials of equal rank, or even of officials whose relations to each other are left undefined. Such a system was adopted by Constantine for the Roman bureaucracy. His object was to establish his complete authority over his officials and to make it plain that loyalty was owed to the Emperor alone and not to immediate superiors. The heads of departments acted as a check on each other, and there was nothing to prevent complaints and information being laid before the Emperor. The organization is, however, clearly not as suitable for the fighting party as a hierarchy. The first essential in the early days of autocracy, when it is still vulnerable to attack, is the loyalty of its officials and supporters. The dictator must first support and reward his own friends before he can turn to wider problems. The problem of controlling the instrument is a vital one. The spectacle of military dictators being set up, overthrown and murdered by their own armies is too familiar to be neglected. Is there any reason to think that the modern party or army is likely to play a similar part in the modern world? It is not really significant that there has, up to the present, not been any evidence of such a tendency except possibly in the German National Socialist Party. The

early years of a dictatorship are not likely to see a revolt of the dictator's instrument. The death of the first dictator, still more the death of the second, is likely to be the test.

The party is obviously on a different footing from the army. On the whole, a revolt of the party does not seem to be very likely. A political party is not a suitable instrument for revolt; it is at once too loosely organized and too strongly disciplined. The position of the rank and file of the party with regard to the executive is similar to the position of the legislative assembly with regard to the government: even when theoretically controllable they are in reality almost independent. The fact that many members are passionately concerned about the party aims makes them willing to accept a leader for the sake of avoiding dissension. The majority of the party have little to gain by the support of pretenders. Only in the case of obvious failure, when the party is endangered, is it likely that the party would attempt to overthrow the autocrat. In this the party is in strong contrast to the army.

An army is a far more homogeneous body than a party. The only tie that unites the party members is their creed. They are drawn from every class and every profession, and their interests or their ideas are always liable to clash. One of the chief functions of the leader is to conceal and to harmonize these divergences. But while these conditions make the modern party a peculiarly dangerous and difficult weapon to handle, they also make a united attack on the ruler by his own party almost impossible. The worst that can occur is a split. Exactly the reverse is true of the professional army. For the seizure of power it is both more effective and easier to handle, but once the autocracy is established it is proportionately dangerous if its interests are threatened. Even in the most strictly controlled party some attention must be paid to the opinion of the members. On general lines of policy they are naturally in agreement, and on some questions, such as details

of foreign policy, they are probably prepared to follow the leader. But there are bound to arise certain practical questions which are not provided for in the party programme and which affect the party members in their private lives. On such questions public opinion within the party must be consulted whatever the creed may say about the duty of blind obedience.

In a communist party the problem of control appears in another aspect. Here it is rather difficult to maintain the autocratic element in the party's government. The only communist party actually ruling a state is the Russian Bolshevist Party, and Stalin's difficulties are minimized by the Russian tradition of government. The Russians have never seen a democratic government in operation, and are therefore equally incapable of recognizing where their own government is deficient or of organizing any effective opposition to the executive. Whether it would be possible to preach one thing and practise another in a country more familiar with the technique of government is doubtful. It seems unlikely that the trade unions, for example, would be so docile in France or Great Britain, or that it would have been as easy to suppress all forms of working-class organization even in Germany while proclaiming the sovereignty of the proletariat. It is one thing to suppress democratic government under the banner of the totalitarian state and quite another to do it in the name of democracy.

The extent of the leader's control depends to some extent, also, on how far the party's creed is all-embracing or merely political. The Fascist, Communist and National Socialist creeds claim to provide guidance on every aspect of life. The ideas of Kemal and Pilsudski are purely political, concerned essentially with the citizen's relation to the State. The all-embracing creed ensures the submission of each member to the party as a whole, and through this process the dictator is assisted in so far as he is thus provided with a self-disciplining

mass. On the other hand, these creeds also bind the dictator and limit his powers in certain directions. For example, it would be impossible for Mussolini to introduce legislation to make divorce easier, while either Kemal or Pilsudski, not being the high priests of a religion but leaders of a political party, are free to study this kind of sociological question on its merits.

The all-embracing creed will tend to make the discipline of a party more rigid, and the purely political creed to make it looser. But even with the political creed a choice exists as to whether the discipline is to be the most rigid or the loosest possible. Pilsudski's party was the least disciplined of all dictatorial parties; it included people whose views on every subject except the benefits of Pilsudski's rule were diametrically opposed to each other. Although not so startling to English ideas, the sight of Catholics and Jews, landlords and peasants, supporting the same party was almost miraculous in Poland.

The problem of public opinion within the party is paralleled by the problem of public opinion in the country as a whole. It is necessary for the autocrat at least to know, and even to some extent to consider, the trend of public opinion. In an autocracy it is, however, dangerous to encourage public discussion of the government, because such criticism weakens the psychological hold of the autocrat. Public opinion is to some extent, especially in the modern world, organized in professional or economic associations, who no doubt privately convey their views to the government. It seems likely that in this direction, rather than in their actual economic activities, the Fascist corporations are important. The Church in Fascist Italy and in pre-war Russia performed this function, at least in the sense that it made it clear to the autocrat when he had definitely outraged public opinion. This representation of special institutions of interests is clearly inadequate, and all

autocracies resort to spy systems. A spy system does not exist only to discover plots and conspiracies, but also serves the purpose of judging the trend of public opinion.

The spy system simply gives information as to what is actually thought, but the dictator must also have some means of inducing people to think what he wishes. There are in modern states certain vehicles of propaganda, such as the national system of education, which simply fall into the hands of any government in power. There are also independent agencies, such as the press, the cinema and the theatre, which are not only extremely effective in influencing public opinion but are also certain to produce literature and propaganda displacing the government unless they are controlled. The first measure of any government is always to suppress contrary opinions, but this is soon found to be inadequate. The complete suppression of opinion by the method of censorship is extremely difficult, for some books and pamphlets succeed in evading the most elaborate and rigid machinery. It is much easier to combine the control of printed matter, which prevents most of the unfavourable comment appearing, with government propaganda so great as to swamp the few protests which get through the censorship. Control is much the more difficult part of censorship.

In Russia the process is simplified by the State control of all economic organizations. For example, the control of books is made much easier by the fact that the chief publishing house is the state, with branches throughout Russia. In spite of this, all books, in fact all printed matter—it is even said that visiting cards are included—must pass the censor. The daily press is a government monopoly. In theory anyone may publish a periodical provided that he obtains the necessary authorization. In actual fact, chiefly owing to the economic structure of Russia, 95 per cent of periodicals are published by the state, the Party, the trade unions and the learned

societies. All these bodies are, of course, controlled by the government. The Press is naturally dominated by the government. A certain amount of criticism of details is allowed, although of course nothing which could inconvenience the government is allowed to appear. There is also strict control of the sale of printing machines. This measure is an attempt to prevent the publication of illegal newspapers or pamphlets. A special licence is necessary for the purchase of a printing machine, and this licence is personal and cannot be transferred to any other person. All printing works must keep a register, which must be signed page by page by the proper section of the State Administration (the G.P.U.). This supervision applies even to the State printing works.

Capitalist countries are faced with the more difficult problem of controlling a large number of independent papers, writers and publishers. The most important of these is the newspaper. It appears every day and affects every class of the population. The problem of controlling the dissemination of news can be attacked in two ways. An attempt can be made to render the editor of the journal responsible for everything that is published in his particular organ, and to penalize him if news or comment unwelcome to the government is published; or journalists may be forced into organizations similar to the Medical and Bar Associations and the rules of these associations utilized to control them.

In Italy both these methods are practised. Every journal must have a responsible director, who must be enrolled in the professional register of journalists. The Podesta has the power to 'warn' the editor of any journal and, if the warnings are disregarded, to suspend the paper. Journalism may only be practised by persons enrolled in the professional association. The keeping of the register of the association is entrusted to five members, who are enrolled in and adhere to the Syndicate and are chosen by the Minister of Justice with the consent of

the Minister of the Interior from a list of names submitted by a competent Syndical organization.

The position with regard to the Press of Turkey is a peculiar one, as there is no law of libel. The constitution guaranteed the liberty of the press, modified by the necessities of the safety of the state. In the early days of the Republic the press was controlled by the Special Law for the Defence of the State; this was, however, abolished in 1929, and in theory the press was completely free. But in the summer of 1932 an agitation was started by the government papers for legal measures to restrain the irresponsibility of the press. The government was desirous of restraining political comment, of regulating the publication of sensational news, and of preventing the appearance of statements which in another country would be libellous. A law was passed in September 1932, which attempted to insist on a certain general level of education for editors by providing that editors must be Turkish citizens about twentyfive who had had a secondary education. The provisions, relating to political journalism laid down that the names of all contributors must be revealed to the authorities, no articles may be written by political exiles, no articles advocating communism may be published, and the Cabinet can suspend any newspaper which it considers to be hindering the government's policy. The moral provisions are extremely austere: murders must be related briefly and without photographs, and the newspaper is liable to prosecution for publishing articles of an immoral tone. This last clause is difficult to interpret and leads to prosecution on the most varied grounds. An unfortunate editor was prosecuted for publishing a story which in the opinion of the government was calculated to glorify brigandage. Subject to the limitations set out above, considerable freedom of discussion now exists in the Turkish press. Articles have appeared advocating Socialism in a general way, though no one may preach the doctrine of the class struggle. The

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doctrines of Islam may be defended even in the most orthodox manner, as long as no political application is made. An article even appeared with the heading, 'Anatolia is becoming a desert', and blaming the government for this state of affairs! But no attack on the general policy of modernizing Turkey would be published, nor a criticism of Kemal himself or of any measure with which he was particularly identified. Caricatures of the other members of the government were published, but any caricatures of the Gazi were inconceivable.

In Poland the freedom of the press is guaranteed by the constitution, but complete liberty has been modified by the Presidential decree declaring that editors were liable to prosecution for 'false news'. This decree was the occasion of the rebellion in the Sejm in March 1927, which finally demonstrated the powerlessness of the Sejm in the face of the President's right of dissolution. Single copies of newspapers were confiscated and newspapers were suppressed, sometimes for several months. But there always existed an opposition press which freely criticized the government, although there were definite limits to the government's tolerance. For example, the edition of Robinik, the socialist organ, which reprinted an attack on Pilsudski from the London Daily Herald, was confiscated.

In Germany control is secured over every aspect of national life by the institution of Reich Chambers. One of the first steps of the dictatorship was the creation of a Ministry of Propaganda. On September 22nd, 1933, a law was passed 'empowering and requesting the Minister of Propaganda to form the members of those professions which came within the scope of his Ministry into public juridical corporations'. Seven Chambers were created, dealing with authors and literature, the press, broadcasting, the theatre, music, creative art and films. Together, these form the Reich Chamber of Culture. Anyone engaged in 'the production of, reproduction

of, intellectual or technical work on, the distribution of, the maintenance, sale or intermediate sale of cultural products must be a member of the Chamber'. This applies also to foreigners. The President of each Chamber can, however, refuse to accept any person he considers either politically unreliable or unsuited to the particular branch in which he is engaged. It is largely through this means that Jews have been excluded from the press, publishing and bookselling.

Actual regulations relate chiefly to the negative aspects of the control of opinion, and in countries where the dictatorship is purely political the suppression of propaganda against the government and a close supervision of direct political writing are all the government attempts to do. But those dictatorships which aspire to create a new social system also try to guide, not only political writing, but every form of cultural activity. The Völkischer Beobachter said: 'As long as there remains in Germany any unpolitical, neutral, liberal or industrialist art, our task is not ended. There must no longer be a single artist who creates otherwise than nationally and with a national purpose.' This statement also applies to science. 'Although science and the State both claim unconditional allegiance, they can actually exist side by side, provided that the spirit of science be allied to that of the State. Liberalism has emasculated science; it has turned scientific research and teaching into a harmless "neutral" occupation. It is also said that we must change the type of the scientist who "knows" into the type of the scientist who "wills".

These utterances can be paralleled from Bolshevist sources. 'However lofty the social achievements represented by the solution of the elementary problems of feeding, clothing, heating and educating the people in themselves may be, they alone do not signify a complete victory of the new historical principle; that can only be accomplished by building up a changed scientific mode of thought on a national scale, and by

the development of a new art.' It is a tenet of Bolshevism that there can be no 'disinterested' science. The Bolshevists, however, regard the conclusions of the nineteenth-century materialists as objectively true although they were certainly bourgeois. Lenin, for example, was extremely annoyed with the modern physicists for disturbing the orthodox conception of matter. 'The physicists, by denying the immutability of the elements so far known and the constancy of the attributes of matter, have gone so far astray as to denying matter itself, and therefore the objective reality of the physical world. By disputing the absolute character of the most important and fundamental knowledge, they have been led astray to denying all objective order in nature itself, and to declare the law of nature to be a single limitation, a restricted expectation or a logical necessity.'

All kinds of autonomous agencies are pressed into the service of political education. Dictatorship has shown a tendency to absorb all the various cultural and educational associations and to give them a political purpose. In Russia it has happened automatically through the centralization of economic power; in Italy all the associations for education or recreation have been co-ordinated to the 'dopo lavora', the 'after work' movement. Co-ordination has made them in many ways more effective, and many of the activities are subsidized directly or indirectly by the government. Physical culture of all kinds is encouraged. For example, in Venice the 'dopo lavora' has provided boats for workers who want to row or sail. The dramatic society which tours Italy under the name of the 'Car of Thespis' has been developed under government inspiration. The actors go to villages where no other companies or cinemas have ever been, to peasants who have never seen a play before. Open-air schools are organized for the holidays of town children. Both these aspects of the work are obviously valuable, quite apart from politics, but at the same time they provide an immense

machine for propaganda and an unrivalled means of reconciling the working class to Fascism.

The German organization is even more elaborate. National Socialism has its own organization in all the professions. For example, there are the National Socialist Teachers' Association and the Association of National Socialist German Jurists. The most important of these institutions, however, is the 'Kraft durch Freude', the 'Strength through Joy'. This institution was, no doubt, originally copied from the 'dopo lavora', but it has far surpassed its model in scope and efficiency. During the years 1934 and 1935 it is reported to have enabled five million members of the Labour Front to have cheap holidays. It has ordered two passenger ships of 20,000 tons for its sea excursion service. It enables its members to obtain either physical or intellectual training for very low fees. The association has two theatres of its own in Berlin; it allots the seats, which cost about sixpence, by ballot, and its programme is by no means confined to National Socialist propaganda. It is proposing to build four model factories in the west of Germany, to show capitalists that beauty can be combined with industrial efficiency. Its ultimate aim is to reach every man or woman employed in industry in Germany, and while not forgetting its propaganda opportunities, to help them to lead a fuller life. In Turkey the 'Turkish Hearth', a patriotic society which was started before the War for the purpose of stimulating interest and education in Turkish, as opposed to Arabic, culture, has since 1931 been transformed into the 'People's Homes' of the People's Party. Kemal declared that all the forces at the disposal of the country must be thrown into the struggle for political unity. These charitable and cultural institutions not only help the government by affording an opportunity for direct propaganda, but enable it to enlist the support of many people who would otherwise be against it, but are prepared to co-operate at least for these limited aims.

The movement also tends to associate all attempts at social amelioration with the particular government in power.

Added to all this, the Germans have attempted to introduce the principle of leadership into every sphere of activity. This principle arises from the 'laws of nature', which, according to Goering, demand that 'authority should be exercised from above downwards and responsibility from below upwards . . . Each leader has authority and he issues orders to officials and followers below him. But he is responsible only to his superiors, and the leader at the top is responsible only to the people as a whole and to their future. In the past it has only been by the virtue of this principle that anything has been achieved. Only by this principle could nations arise and history be made'.

This principle has been applied to every activity. All persons in authority of whatever kind — schoolmasters, editors, industrialists — are 'leaders'. Those under them are bound to accord to them, as long as they carry out their functions properly, complete loyalty and obedience. The leader, on his side, must exercise his power in the interests of the nation and of his subordinates. There is an element of genuine idealism in this arrangement, but it is plainly also another weapon in the hand of the government. It is impossible to coerce a large number of employers or work-people, but once certain individuals are singled out and made responsible, it is very easy to bring pressure to bear.

The most important of the existing organizations for the creation of opinion are religious institutions. Therefore one of the most important problems that a dictatorship must decide is what attitude is to be taken to religion. Either complete identification with the prevailing religion or complete suppression solves the problem at once. Austria and Portugal adopted the first alternative, and the dictatorship in both these countries was directly inspired by Catholic ideals. Russia, in accordance with the views of Karl Marx, chose to suppress

religion as far as possible. Although it is not illegal to pray either in a church or a mosque, or even to be a priest, religion suffers certain severe disabilities apart from the actual persecution of certain priests in the early days of the Revolution. No member of the Communist Party can belong to any religious organization. Militant atheism is taught in the schools and to the children who belong to the youth organizations. The atheist organization, the anti-God society, is supported and financed by the government. Until the introduction of the New Constitution in 1936 priests were not allowed to take part in elections.

This policy at any rate provides a solution of a kind, but dictators who are neither believers nor atheists have to deal with a more difficult situation. On the one hand, they are unwilling or unable to suppress the churches, on the other, they cannot leave them alone, as the churches may frequently teach doctrines which are in direct conflict with those of the State. And even if their general doctrines are in agreement, unless the Church and the State are completely identified, which in most modern States is not possible, the Church sets up an alternative claim to obedience. The problem has been solved in a different way in every country. No problem arose in Poland, although Pilsudski was always supposed to be strongly anti-clerical, because the Polish Government never attempted to set up a totalitarian State and therefore was able to tolerate the religious organizations. In both Italy and Turkey the State was, owing to the past history of the country, in a peculiar position in regard to the national religion. In Italy the State and the Church were on terms of peculiar hostility, and in Turkey religion and the State were inextricably entangled together.

In Italy the Catholic Church was traditionally hostile to the government. But various considerations made the Fascist Government anxious to use religion as a buttress for their system. First, in Italy, as in other Latin countries, there is a

definite link between politics and religion. Socialists are atheists and Conservatives are religious. The Fascist doctrine exalting the national culture also led the Fascists to value religion. The influence of the Church on Italian culture was undeniable; it is impossible to separate the history of Italy from the history of the Catholic Church. To these special considerations was added the strength which a supernatural sanction has always given to governments. One of the first educational measures of the Fascist government was to reintroduce religious teaching in the schools. Mussolini's idea appears to be to use the Church as a useful propaganda machine. The words of Christ may be at the same time rendered harmless by completely associating the Church and Fascism in the mind of the people. The Sermon on the Mount, if spoken by a Fascist official, can have no tendency to make pacifists. Mussolini also values the cultural influence of religion. 'The religion of the people, that weighty and ancient force which has upheld it in times of submission, which has shaped that moral and civil spirituality, that individual loftiness of mind, which constitutes its greatness, is recognized by Fascism . . . Fascism therefore refuses to associate itself with any kind of warfare against mystical ideas which the people have inherited from their forbears.' These remarks, while fully acknowledging the cultural value of Catholicism, imply a rejection of its religious truth which can hardly be welcome to Catholic opinion.

There are also certain difficulties in the way of a reconciliation between nationalism and religion, especially when the religion is an international one. The worship of Christ is really incompatible with the worship of the totalitarian state, especially if the state is bent on proclaiming the blessings of war. Much the same situation has arisen in Italy and Germany, made more intense in Germany by the rise of the German Christian movement. In Italy the struggle has chiefly been confined to education and youth organization. In spite of the

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agreement with the Church, there has been constant friction between Church and State over the children.

In Turkey the position was almost exactly the reverse. Whether Kemal wished or not to antagonize the pious, his policy of Westernization was bound to do so. The law in Turkey, as in other Mohammedan States, was directly based on the Koran. The judges were religious officers, the chief legal authority was the Sheikh Ul-Islam, also the chief religious authority. Compromise was impossible; reform must either be based on religious motives or the hold of religion over the minds of Turks must be broken. The leaders of the nationalist movement were far from well equipped to conduct a reform on Islamic lines. They were practically all soldiers and had all been educated, not in the mosque schools, but in military schools, where the subjects taught did not include Islamic doctrine.

There is also a real antagonism between nationalism as a political creed and any universal religion. This has been chiefly shown in Germany, where, unlike either Italy or Turkey, there were no special reasons for trouble between Church and State, yet the only organizations which have resisted Hitler are the churches. There is an analogy between the position in Turkey and the position in Germany. In both cases a religion which claimed to be universal clashed with a national revival on a racial basis. In both cases the founder of the religion came of a race which was at the moment particularly unpopular. Also it is difficult to combine the religious duty, proclaimed by both Christianity and Islam, of regarding all believers as brothers, with the national pride which bids all citizens to consider themselves bound together by a special tie which isolates them from all other nations. A real incompatibility exists even where, as in Turkey, nationalism is not associated with a desire to make war on other nations. In Germany, where a praise of warlike virtues and of war as the school of these virtues is part of the official propaganda, it is accentuated.

Kemal, Mussolini and Hitler have all attempted to relegate organized religion to the position of a useful auxiliary to the state. Only Kemal has been really successful. The property of the religious orders and schools was taken over by the state in the early days of the Revolution, and as a result the priests are all paid by the state, a method of control which makes organized religious opposition almost impossible. A certain amount of what would be regarded in other countries as religious activity is also absolutely forbidden as being political. Neither Mussolini nor Hitler is in a position to take such drastic action, and the position in both Germany and Italy is one of tension between the state and the religions. Neither side can yet be said to have won.

The central problem of autocracy is the problem of the succession. There are two aspects of the question: first, the aspect of the actual choice of ruler, and second, the aspect of the transfer of power. First, it is essential that the autocrat should be able to carry on the government, and it is desirable that he should be the best man available. Secondly, at the death of one ruler there should be no doubt as to his successor. If the prize seems open to competition, there is a strong probability of civil war. The second aspect is the more urgent and the more immediately important. It is true that a method of succession which confers the power on incompetent rulers may in the long run destroy the system, but it may be a very long run indeed. The danger of incompetence is generally exaggerated. Once the administration has been set up it requires, in ordinary circumstances, only moderate ability to keep it going. The test of a good system is how far it approximates to the perfect solution for both these purposes.

The chief methods which had been adopted are hereditary succession, nomination by the previous ruler, nomination by some special body, and popular election. Every autocracy so far known has ultimately developed into hereditary monarchy.

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We know the details of the foundation of two autocratic systems, that of the Roman Empire and that of the Mohammedan Caliphate. Both these systems started with a strong theoretical bias against hereditary monarchy, and yet both became hereditary monarchies. There seem to be three reasons for this development. There is, of course, first the factor of personal ambition. Most men desire their sons to succeed them. In an autocracy this sentiment is supported by the idea, frequently fallacious, that a son is less likely than any other nominated successor to hasten his accession by murdering or overthrowing the existing monarch. Secondly, the personal loyalty of the people to the ruler may express itself in a desire to see his son succeed him. But the most important of all the factors which work for hereditary succession is the necessity for an immediate transfer of power. Imagine the situation on the death of some modern autocrat, say Mussolini. It would obviously be the moment when the opponents of Fascism would attempt to overthrow the government. The immediate necessity would be some successor to present to the people. It would hardly matter for the moment what his qualifications were, so long as he was acceptable to the party and to the people.

Hereditary succession does completely solve this side of the problem. Succession is automatic; there is no room for either popular risings or civil war between rival claimants; but it does this at the expense of leaving the competence of each ruler to chance. The development of a science of genetics might alter the conditions, but such a possibility is remote and speculative. The danger of incompetence can, of course, be exaggerated, as has been pointed outabove. In an established despotism the ruler need not be a genius, or even a man of very remarkable intelligence. It is true that in a sudden crisis incompetence may lead to disaster. But it seems practically impossible to invent a system which shall be both tolerable in

ordinary periods and adequate for crises. The reigns of the 'bad' Roman emperors seem to have had little effect on the ordinary machinery. The danger of incompetence lies rather in the encouragement which it gives to the ambitious to try to seize the throne for themselves. The defect of the Principate was not so much that it produced Nero as that it produced four emperors in the year following Nero's death. Temperamental unfitness to govern is a worse danger than incompetence. The position of the man who feels his importance, who knows and cares that his decisions affect millions of human beings and who feels also that he is not competent for the task is agonizing. It is this situation which hereditary succession is particularly likely to bring about. Under every other method a man can avoid becoming the autocrat. He must consent to stand for popular election, and no ruler would nominate anyone who was plainly unwilling. Hereditary monarchy is therefore particularly suitable to periods of stability, but particularly likely to be developed in periods of crisis because of its convenience in bridging over the dangerous moment between the death of one ruler and the succession of another.

Political theorists have not discussed the merits of elective monarchy. It has been considered sufficient to utter the word 'Poland' and to pass on. The real disaster of the Polish constitution, however, was the rule that the assembly must be unanimous, not the fact that the King was to be elected. There is no doubt that elective monarchy is a particularly difficult system to work. Rational beings should be more, not less, willing to obey the man chosen by themselves. In fact, people find it much easier to obey the man chosen by heaven, chance or himself. Modern dictators have, of course, nearly always been chosen by a large section of their subjects, or even by the majority. It was, however, not always made plain at the moment of choice that the decision was irrevocable. The only country in which the basis of popular choice is much insisted on is

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Turkey, but the object of the Turkish dictatorship is to establish a democratic and not an autocratic system.

The chief defect of elective monarchy is that it weakens those irrational elements on which both monarchy and dictatorship largely depend. If the monarchy is really elective it destroys much of the fear inspired by the tyrant and much of the awe evoked by the hereditary monarch; it also gives an obvious opportunity for theories of the right of resistance to the ruler to develop. In attempting to combine the advantages of a centralized administrator with some of the advantages of free choice of the ruler, it seems to attempt too much. It has in theory great attractions, but in practice it presents extreme difficulties. Elective monarchy requires, above all, a reasonable people and a reasonable monarch. The tendency from one side to turn it into complete democracy and from the other to complete autocracy is almost irresistible.

The other objection is the objection which can be brought against elective systems in general. The foolishness of the people's choice of rulers has often been pointed out. The objection is greatly enhanced if the people have no chance of reversing their decision. It might, of course, be obviated by placing the choice in the hands of some official body. Choice by a special body is open to two separate and divergent dangers. The special body becomes, as it has become in a democratic system in the U.S.A., simply a machine for registering the decision of the majority of the people. In this choice it is far better that the popular will should be directly expressed. The other danger is lest the special body should gradually supersede the autocrat as the real ruler. It has always been found that small oligarchies of this kind are peculiarly liable to put the interests of a section before the interests of the community as a whole.

The problem of the succession, like other political problems, cannot be settled by considerations of pure theory. It is neces-

sary also to ask how far the different methods of choice are possible in the modern world. With this question is bound up the question of the autocrat's title to rule. It is easy to think of circumstances in which hereditary succession would be impossible because public opinion would refuse to tolerate it. It is difficult to imagine that the leadership of the Communist Parties in Russia could easily become hereditary, at least for a considerable period to come. Hereditary succession also accords ill with the claim that the dictatorship is the rule of the best.

In the first days of autocracy, in which the position of the ruler is still illegal, there is no answer to the question why the ruler must be obeyed, except that it is impossible to resist him. In the circumstances in which a violent seizure of power is possible, people are content with this answer. But with the institution of a regular system, another and a different title to obedience must be produced. No country has long remained content with pure expediency as the basis of government. The subjects have always insisted on a theory, even a theory completely inconsistent with the facts, which shall explain that the institution of government has an ethical basis. The nature of this explanation might be considered of little importance, provided only that it could be made acceptable. But the transformation of the Principate of Augustus, in which the ruler was merely an administrative expedient, into an Oriental monarchy with the attributes of holiness and magic which clung to the Persian King, indicates that the earlier and common-sense view was felt to provide inadequate protection. Constantine cemented the union between Caesar and the supernatural powers so that the later Caesars ruled both by the will of the people and the Will of God.

It must be admitted that no completely satisfactory solution of the problem of the succession has yet been found. Indeed, it seems probable that no really satisfactory solution ever could be found. Every method of handing on the power is open to

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abuse. The uncertainty in which this difficulty involves the government must be put down as one of the disadvantages of dictatorship. But it must be recognized that the disadvantage is modified if democracy is so inefficient as to make chaos more or less permanent. The disadvantages of a disputed succession are less serious, as it cannot occur very frequently.

The fundamental problem of all autocratic systems of government is how to keep public spirit alive while removing all responsibility from the citizen. All autocracies have to make the very delicate adjustment of allowing just the amount of interest in politics which will cause people to defend the State if necessary, pay their taxes with alacrity, and generally behave in such a way as to smooth the administrative machine, while not encouraging the kind of interest which would threaten the autocrat. This is a problem of the ultimate effects of dictatorship. If autocracy really tends to the extinction of public spirit, it will only be apparent after generations. Changes of government can only be effected by enthusiasm, and the enthusiasm will carry on for a time. This particular question has probably never presented itself consciously to the mind of any dictator, but the party organization does to some extent provide for the generation of enthusiasms. The fact that it is open to every child should also tend to keep public interest alive, while the fact that it is the dictator's party prevents it from being a threat to the autocracy. The attempt also to centralize every human activity in the state would also seem to keep subjects interested in the government. If every detail of their life depends on government action, they can hardly become indifferent to the state.

Modern dictatorship does seem to be a successful form of autocracy in the sense that it has solved the immediate problems of autocracy. The party is the most efficient method yet devised for delegating the authority of the autocrat without limiting his power. It also seems, from the experience of

Poland and Russia, to have gone some way towards a solution of the problem of the succession. Neither the Polish nor the Russian dictatorship broke down on the death of the first dictator, although breakdown had been freely prophesied for both, nor was there a violent conflict for the succession. It is too soon yet to say that the Polish dictatorship will succeed in establishing itself as a permanent form of government, but the communist government in Russia has continued for thirteen years after the death of Lenin, and if it should collapse its fall would be plainly owing to its policy and not to its organization. It is clear that the party does provide an element of continuity to autocratic government. The dictator dies, but his ideas incorporated in the party live. The problem of finding a party leader is simple compared with the problem of finding a dictator, and if the party leader automatically becomes the dictator the question of the succession is greatly simplified.

The party, however, performs this important function at the cost of incorporating certain elements of democracy into the system, and these elements are not the most desirable. Whatever merits may exist in autocracy are dependent on the government being really autocratic, and really unaffected by the vagaries of public opinion or the pressure of special interests. The cruelties which have been committed by all absolute rulers, even good ones, and the horrors which have been indulged in by some tyrants, are admitted by most advocates of a dictatorship, but they argue that, though the ruler's position gives an opportunity, even a stimulus, to cruelty, yet this cruelty is felt by individuals only, while the benefits of unlimited power are experienced by the whole country. An application of this idea is that autocrats are unlikely to persecute minorities, while to do so is a temptation to which democracy is particularly prone. But the party organization tends to modify all these conclusions. If a modern dictator is able to disregard public opinion as a whole, he must con-

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ciliate public opinion to his party, and this public opinion is likely to be no better informed or more generous than any other. Of course, it is possible to subordinate the party so completely to the dictator as to make it truly incapable of an opinion of its own. But if this is done it seems to modify the party's power to ensure the succession. If the party is to bridge the gaps from one autocrat to another, it must be bound together by some creed which makes the members prefer the preservation of the party and its ideas before everything else. This involves some of the elements of democracy: for example, the dictator will be restrained, just as a democratic statesman is restrained, from following the course he really believes to be best by the necessity of doing only what his own party will stand. And such conduct is more serious than in a democracy, because there is no alternative and no criticism.

This consideration only applies to permanent dictatorship. If the object of the dictatorship is merely to ensure the government of one particular man for his lifetime, the party organization has no drawbacks. The party is certainly by far the most effective instrument for carrying out the dictator's ideas.

#### CHAPTER VI

# DICTATORIAL ECONOMICS

Economic policy is so important a branch of administration that it deserves separate treatment and the economic policies of the dictators are of peculiar interest because many believe that it is here that they have been successful. When we are told that democracy can only survive by giving leadership as bold as that of the dictators, it is economic leadership which is meant. Nor is this surprising; the motor roads of Germany and the land reclamation of Italy are obvious to the most superficial tourists, but the price paid for them is not so immediately perceptible.

The economics of dictatorship are the economics of state control. At first sight there seems to be no particular reason why autocracy as a form of government should be more inclined to interventionist policies than democracy. In fact, during the first years of the Fascist dictatorship in Italy Mussolini pursued, or perhaps it would be truer to say permitted, a policy of economic liberalism, and neither in Poland nor Yugoslavia has any attempt been made to introduce a planned economic system. But strong influences impel the dictators to interference. First the concept of the totalitarian state as all-embracing includes the control of production and distribution. Theoretically it is necessary that the economic system should be moralized or nationalized, and practically the dictator must be able to curb the power of both employers and workers. A free entrepreneur, unless he is directly dependent on the government for his market, is in a peculiarly favourable position for defying the dictator, and trade unions or indeed any kind of free associations of workers are obviously

a threat to an absolute ruler. Secondly most dictators are inspired by a genuine desire to improve the condition of their people and intervention to help specially depressed classes, industries or localities appeals both to the ambitions and to the sympathies of dictators. As an admirer of Mussolini's economic activities says: 'Nor is it easy for a strong man in power to remain passive when it is only too obvious that by intervention he can bring about an improvement.' Nor is it easy for him to withdraw when it is only too obvious that he has brought about no improvement. Also both Hitler and Mussolini came into power largely as a result of economic crises and it was essential that they should improve, or at least try to improve, the situation. To these considerations must be added the influence which socialist ideas have had on all governments. In this the dictatorships, of course, are not sharply differentiated from the democracies. All governments have introduced measures of control, but the dictatorships are in much better position to carry them out. No democratic government could hope to impose the drastic regulations on both employers and workers which the German and Italian governments have introduced nor to force the sacrifices of profits and wages. It fact it may be plausibly argued that dictatorship is essential to the maintenance of a planned economy.

All the dictatorships, with the exception of Poland and Yugoslavia, are attempting to control the economic system, but far the most important examples are Germany and Italy. With the Russian system is bound up the whole question of the practicability of communism, far too large a subject to be discussed here, but the Soviet has pursued certain policies, such as that of economic nationalism, which are in no way implied in communist theory and are very similar to those of the other dictatorships. Portugal and Turkey have both attempted to raise the standard of living of their people by creating industries with funds obtained by taxations;

but these countries are both extremely poor and predominantly agricultural. No one suggests that they are a suitable model for the industrial countries.

Italy and Germany are dominated by two politico-economic theories, the theory of economic nationalism and the theory of supremacy of political over economic criteria. The theory of economic nationalism is crudely that it is better to produce any given product at home, rather than buy it from another country, and that the test of success of an economic system is how far the wants of a population can be met by production within the national area.

The second of the Fascist doctrines, the necessity of subordinating economic to political criteria, leads in the same direction. In fact this means the subordination of economic to military considerations. The overriding consideration is to place the country in the best possible position in the event of war, regardless of the sacrifices of material welfare entailed. A minor result of this policy is the attempt made by both Germany and Italy to use trade agreements as a means of consolidating political alliances.

Attention has been chiefly directed to the organization designed to carry out the Italian economic policy, rather than to the policy itself. This organization is now famous as the corporate state. The function of these corporations is, of course, at least as much political as economic. They are designed to provide the machinery of government as well as of economic control. The corporations are associations of employers and workers within the different industries. They are supposed to fulfil the functions of trade unions and employers' federations as well as being the means of 'rationalizing industries'. There are twenty-two corporations. The basis of organization is not that which a free organization would have produced. Every activity connected with the nominal name of the corporation is included. Thus in the example of the textile trade given by Dr.

Finer, representatives of sheep-breeding and wool-growing are included as well as the woollen and worsted industry. The same organization applies to silk, which includes the breeders of silk-worms as well as of silk weaving. Both these trades, together with jute, are included in the textile corporation. The number of representatives is 500—fixed according to the number of interests represented in the corporations; each interest in the corporation being represented. The representation of employers and employed is equal and there are three delegates of the Party in each corporation, one of whom is vice-president.

The corporation's powers are defined in the vaguest terms; originally they were limited to certain small powers of regulating conditions of apprenticeship, and so forth, and the setting up of employment bureaux. But in 1934 they were 'empowered to elaborate rules for the collective regulation of economic conditions and for unitary discipline of production'. These rules must, however, be submitted to the Prime Minister. The corporations are also allowed to fix wages and prices within their own corporation, but the consent of the General Assembly must first be obtained, and these rules cannot be enforced unless the Prime Minister issues a decree for the purpose.

Below the corporations are the associations organized in the same way as the corporations. The officials of the corporations are appointed by the government and are naturally all members of the Fascist Party.

The idea of corporations is, even in theory, rather a political than an economic idea and the purpose served by the corporations in Italy has been largely political. Mussolini indeed declared them to be 'an organization which will gradually but inevitably diminish the distance between luxury and poverty'. There seems to be no reason why the corporations in themselves should have this tendency. Diminishing the distance

between luxury and poverty involves either an increase in total production or a change in the relative shares going to capital and labour respectively. There is nothing in the corporate idea in itself to raise total production, except possibly by stopping labour disputes. Nor is there anything in the mere fact of association to change distribution between the different factors of production. The associations are in fact merely administrative units and like other administrative units can be used for any purpose the government may desire. They might at different times be used as a means of bringing pressure to bear either on the employers or the workers. But they do not appear to be particularly suitable mechanism for transferring wealth from one section to another, even if such should be the government's wish.

The economic effects of the corporations are obviously restricted by the fact that a very large proportion of both employers and workers are still outside the corporate system. The number varies from industry to industry, but even the largest corporation does not include all the undertakings.

It is, however, apparently the intention of the government to force all Italian economic activity into this form and to allow each association to control prices and conditions of entry into the industry, subject to government supervision. This would clearly involve the abolition of competition and the creation of monopolies of producers. The fact that workers are included in these corporations strengthens their monopoly aspects; it is by no means unheard of for workers' organizations to combine with employers to exploit the consumer, even in countries where there is no government pressure.

What is likely to be the consequence of such a form of organization? It appears that this particular form of organization has all the disadvantages of monopoly control of prices without any tendency to the increased technical efficiency which may accompany monopoly, if it takes the form of an

increase in the size of individual undertakings, as in the development of the trust movement. This development has been defended on the grounds that it leads to the economies of large-scale production. But the corporations appear to have no tendency to increase the average size of the firm. They seem merely to provide a mechanism through which associations of producers can eliminate competition between themselves, through price-agreement and a limitation of new entrants to the industry. The result would seem to be a thoroughly uneconomic organization. Prices and costs will be higher than they would have been without the corporations, and there will be increased resistance to any change which may threaten the interests of the particular group. This is clear when it is remembered that those in control of those organizations will wish to make the largest profit possible; the employers' representatives for obvious reasons, the workers' representatives in order that high wages may be paid and conditions improved, the Fascist officials because the government will wish to keep both employers and workers content. There is every reason to think that this will involve prices higher than they would be under competitive conditions and to a consequent worsening in the position of the consumer. To this criticism the Fascist economist would reply that in some cases the interest of the producers would cause them to lower prices in order to sell more goods at the lower price, that the government is carefully watching to see that the prices charged are 'fair' and that in any case the average worker is prepared to consent to his standard of living being lower than it otherwise would be, in return for the greater stability which the corporative system affords. The first condition by no means applies to all goods. It is clearly to the advantage of the producer to raise prices if people will still buy the same amount of his goods. There are some commodities which will be bought whatever the price, for example, bread, which still remains one of the chief foods

of the very poorest in Italy and Germany, in spite of its rise in price. But even if the conditions of demand are such that more goods would be bought at a lower price, monopoly price will be above competitive price except where conditions of production are such that the marginal cost of goods will fall as more are produced. This means that technical conditions must be of such a nature that each successive unit added to the total production of the particular goods will cost less than the last. This will clearly only occur in the most exceptional circumstances.

It must also be remembered that Germany and Italy are dominated by an economic theory that believes certain industries to be valuable in themselves rather than because they satisfy wants. Therefore the corporations, once they can persuade themselves that a given policy is essential to the preservation of a particular industry, are unchecked by considerations that they are injuring the interests of the consumer. They believe that the production of wheat or the creation of a mercantile marine is an end in itself, worth any sacrifice of income or of standards of living. It is true that the government is always ready to intervene and it is also true that government intervention may prevent the exploitation of the consumer being as heavy as it otherwise might have been. But any government, however autocratic, is susceptible to pressure from both industrialists and workers, and it will shrink from the prospect of causing unemployment and bankruptcy. The Fascist governments have committed themselves to the support of agriculture, of shipping and of coal-mining and they are prepared to pay or to make their subjects pay any price to achieve their end.

Nor even, apart from this, does it seem likely that occasional arbitrary intervention by the government is likely to improve the position. The government itself will have no criterion as to what an economic price would be. In order to arrive at the

economic price it would be necessary to discover what the price would be without the corporate organization. It would be possible to take the world price of the particular commodity as a basis, but this in itself would in most cases lead to the bankruptcy of a large number of firms and no government would face such a possibility. It will be guided by the case the representatives of the industry can make as to the costs of production. The objection to the corporate system is that it in itself tends to make costs higher than they need be. The government will try and insist on a 'fair' price. What is a 'fair' price in this sense? From our experience of governments we can guess that it will be that price which will keep the industry as unchanged as possible. Change produces grievances, and grievances are inconvenient even to the most autocratic of governments.

The greater stability of the corporate system would perhaps be a more valid point. But this question of stability is still a matter of doubt. Even apart from this, the condition of this greater stability is a loss, how g eat exactly it is impossible to say, but obviously potentially enormous, of economic progress. It will be against the interest of the corporations to allow new and more efficient competitors to enter the industry, it may be against their interests to introduce technical changes. On this latter point indeed they are likely to be overruled by the government, which will insist on new machinery being installed. But the government is unlikely to insist on the necessity of competition within the industry.

It is of course possible that people prefer this kind of organization, that they would voluntarily give up possible gains in order to be certain of keeping what they had got. But it is quite certain that they have not been consulted on the subject, nor does it seem to be always clear to the authorities themselves what is involved in their policy. The rulers of Germany, it is true, have frequently said they wished to return

to a simpler economic system, but Mussolini appears to believe that his policy is designed to make Italy one of the greatest of industrial nations.

The whole corporate system is, however, still in the making. What economic results the Fascists have achieved they have achieved by more ordinary methods. After the first two years the Fascist government was dominated by economic nationalism, but up to the Abyssinian War it was economic nationalism of a kind no more violent than that indulged in by many democratic governments. Since the sanction crisis has reminded Mussolini how dependent Italy is on foreign supplies and since he is now under the influence of Germany, a policy of self-sufficiency has been announced.

The first efforts at a government aiming at self-sufficiency must be directed towards the first necessity, food. In fact 'the battle of the grain' commenced in the early years of the regime. It may now be said to have been decisively won. Wheat production increased from 49.3 million quintals in 1914 to 63.4 quintals in 1934. The imports of wheat decreased from 18.5 million quintals in 1925-26 to 2.3 million in 1933-34. This striking success has been achieved by subsidy, tariff and import quota. The cost of the policy in direct subsidy since 1925 has been 225,520,000 lire. The price of wheat in Italy in 1932 was 105 points above the world price. At that time there was a world surplus of wheat, and as one of the few countries remaining on the gold standard, Italy was in a particularly good position for buying from the wheat producing countries. When it is remembered that bread is the food of the very poorest the result of this policy is only too clear.

Agriculture, however, is not the only preoccupation of the government. Since the Abyssinian War there has been a deliberate attempt to produce all raw materials in Italy and her colonies. In the Italian case the attempt is clearly bound to be unsuccessful, quite apart from its effects on economic welfare

generally. For example, it is clearly physically impossible for Italy to supply her own demand for coal.

Of course, such a policy involves a control of both imports and of national investment. National planning in its first stages, at any rate, is directed to the creation of new industries considered especially desirable or to the protection of old which are finding it difficult to meet foreign competition. But even if planned economy is introduced for other reasons, as it was for example in Russia, it is obvious that those in control must be able to prohibit imports if necessary, otherwise they will be faced with changes outside their control damaging the plan. It is also necessary to prevent the export of capital. There is in both national and equalitarian socialism a strong dislike of foreign lending. It is a characteristic of all planned economic systems that national capital should be invested in national industry. Rigid exchange control, although originally introduced for other reasons, achieves both the object of decreasing imports and of preventing the export of capital. No one may buy foreign exchange except with the government's permission. Therefore no unpatriotic capitalist can lend money to foreign rather than to native industries, and no one can import goods as he is unable to get the money to pay for them.

Capital cannot be exported, but it is still necessary for the government to see that it is applied to those industries it wishes to see strengthened. The Italian Government has made direct loans to particular industries which it wishes to develop, including the cotton, chemical and fishing industries. The fact that it is necessary for the government to procure capital for these industries means that they cannot attract investment themselves. Although in theory such industries might cater for needs which would not be met by ordinary means, in fact the Italian Government has diverted the national capital from its most profitable use simply in order to produce goods in Italy which could be bought more cheaply from abroad. This is

clear if the industries helped by the state are examined. The state in Italy was providing capital for the establishment of an Italian cotton industry when Japan and Lancashire were competing to sell their products at the cheapest possible price.

The banking crisis of 1926 provided an opportunity for the introduction of state supervision of banking. Regulations were introduced by which the government could lay down conditions for the granting of loans by the banks. Special institutions were created for the financing of industry. These institutions operate under what amounts to a government guarantee. A licence has to be obtained from the government before anyone is allowed to start new enterprises or to extend old ones in twenty-three industries, including the chemical, glass, cement, paper and metallurgical industries. It is not uninteresting to observe that the authorities are much more willing to permit the extension of old industries than the creation of new ones.

In addition to this, out of a total budget of 24,504 million lire, the government is paying in direct subsidies to industry 3374 million lire. The Italian railways and roads are subsidized and every Italian shipping line is subsidized to an apparently unlimited extent. The Italian Government seems to be prepared to pay any price to keep Italian ships on the sea, even if they carry neither goods nor passengers. It must be remembered that the Italian budget has an ever-increasing deficit every year. The natural consequence of these policies is a decrease in Italian exports. A complicated system of export credits has been evolved and direct subsidy is also paid to certain particularly depressed export trades.

The policy of the National Socialist government is similar to that of Italian Fascism. The German Government is in the process of setting up a corporate state, but the German corporation is not allowed to control prices or wages. Wages are reserved for the Labour Front and prices for the Ministry. The German corporations would therefore seem to be less important

from the economic point of view than the Italian corporations.

In one aspect National Socialism is simply an extension of the economic policy pursued by all German governments. German industry has always been state-aided and state-controlled and both economists and business men have always approved of regulation and restriction. The trust movement reached its highest development in Germany and had in some industries, aided by high tariffs and government favour, achieved an almost complete control of internal prices. Socialists were probably right in welcoming this movement as inevitably leading to socialism.

Two chief aims have guided the rulers of Germany, the desire to make Germany more self-sufficient in case of war and the determination to reduce the number of the unemployed. The first of these involved a control of industry and production generally.

Besides the desire for self-sufficiency, there is no doubt that the National Socialist Party is really Socialist in the sense that it sincerely wishes to minimize class-distinctions as far as possible, and that as far as the economic circumstances permit, it would like to see a much greater equality even of income. As the report of the Board of Overseas Trade puts it, the German government 'is attempting by law and moral pressure to make the private owner and wage-earner share at least their income with the rest of the nation; there can be no doubt that this sharing has also to a certain extent spread to savings and reserves'.

The policy of self-sufficiency involves the production inside the country of all food stuffs and all materials essential for war. This entails a major revolution in the economic system. Before 1933 Germany imported a great part of her consumption of oil, fats, oilseeds, oil-cake, fruit, and ore metal. A policy of selfsufficiency means that these must be produced inside Germany as well as a greatly increased amount of wheat and other food-

stuffs. The military argument in favour of agriculture was reinforced by the National Socialist view that agriculture is a more desirable occupation than industry. It is believed that peasants make better soldiers, have larger families, and are politically more reliable than industrial workers. It is plain that this involves economic control on an enormous scale. It was also essential for the government to reduce the number of unemployed, and it must not be forgotten that certainly Hitler and probably the majority of the party were filled with a genuine, if vague and ill-informed, desire to help the poorer sections of the community. To regard the German economic experiment as a gigantic conspiracy to raise profits and depress wages, is to miss entirely the real tragedy of the situation.

Self-sufficiency of course involves the control of imports. Imports of foodstuffs have been reduced by 43 per cent in volume and by 74 per cent in value from 1927–35. Certainly this has not been achieved entirely by Hitler. The impoverishment of Germany before Hitler seized power was one factor in the decline and the efforts of the Republic to defend the mark were another. The rise in prices consequent on the curtailment of foreign sources of supply was not in all cases sufficient to make it profitable to produce the goods in Germany. The government has, in the case of several commodities, subsidized production, notably that of wool, flax and iron ore. Vast sums have also been spent on synthetic processes and a great campaign has been conducted for the use of substitutes. For example, rayon, flax and staple fibre have largely replaced cotton and wool.

This has been accompanied by subsidies on exports, paid for by a levy on the exporting industries. This method of collection seems calculated to raise still further the costs of German industry and thus make it still less able to compete in the world market.

What has been the result of these policies? Prices in

Germany are higher than world prices, the prices of foodstuffs are well above the world prices, in some cases several hundred per cent. This means that the industrial workers are paying several hundred per cent more for their food than they would be if the government had chosen material welfare instead of national self-sufficiency.

Below are the 1936 prices of some commodities in Germany and elsewhere:

German	wholesale prices	World wholesale prices1	
Wheat	211.5	72.4	(London)
Rye	167.0	58.5	(Posen)
Wool	6580.0	1441.2	(London)
Sugar	406.8	104.8	(London)

We then have to take into account that these prices are subsidized prices. For example, wool is four times as expensive in Germany as in London and wool production is also subsidized by the government. From the point of view of the nation as a whole the subsidy should be added to the price.

On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that a considerable economic revival has occurred in Germany. The number of unemployed was reduced from over 6 million in 1932 to less than four hundred thousand in 1936. Of course, some part of this reduction is due to the introduction of conscription and of the compulsory labour camps. From the point of the individual unemployed man the change is a vast improvement. A case may also be made for it from the point of view of the morals of the unemployed and of national health, but from the purely economic point of view this is not a solution to the unemployment problem.

Another and smaller part of the reduction can be accounted for by a change in the incidence of unemployment. The government has done all it can to persuade women to leave

<sup>1</sup> R.M. per metric tons. Report of Dept. of Overseas Trade, 1936.

industry and either to live at home or to enter domestic service. This again, whatever justification it may be held to have, is not a reduction of unemployment so much as a reduction in total number of persons seeking employment. National Socialists themselves would not attempt to deny the effect of conscription and other policies in reducing unemployment. From their point of view which regards not the standard of living, but the military and what may be called the social efficiency of the citizens, it is obviously better to have a contented, well-fed and disciplined soldier than a discontented and ill-fed unemployed man whatever the total cost to the country may be. It is better to have an employed man than an employed woman, an employed Aryan than an employed Jew.

But these measures obviously can only account for a small proportion of the decline in unemployment. Taken with other indices of economic conditions, it is plain that a considerable revival has taken place. In 1937 the level of industrial production was 23 per cent higher than in 1929, the last year of the boom. The money income of the nation increased from 47 milliards Reich Marks in 1933 to 68 milliards in 1937.

In 1933 the government attacked the prevailing depression in two directions — by an ambitious public works programme and by a series of tax exemptions and special concessions. The latter have not attracted the same attention as have the German public works, but Professor Bresciani-Turroni believes them to have been very important. They ranged from such measures as the abolition of the tax on motor cars to the marriage loans, which increased the demand for new furniture and the subsidies to householders for re-painting or repairing their houses.<sup>1</sup>

Gigantic public works were also undertaken, financed by special works bills which were discounted by the Reichsbank.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For details see Bresciani-Turroni. Harvard Review of Economic Statistics, May 1938.

That is to say that they were financed out of credit. An enormous rise in prices was only avoided by the peculiar banking position and by the government's determination to keep prices and therefore wages stable. In the early days of the régime, wages in the work camps and the public works were very little higher than unemployment pay, although they have now risen considerably. The necessity of keeping money wages stable is the meaning of the new decree fixing maximum wages.

It has, of course, been necessary to keep retail prices from rising. No government could fix wages and allow the prices of the goods the workers wanted to buy to increase. The price is laid down by the government and the most severe penalties are attached to asking a higher price. This has, of course, resulted in a certain amount of surreptitious selling, but it is less in Germany than it would be elsewhere owing to the prevailing atmosphere of terrorism. What amounts to a system of rationing has been reverted to in the case of some goods which the government's policy has made scarce, for example, butter. Each retailer is provided with a list of customers, who are forbidden to go elsewhere, and the shopkeeper may only sell to his own customers.

Both the policy of self-sufficiency and the measures taken to relieve unemployment involve the strict regulation of the capital market. Besides the limitation of dividends to 6 per cent, permission must be obtained for private capital issues. Even new building or new plant in the established industries is forbidden without special permits.

With the development of the rearmament programme another difficulty has appeared. There is now a shortage of labour. The normal way of distributing labour is to allow entrepreneurs to bid for the services of workers. This the German Government cannot allow, as it would involve rising wages and prices. They have been impelled to the authoritarian

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regimentation of labour. The government has taken powers to conscript labour for those industries which are considered specially important.

It must be recognized that the German authorities have conducted their economic policy with great administrative skill, and have taken advantage of every factor in the situation which could help them. But their success has probably also been, in no small measure, due to the special circumstances of 1933. The deflationary policy, necessarily so unpopular, had already been carried out by the Brüning Government. There were therefore large reserves of materials as well as labour when Hitler came into power. There were signs that the depths of the depression had been reached and they must have been helped by the general world revival. Also it seems doubtful if it would have been possible to control wages so strictly except under a dictatorship. Without the threat of terrorism it seems unlikely that the natural tendency to rising wages could have been checked, and once wages and prices had risen, there would simply have developed an ordinary inflationary boom.

It must also be considered that, as Professor Bresciani-Turroni has made clear in his two studies of National Socialist economics, recovery in the ordinary sense has not taken place in Germany. The revival is still dependent on public works and armaments; the secondary effects of public works in reviving industries not directly connected with them, have occurred only to a very limited extent.

The exact effect of these measures on the standard of living of the German people is difficult to assess. The increase in employment has not been accompanied by a considerable fall in money wages. Wages rates have remained more or less stationary.

Real wages have fallen since 1933 by 7.4 per cent. The fall during the year 1933 was however 4.6 per cent. The whole of this fall cannot be attributed to Hitler's economic policy, which

hardly began to get into action until 1934. There has been a slight but steady fall in real wages from 1934-38. It is estimated that real wages have fallen 3.8 per cent since 1934. The Economist estimate gives a still smaller fall, according to this the index number of real wages taking 1929, a boom year, as the base, has fallen from 104.3 to 97.9 in 1936. Against this must be put the reduction of unemployment. A man who was unemployed in 1933 is clearly better off, even though the level of real wages has decreased. There has also been a much heavier decline in the standard of living of the middle classes, as anyone who has been to Germany can testify. On the other hand, the figure takes no account of the admitted deterioration in quality in many goods and the lowered standards involved in the restriction of choice, which results from the scarcity or the complete absence of certain commodities. The production of synthetic forms of commodities of which there are already vast quantities in existence is clearly wasteful in every sense of the word. The skill of the scientists, the capital and labour spent in these processes are irrevocably lost to the world and every step in this direction makes it more difficult to return to more rational policies. However artificial the economic structure created by the dictators, a return to world free trade would now cause suffering and loss to individuals. Even this assumes that the planning is efficient in the sense that the different parts of the plan do not conflict with each other. But even this is not so, for example, the restriction of imports of cattle foods involved in the policy of self-sufficiency makes it impossible to extend the number of live-stock. The loss has up to now chiefly shown itself in a decline of middle-class standards, restriction of exports and foreign exchange difficulties, rather than by a fall in real wages.

At present there is no doubt that Germany is enjoying, not exactly prosperity, but general trade activity. The situation has two elements of weakness, first the foreign trade difficulties

and secondly the fact that the revival still seems too dependent on public works and rearmament. Foreign trade difficulties are particularly serious because Germany still has to import a large proportion of raw materials. The present boom cannot last unless exports can be sold. In spite of export subsidies, these difficulties seem to be increasing, German exports fell considerably during the first half of 1938. Rigid exchange control and economic nationalism do not of course exactly facilitate the export trade. The German Government is now making strenuous efforts to obtain raw materials from South Eastern Europe by direct barter agreements.

The other difficulty is that if things are to continue at the present level the government must continue or even increase its expenditure. Taxation is already very high and it is doubtful if further increases would increase the yield. Motor roads and armaments certainly do not produce a direct return which could be used to finance further public works. It is said that Hitler is anxious to re-build Berlin and Munich. It looks as if the government will be pushed further and further into Socialism, because the control of one part of the price system involves sooner or later the control of the whole. For example, industrialists will prove to the government that they cannot continue production at the existing price and the government will then be driven either to allowing prices to rise or to further interference to control the price of raw material and other costs.

The other planned economic system has not achieved even the limited and precarious success which has attended the German efforts. Most things in Russia are wrapped in impenetrable mystery, but certain points are plain. It is no more rational to create an artificial industry when more and better goods can be had by buying from abroad than it is to create an artificial agriculture. It is no more sensible to spend large sums on the production of synthetic rubber in Central Asia than in

Berlin. Economic nationalism is just as characteristic of Russia as of Germany. So also is misinvestment of the country's resources on an enormous scale. Much discussion of the Five Year Plan has been concerned with the question of the number of tons of pig iron actually produced; but the point is not so much whether the Five Year Plan was fulfilled in the physical sense or not, but whether the goods actually produced satisfied the most urgent needs and satisfied them in the order of their urgency. Can it really be argued that the most urgent need in Russia was for the construction of the much admired giant power station on the Dnieper, whose function is to generate electricity for factories not yet built?

Although the Fascist governments have undoubtedly made their subjects poorer than they otherwise would be it has never been their intention to make them richer. Both Hitler and Mussolini have repeatedly said that they were not interested in material wealth and considered the preoccupation of democratic governments with economic considerations one of the symptoms of democratic weakness. On this basis it is hardly possible to criticize their economic policy. If they prefer agriculture to industry, even at the cost of general impoverishment, one may think it a mistake, but perhaps it cannot be called a failure on their part if general impoverishment results from their policies. But the rulers of the Soviet Union have always told us that their object was to increase the standard of living of their people and the wealth of Russia. Their contention is that they can do this better than can free competition.

The situation in Russia raises the whole question of the practicability of communism as an economic system, far too large a question to be treated here. But it may be interesting to discuss the actual results of authoritarian planning. The first problem to be solved in any planned economy is, what is to be the object of the plan. Once the profit index is discarded, various aims might be followed, for example, the best possible

system for war. The Russians have chosen another object; their declared object is material welfare, expressed in the average standard of living. How have they attempted to achieve this? First by a policy of national self-sufficiency. While selfsufficiency remains even in Germany a pious aspiration only, in Russia it is a fact. This policy means, of course, just as much economic loss in a communist state as in any other. The mere fact that industry is owned and operated by the state does not abolish the advantages of an international division of labour or make it less costly to produce everything at home than to buy some goods from abroad. The Soviet Government cannot, however, be altogether blamed for their adoption of this policy, though in its application they showed a horrifying incompetence. While in the other dictatorships, economic nationalism arises from war preparation or from an aesthetic preference for agriculture, it is an absolute necessity for a communist state. In theory communism is internationalist, but in a world of sovereign states either the communist state must be isolated or adjustment must be made to meet changes in the outside world. Such changes are often impossible and always inconvenient. They mean the decline of one industry and the rise of another, with all the resulting difficulties. They may mean a temporary decline in wages for some workers.

Granted that nationalism was essential, what was the appropriate policy? Critics of the Five Year Plan have tended to concentrate on its obvious administrative defects, for example the neglect of transport, which frequently made it impossible to move such goods as were produced. But a more interesting question is whether the whole policy of rapid industrialization was not mistaken. It is clear that the intensive industrialization of such countries as Great Britain or Germany is only possible on two conditions—the international division of labour and the accumulated capital which they possessed. If Russia was to be a self-contained unit, a much lower degree of industrializa-

tion would be desirable, and as Russia would not be able to draw on the rest of the world and was herself a poor country, the economic plan should have concentrated on providing, in great quantities, simple consumer's goods. As Russia was so poor, which meant capital was scarce, she clearly could not afford the capital investment involved in building up a vast engineering or chemical industry. Such enterprises require too much capital, relative to the saving capacity of the Russian people. Russia had no great accumulation of capital resources and her socialized industry showed no prospect of being able to pile up profits which could be used for development. The only source of saving lay therefore in cutting down the consumption of the Russian people. Considering their already low standard this meant actual physical hardship, which apart from other considerations, was bound to react unfavourably on their power and willingness to work. Other factors reinforce these views. There were practically no skilled workers and very few technicians. The vast majority of the population were peasants. Common sense surely dictated a concentration on the improvement of agriculture and the provision, when sufficient funds had accumulated, of factories for the provision of such goods as the peasants were likely to want.

The exactly contrary policy was in fact pursued by the Russian government. The entire resources of Russia were devoted to creating an industry for the production of such objects as machine tools, while human beings died of hunger. Professor Von Mises in 1920 put forward the view that the real difficulties of a Socialist state would lie in the region of investment. Few economic theories have been so fully illustrated as has this by the Russia of the Five Year Plan. As a disillusioned communist puts it: 'Russia sacrificed light industry for heavy industry, peace manufacture for war manufacture, quality for quantity, food for machines, men for statistics.'

In 1928 when the Five Year Plan was conceived a great

part of Russian economic life was still conducted by private enterprise. Practically the whole of Russian agriculture was in the hands of peasants who tilled their land and sold their products for the highest price they could get. All large-scale industrial enterprises and all natural resources were owned by the state, but private shops and agents were still allowed in the distributive trades, and there were still small-scale industrial enterprises. From the Socialist point of view, there were, however, very disquieting symptoms in the situation. Private enterprise showed a most unexpected vitality and the peasants showed a determination not to sell their products for less than they considered a fair return. The government determined to deal with the danger by abolishing private enterprise as far as was possible both in agriculture and in industry.

It was laid down that 'The starting point of the Five Year Plan is the great task of overtaking and surpassing in the next historical epoch the level of the advanced capitalist countries.' This obviously involved a vast amount of new investment. It has been calculated that new capital to the extent of 90 per cent of the existing capital of Russia was called for by the Five Year Plan.¹ It was apparently thought that this enormous investment, 78 per cent of which was to go into the constructional industries, could somehow be got out of the profits of industry without curtailing consumption. This idea was partly due to a belief that costs would be greatly reduced during the progress of the plan, and partly to a sheer misunderstanding of the nature of the task undertaken.

The plan envisaged a harmonious development of agriculture, natural resources and industry. The profits of each successful step were to finance the next. These calculations, however, depended on two conditions: a great expansion of agriculture and a great reduction of the costs of production in industry.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Boris Brutzkus, Economic Planning in Soviet Russia. Routledge, London, 1935.

The expansion of agriculture was to be brought about partly by the extension of collective farming and partly by encouraging the peasants to grow more wheat by giving them more industrial goods in exchange for it. One of the difficulties of the Soviet economy up to now had been that Russian industry could not provide industrial goods on terms which made it worth while for the peasants to grow more food than they could consume themselves. One of the great disadvantages of peasant farming, from the point of view of an economic dictator, is that while the products of industry must be sold or at least distributed, peasants can always dispose of their products, if the price offered for them is too low, by eating more themselves, by feeding their animals or by refusing to grow more than is necessary for their own subsistence. This had occurred several times in Russia and on every occasion the government had been forced to retreat.

In its first year the plan was successful in the sense that a large number of material objects, quite unrelated to the needs of the population, were produced; in several cases more than had been laid down in the plan.

As there is no connection between any part of Socialist industry and any other part, the growth of various industries was quite disproportioned to the needs of either the plan itself or of the Russian people. The cost of production was also entirely disregarded, nor when it is remembered that failure to produce the quantity laid down might mean death for the factory manager is this surprising. The result, however, was that far from being able to give the peasants more favourable terms, industry was less able than ever to offer good prices for foodstuffs. It was, however, essential for the government to secure wheat. The private trade in grain had been abolished and the government had become responsible for feeding the people. The authorities were determined not to give way and grain was seized from the peasants and they were forced into

collective farms. These measures resulted in the famine of 1932-33 in which from three to seven million people, estimates vary, died of hunger.

At the end of the first Five Year Plan a very large number of industrial enterprises had been constructed, certain industries, such as coal, had been greatly developed. The Russian stock of cattle and horses had been reduced by half, sheep and goats by two-thirds, pigs by two-fifths. Apart from the peasants who had died, a very large number were in concentration camps, engaged in forced labour. These included the 'Kulaks', those peasants who had been the most successful and were therefore presumably the most capable agriculturists. The number of industrial workers had been nearly doubled. The standard of living had declined even from the modest standard of 1928. This is almost the only point in the Russian situation about which there is no disagreement. Convinced communists admit it as readily as anyone else. They simply see it as a voluntary sacrifice undertaken in the hope of prosperity at the end of the Five Year Plan. The situation was so serious that the second Five Year Plan was devised with the object of producing some of those commodities which the people had been promised by some more direct method than by expanding the engineering industry. Quantitative success was achieved here also, if one may judge from the fact that rationing was progressively abolished. But the goods produced were of extremely low quality and further difficulties were encountered, once the mechanical machinery of rationing disappeared, as to what should be produced. Economic theories had pointed out that with the abolition of a free market there would be no guide as to what goods consumers actually wanted.1 This contention has been borne out by Russian experience. There has often been a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> LUDWIG VON MISES: Socialism, Jonathan Cape, London, 1936. F. A. HAYEK: Economic Planning, Routledge, London, 1935. L. E. HUBBURD: Soviet Trade and Distribution, Macmillan, 1938.

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scarcity of those things which people wanted to buy and plenty of those they did not.

The general effect of communist policy on the standard of living is fairly clear, although it is impossible to give any figures because Russian wage statistics are unreliable owing to the uncertainty of the value of the rouble. There are various kinds of rouble with different purchasing powers. The last serious inquiry calculates that the peasant is on the whole slightly worse off than in 1913, and the urban worker possibly very slightly better off. Objections to this view have been advanced on the grounds that it is based entirely on money wages and neglects the states' contribution, in the shape of communal kitchens, free or very cheap entertainments, and all the other decorations with which dictators are wont to amuse their subjects. For the majority of peasants, however, these communal institutions certainly do not exist and it may be doubted how really important they are even for the urban worker. Also if the purpose of the estimate is to compare conditions in pre-war Russia with those of to-day, the social services and charitable institutions must be included in wages under the Tsar. The inclusion of social services would make any estimate of real wages, already difficult, practically impossible. Everyone in work gets a wage, but the extent to which social services are used varies. How is it possible to add the benefits of free education to the wages of a man with no children?

It seems likely on general grounds that the peasants are worse off now than in 1913. Industrial goods were then no dearer in terms of agricultural goods, and they were of better quality than they are now. Nor does there appear to have been a great increase in agricultural production. There is still a shortage of draught horses, and difficulty is apparently being found in supplying enough fuel for the vast numbers of agricultural machines which the Five Year Plan turned out.

Everything in the actual conditions of Russia is still in dispute, but however conditions may compare with those under the Tsar, it is clear that the Russians are worse off than they would have been, if the government had pursued a more sensible policy. It does not seem necessary that a dictatorial state should make quite such a mess as the Russians have done, but dictatorship has certainly not been strikingly successful in solving economic problems. It is easy to construct an imaginary picture of a benevolent despot performing economic miracles, and such a vision is liable to occur to anyone in a democracy, in which the organization of groups, whether Trades Unions or employers' organizations, bent on defending their own interests and not even clearly understanding what those interests are, seems to hinder the adoption of reasonable policy. But in actual practice dictatorships have pursued much more disastrous policies than any democracy and even where their economics have not been disastrous, they have not been particularly successful. The exceptions are Salazaar and to a lesser extent Pilsudski. But even Salazaar's achievements seem to be in reality administrative and financial rather than economic in the strict sense. Financial reform was essential for an economic revival, but Salazaar balanced the budget by imposing drastic economies and by diminishing at least, if not entirely abolishing, corruption, which in Portugal had reached such dimensions as to be extremely expensive to the taxpayer. Both these measures are similar to other administrative reform, and no one doubts that dictators have been able in many cases to restore or to produce efficiency in government departments. Salazaar's strictly economic policy seems merely to consist in the establishment of a series of producers' monopolies on the model of the Italian Corporations. An economic revival did follow Pilsudski's seizure of power, but again the previous difficulties were largely due to incompetence and to unwillingness to face the necessity of economics.

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Fascists might retort that exactly the same is true of democracies; democracy no more than dictatorship has been successful in economic policy and in fact many democracies have pursued policies very similar to those of dictatorship, only in a more half-hearted manner. This half-heartedness is, however, a great advantage; the danger of dictatorial systems is that the ruler is able to disregard the results of his own actions. It would have been impossible for a democracy to reduce a country to the condition of Russia. Electors may not be very learned in economic theory, but at least they know when they are starving, and in a democratic state they can change the government or the government's policy. Democracy is a real safeguard against the wilder economic experiments.

#### CHAPTER VII

# IS MODERN DICTATORSHIP SUCCESSFUL?

It is extremely difficult to discuss the merits of dictatorship as a system of government. Any judgment must depend on values, which are finally matters of taste. If you are one of those who consider that economic quality is cheaply bought by the sacrifice of political liberty, then you are one of those, and no argument is likely to make you change your views. There is no way of deciding between liberty and equality. But at least it is possible to be clear about what is involved in the system which is accepted or rejected. Advocates of different types of autocracy often separate the two elements of modern dictatorship and offer us one without the other. These two elements in dictatorship, logically unconnected with each other - the concentration of power in the hands of one man and the prohibition of open criticism — although in the modern world they are always found together, they have in the past existed separately and are often so defended. The Bolshevists, for example, although Stalin is probably as autocratic in practice as the other dictators, and although they make use of the emotional appeal of the personal ruler, in theory advocate only the tyranny of a party and deny that Stalin is anything but the delegate of the Communist Party. The kind of measures advocated by Sir Stafford Cripps involve, ostensibly at least, only the suppression of opposition. Neither the Socialist League nor the Communist Party desires the rule of a personal autocrat. The Fascists, of course, desire both these aspects of autocracy, but the appeal of some kind of dictatorship is to the personal authority of the king or the national hero, and any coercion involved in the

maintenance of his position is as far as possible concealed and denied.

But although the different elements in autocracy can be thus separated, it seems almost certain that in the modern world one involves the other. The Communists may desire to exercise power through a committee or even through the whole party, but it is inevitable that one man should acquire a preponderant influence, and if he does so the whole atmosphere of dictatorial government will tend to increase his power. The establishment of communism involves violent change, and in times of violent change there are bound to occur moments when the majority or even the leaders of the party will be not over-anxious to assume responsibility. It is at such moments that power will tend to shift to the leader, and once he has shown himself capable of meeting such a crisis the affection and confidence of the ordinary members will be concentrated on him to the exclusion of the other leaders.

It is possible to imagine an autocracy in the sense that one man rules untrammelled by any democratic hindrances without the suppression of free thought and free speech. But it is impossible to imagine it in the modern world. The condition for such a state of affairs is the general acceptance of the system of government, and such an attitude is most unlikely to be prevalent immediately after a change from democracy to dictatorship. Even apart from this, if there is no alternative to the existing government — and dictatorship, of course, implies that the government cannot be changed — public and widespread criticism loses most of its functions and runs the grave danger of rousing discontent which there is no means of allaying. A really loyal subject of a dictator would surely hesitate to do more than tender advice or complaints privately. It is, of course, true that where the autocrat has some particular claim to the gratitude and affection of

his subjects, criticism will be less dangerous and will therefore be permitted. Poland under Pilsudski was much less repressive than the other dictatorships. But on the whole there can be no doubt that the two aspects of dictatorship are inseparably linked together. Anyone who votes for one therefore votes for the other. The price of whatever advantages dictatorship may have is the loss, partial or complete, of freedom of speech as well as of political liberty; the type of dictatorship determines whether it also involves the abolition of free thought in scientific and cultural spheres as well.

Before discussing whether the advantages of dictatorship outweigh these drawbacks, it will be useful to deal with the argument, very fashionable in some circles, that political liberty has no existence and therefore its absence makes no difference. In the communist creed the argument takes the form that political liberty has no value without economic equality, that no man can be said to be free who must earn his living as an industrial worker. The necessity of staying in one place, of finding an employer, and of satisfying him when found, chain him in one direction, while his poverty deprives him of the opportunity of fully developing his personality.

All this may be true, but it has nothing to do with political liberty. No one ever suggested that the right to discuss, to join political organizations, to work and agitate and vote, automatically alters the conditions of anyone's life. All that Liberals ever promised was the opportunity to every man to attempt to alter political or social conditions, or to resist that alteration, as long as he kept certain conditions by which his opponents were also bound. It is possible to argue that economic equality or economic privilege is more important than political liberty; that, for example, the right to strike is more important than the right to vote. But to argue that political liberty is non-existent without economic equality is to reduce political discussion to a farce.

No one is in fact 'free'. We are all tied down by inherited dispositions and by the social tradition in which we have been brought up. Unfortunately the working class is in this matter in a worse position than the rest of us, and there are occasions on which it is necessary to recognize this. But such considerations have no relevance to the question of political liberty. Liberty means the possession of certain legal rights. The extension of the word 'liberty' to cover matters which are completely outside the political sphere leads only to confusion. Stalin apparently asked, 'What personal liberty can be held by an unemployed man who goes hungry and cannot find means of using his labour?' It is perhaps natural that Stalin should not know, but the personal liberty enjoyed by an unemployed man in a democracy is the liberty to move about freely in search of work; to express his views as to the causes of his unemployment or any other matter, either verbally or in print; to choose the political party which is most likely to remedy his plight, and not only to vote for that party, but also to work and speak on its behalf. If the form of government established in Russia were introduced into England, then, assuming that communism could provide work for everyone, the man would be unemployed no longer. He would be unable to move from place to place without a special permit. He would be unable to express any views contrary to the government even in private conversation, much less in public speech or writing. Nothing he could do, except possibly by bribery, would have the slightest effect on the political system, and he would be absolutely prohibited under the most stringent penalties from in any way attempting to make his wishes known. That man might be happier under such a dispensation, but it is a mere misuse of words to say that he would be freer.

The whole of this kind of argument rests in fact on a verbal quibble, produced by the extension of the word 'liberty' to

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cover things which are quite unrelated to liberty or indeed to any political conception. Stalin, in the passage quoted above, goes on to say, 'Real liberty exists only ... where there is no unemployment, no poverty.' There seems no reason to stop at poverty. Why not say that real liberty only exists where there is no illness? Ill-health is a much more serious interference with freedom than unemployment. The answer is that ill-health is outside the sphere of law. This is true also of poverty and unemployment. Political liberty is that liberty that can be secured by law, and by law alone. If it is argued that the right to work or maintenance could be secured by law, and that in fact the right to work is guaranteed as a fundamental right in the new Russian Constitution, the answer is that it is quite plain that, whether guaranteed in words or not, such a right does not depend on the law alone, in the same sense as the right to free speech does. The right to free speech, once established, merely requires that the law shall be carried out, while the right to work clearly depends also on the Russian Government being able to work the economic system.

Defenders of autocracy show a strange unwillingness to admit that autocracy and liberty are incompatible. They say that liberty is in reality quite different from what ordinary people think it is: Marx that 'freedom is the realization of necessity', De Maistre that man is only free in so far as he acts in accordance with the will of God. Such arguments are really inapplicable to politics. They deal with man's relation to the universe, while politics deal with man's relation to society. Freedom in the metaphysical sense may be an illusion, but it is that illusion which men value. Other things may be more important than liberty. Dictatorship may be a better form of government than democracy. But liberty does exist in democracy, and liberty must be relinquished if dictatorship is set up, whether it is the dictatorship of the proletariat or any other.

It may be conceded at once that there are circumstances in which the suppression of opposition is justifiable and even necessary. There are two conditions in which dictatorship is necessary: in a crisis so acute that ordinary rules must be laid aside, and in order to make far-reaching changes in the social or political structure quickly. No one except an anarchist would contend that there are no circumstances in which the suspension of civil liberties is justifiable. The preservation of the state must finally override every other consideration, and in moments of extreme danger, such as war or revolution, the government is bound to take whatever steps it may consider necessary, even if they involve injustice to individuals. Everyone would agree with that proposition in theory, although there would inevitably be the widest disagreement as to whether such a crisis had actually arisen in practice.

Besides this obvious case, dictatorship is absolutely essential in order to make great changes quickly. It has frequently been argued that it is necessary in order to make great changes at all. This view is clearly false. France and England have both evolved a democratic system of roughly the same type. France in the period from 1780 to 1900 had three violent revolutions and two dictatorships, while the same process has been carried out in England entirely by parliamentary methods. It is certainly true that England did retain some slight elements from the previous system which have completely disappeared in France. For example, the influence of large landowners was perceptible even up to the War, and survives in a minor degree to-day. But it is absurd to exaggerate the importance of these survivals, and everyone is aware that the barrier between the ancient nobility and the Republic, largely caused by the methods employed by the revolutionaries, has contributed to the extremely low standards of French political life. The argument that the English democratic movement was merely a result of the French Revolution neglects the

spread of liberal ideas in England before the French Revolution. It must also be remembered that if the French Revolution gave an enormous impetus to the democratic movement, it was the French Revolution also which created the reaction against liberalism.

A complete political transformation can take place, if it is spread over a sufficiently long period, without dictatorship, but to make great changes quickly - and speed is an essential element in the programme of most revolutionaries - the abolition of liberty is essential. This can be seen both in general terms and in practical details. Fundamental changes are bound to injure various individuals and interests, and if suddenly introduced they are almost certain to be resisted with violence. The suddenness exasperates the situation for various reasons. A slow transformation of political or social institutions runs parallel to a transformation of public opinion. The change is gradual and plain to everyone; it has been long expected; it as far as possible it has been discounted. It affects men who, from their youth upwards, have realized its possibility, and is in no sense a shock. In the atmosphere of reason engendered by this cautious approach it is possible to spare the feelings of individuals, and in general to offer some compensation for lost rights. Compensation fulfils two purposes: of diminishing bitterness and of offering a bribe for acquiescence. Any attempt at violent resistance means that the advantages of compensation will be lost.

Gradual developments also have the appearance of inevitability, while there is always something accidental about revolution. If the existing order has been overturned by one accident, it may be restored by another, and in any case those who have lost everything will be prepared to try. The confusion of revolution makes resistance more hopeful. The slow process of constitutional change reveals quite plainly what support and what opposition any policy will raise. In the confusion

of revolution it is impossible to see that a hopeless cause is hopeless. Resistance is inevitable, and the wise revolutionary will forestall it by repression. A revolutionary government is confronted with two tasks - the task of making the new system work and the task of educating the people in its own ideas. Liberty makes both these tasks more difficult, even if it does not make them entirely impossible. Freedom to organize opposition may enable the dissentients to turn the new institutions to their own use. For example, Cromwell could not allow a free election, because a free election would have meant the overthrow of any democratic system. Even the sincerely liberal Government of Spain was forced, before the Civil War, to penalize the expression of certain political and religious opinions. This necessity is reinforced by the effects of the revolution itself. All revolutions have months and even years when their only achievement seems to be general misery. In a democratic system these years would see the triumphant return of the reactionaries.

Administrative necessity leads in the same direction as political considerations. In the modern world the revolutionary takes over a machine which must be adapted to the revolutionary purpose. In order to adapt it, coercion is necessary. For example, the new measures must be carried out by the old civil service, and there is no reason to think that the civil servants will be particularly sympathetic to the new ideas. The threat of dismissal will have to be brought into play. In democracies civil servants are protected from dismissals, and the alteration of these conditions could hardly be carried through under a democracy.

It is impossible to have alternating governments pursuing diametrically opposed policies. It would, for example, be quite impossible for a socialist government to nationalize the banks and for a conservative one to restore them to private enterprise every five years. The same kind of situation occurs

in matters other than economic. It is, for example, difficult to see how, once the Turkish Government had decided on the radical transformation involved in the Westernization of Turkey, it could allow a government opposed to that policy to take office. It is plainly not possible to alter the social and legal system every five years. It is also obvious that in such a situation the only possible opposition is an opposition pledged to fight against the government's whole policy.

These, however, are admittedly unusual and exceptional cases. We are now asked to accept dictatorship not only as a method of change, but as a permanent form of government. Modern dictatorship is not exactly the same kind of government as autocracy in the past, although it does incorporate certain elements common to all autocracies. Some of the arguments generally used about autocracy, both in its favour and against it, are therefore no longer applicable. For example, it used to be said that while under democracy the question whether a man became a leader or not depended on his powers of persuasion, under other forms of government more essential qualities were the basis of choice. It appears, however, that there is not really a sharp contrast between modern democracy and modern dictatorship. The process of establishing dictatorship now consists in changing the government from a democracy to a dictatorship. The only way in which a man can do this in the modern world is either by building up a party or by commanding an army. If he does the first, he must do it by exactly the same methods and qualities as any democratic statesman. Lenin, Mussolini and Hitler all succeeded in substantially the same way as Lloyd George. The two soldier-dictators were in many ways a pleasing contrast to the others, but there seems no way of choosing this type of dictator except by having a first-class war.

It is true that with the second dictator the demagogic element is diminished, to be replaced, as far as can be seen,

by a talent for intrigue. The man who wants to succeed the autocrat must first conciliate the men who hold the key positions in the party, and he must do this without arousing the jealousy of the reigning dictator. It hardly seems that this sort of training is preferable to that of the democratic statesman.

The administrative advantages of democracy have often been proclaimed but never analysed. They can be summarized under the two headings of responsibility and continuity. Responsibility means that there is one man who is plainly responsible, who can give a decision at once, and who is, in theory at least, uninfluenced by popular prejudices. How far these advantages are really important depends on circumstances and also on the qualities of the dictator. It is clear that in the modern world the dictator is likely to have the qualities of a democratic politician, though he may perhaps have them in a more intense form. But given that the dictator is reasonably competent, are the advantages of autocracy important in dealing with the normal problems of a modern state? On the whole there is very little reason to think that they are, if democracy works with ordinary efficiency. Ordinary efficiency merely means that a decision of some kind can be arrived at. Neither in Poland, Italy or Yugoslavia did democracy work, even in this limited sense. But has there been a single major issue in English politics since the War which required a quick decision rather than long deliberation? It was not necessary to decide in an hour or even in a month what peace terms should be imposed on Germany, or whether or not England should return to the Gold Standard. No serious crisis has been produced by dilatoriness, or even made worse by unwillingness to act. Complaints of this kind generally come from those who are prevented by democracy from taking the action they desire because the majority are not of their opinion.

Freedom from popular prejudice is a more valid point in favour of some kinds of autocracy. But it is doubtful whether

this applies to modern dictatorship. Dictatorship in any modern state must be founded on a party, and the party will incorporate many of the least desirable characteristics of democratic public opinion. In theory, however, a case can be made for the superior judgment of one individual compared to that of a large, anonymous mass. The dictator will presumably have more information at his disposal and more capacity to understand it, and his position will force him, merely from the point of view of his own interests, to take an unbiased view. Of course, all this depends, as does every other consideration of dictatorship, not only on the qualities of the dictator himself but also on the basis of his power. All dictatorship is founded on some kind of organization, and the nature of this organization profoundly affects the nature of the dictatorship. There is the broad distinction between the army and the party, and there is a distinction between the parties themselves. If the party is largely composed, as it is in Germany, of young men interested in the theory of politics, it will be a different dictatorship from that of Turkey, where the party is largely composed of peasants with a tradition of discipline and obedience who are, besides, unmoved by theoretical inconsistencies.

The advantages of continuity in government are also contingent on the dictator being the best available ruler. Great political ideas obviously require time to come to fruition, and a great statesman requires security of tenure in order to have his full effect on events. But dictatorship gives no better guarantee than democracy that the dictator will be a great ruler and permanence, which may be an advantage if the dictator is a genius, will be a disadvantage if he is not. There are, of course, circumstances in which dictatorship may be necessary and even beneficial, but even here its advantages are conditional on the character and abilities of the dictator, while its disadvantages are in the nature of the system itself. Cruelty, for example, is absolutely inseparable from dictatorship. The

most kind-hearted autocrat, (and there is no reason to think that any of the modern dictators with the possible exception of Mussolini, took any personal pleasure in repression), is driven by the nature of the dictatorial system to suppress his opponents, and it is either hypocrisy or silliness to pretend that the suppression of opposition can be carried on without cruelty.

The question of the merits of dictatorship is, however, purely theoretical. It is not a reasoned appreciation of the advantages of autocracy which produces dictatorship, but the actual demands of a crisis. Men, even a whole nation, can be saved from the effects of their own folly and incompetence by a great leader, but at the price of giving up the guidance of their own lives, at the price of being delivered body and soul to the caprice of the dictator, and not of the dictator only, but also of the smallest official of the dictator's party. Of course, it is possible to escape being a slave by becoming a slave-driver and finding a niche in the party hierarchy - and it is not only those who advocated the dictator's policy who will find a place for themselves. Or an escape can be found through the intoxication produced by the complete acceptance of the dictator's views. To some the prospect of freedom, of dealing with their own lives without the help of a superhuman ruler, without the conviction that they are marching in the ranks of an irresistible army and are identical with every other soldier, appears bleak and cold. Democracy cannot compete with the dictators on their own ground. Democracy can offer neither the joys of obedience nor its rewards; neither 'the worship the heart lifts above and the heavens reject not', an emotion eminently satisfying to certain people, nor the complete solution of every problem, personal or political. Democracy can only offer the responsibility of choosing for one's self. To those who shrink from that responsibility, democracy offers nothing. To those who accept it, it offers an opportunity for self-control, for sacrifice, for moderation.

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